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Abstract 
 
This work sets out to critically reconstruct human rights as both an ethical ideal and a 
political practice. I critique conventional moral justifications of human rights and the 
related role they play in legitimating political authority, arguing that the pluralism and 
political content of human rights cannot be eliminated. I reconstruct the relationship 
between ethics and politics through an engagement with pragmatist and pluralist 
moral theory, which I then develop into a democratising account of human rights by 
incorporating work on agonistic democracy. The resulting view of human rights is 
situated and agonistic, seeing the act of claiming human rights as a political act that 
makes demands on the social order in the name of a particular ethical ideal. Rather 
than seeing the political act of claiming rights as undermining human rights as 
universal moral principles, it becomes essential to global ethics as such. The 
international political aspect of rights is then examined by looking to the drafting of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in historical context, and contrasting 
human rights practice as expressed in popular social movements with conventional 
state-centric and legalist accounts. In the end the defence of human rights that is 
offered aims to preserve the transformative power of human rights claims, their 
democratising content, while undermining their totalising tendency, in which a 
singular conception of humanity provides certain moral principles to legitimate 
political authority. 
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Introduction 
Reconstructing Human Rights 
 
‘Now architect, now archaeologist, now a man whose hand is in the past. 
Somebody is made to face the changes; somebody is built to last. 
What do you know, still living so young? 
Tomorrow is no burden; time can be overcome.’ 
-The Constantines, Time Can Be Overcome 
 
I. Beginnings 
 
Beginnings are difficult. Whether it is the first line of a treatise or the first action 
taken by a social movement, creativity requires sensitivity to the world that surrounds 
us, and the boldness to move beyond that starting point. It requires us to be both 
experienced and earnest. And beginnings matter. Whether it is our fundamental 
philosophical beliefs or the political commitments we carry forward, our starting point 
delimits the immediate horizon of our ambition – such that the problems we face, the 
challenges we overcome, the point in the distance we move towards, and the manner 
in which we travel are determined both by our context and our character. These basic 
premises are as true for the academic as they are for anyone else engaged in a creative 
and critical project. 
 
     In this work I seek to reconstruct human rights as an ethical and political ideal. The 
motivation for this work comes out of dissatisfaction with the moral and political 
thinking generally mobilised to defend human rights, as well as scepticism about the 
use of human rights to justify the actions of powerful actors in world politics. This 
dissatisfaction, however, does not result in a complete rejection of human rights as an 
ideal or a political project. Nonetheless, the standing indictment of human rights is 
extensive and serious. The most basic critique is that it repackages and reaffirms an 
ethics and politics of exclusion and superiority1 – on this reading human rights are a 
contemporary expression of a tradition of Western universalism that served to justify 
and enable an imperial politics with moral principles.2 In its modern form, critics 
argue, human rights imposes an essentialised conception of humanity upon the world 
                                                 
1
 Makau W. Mutua, Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
2
 Anthony Pagden, “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy,” Political Theory, 
Volume, 31, Number 2 (April 2003), 171-199. 
  9 
at large,3 while justifying the dominance and exploitative actions of western liberal 
powers.4 This is a profound and multi-dimensional critique, which is addressed 
throughout the work that follows. While I share many of the doubts and damnations 
that the harshest critics of human rights express, the fundamental question I want to 
answer is: what can human rights become? I am motivated to ask this question 
because many of the values that underlie the human rights project – particularly those 
of moral equality, political participation, and social recognition – are of great 
importance, even as their affirmation in conventional theories of rights is problematic, 
they point to real goods that we desire and fight for. Further, human rights have a 
central place in world politics; they are one of the primary ways that we understand 
ethical relations in a global context, therefore, as human rights continue to be used by 
groups and individuals struggling to improve their lives, it is important to understand 
the limits and possibilities of human rights as a complex political practice. The 
question of what human rights might become requires both understanding what 
human rights have been, in their ambiguity and contestability, and what sort of 
political transformations they might enable as a reconstructed political ethos. 
 
     This is a speculative question and requires some qualification. The method of 
approach in this work is not the one we usually see in philosophical or social 
scientific work on human rights. I do not begin with a defence of foundational 
premises; the fundamental question is not: what are human rights? Nor do I set out to 
study the existing world of human rights enforcement and institutions; the 
fundamental question is not: are human rights instruments effective in altering the 
behaviour of actors in world politics? I begin from the premise that human rights exist 
– as an ethical ideal, a set of political institutions and varied social practices. No 
amount of philosophical critique will ensure their continued existence or result in their 
disappearance. Also, no amount of empirical inquiry into existing human rights can 
                                                 
3
 Critics argue that the image of human experience that is imposed upon humanity is essentially that of 
white men. See, Catharine A. Mackinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Brooke A. Ackerly, Universal Human Rights in a 
World of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Sonia Tascón and Jim Ife, 
“Human Rights and Critical Whiteness: Whose Humanity?” The International Journal of Human 
Rights, Volume 12, Number 3 (2008), 307-327. 
4
 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Tony Evans, “International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge,” 
Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 3 (2005), 1046-1068; and Slavoj Žižek, “Against 
Human Rights,” New Left Review, Volume 34 (July – August 2005), accessed 3 February 2009, 
http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2573. 
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reveal their value in world politics. Both conventional endeavours are important, and 
throughout I depend upon such work, but they do not focus on the critical questions of 
how we evaluate the consequences of human rights and what potential they have to 
continue to influence and transform world politics. The language and method of 
reconstruction I deploy are drawn from the work of John Dewey and his view of the 
purpose of ethical inquiry.  
 
A fact known does not operate the same as a fact unperceived. When it 
is known it comes into contact with the flame of desire and the cold 
bath of antipathy. Knowledge of the conditions that breed incapacity 
may fit into some desire to maintain others in that state while averting 
it for one’s self. Or it may fall in with a character which finds itself 
blocked by such facts, and therefore strives to use knowledge of causes 
to make a change in effects. Morality begins at this point of use of 
knowledge of natural law, a use varying with the active system of 
dispositions and desires. Intelligent action is not concerned with the 
bare consequences of the thing known, but with consequences to be 
brought into existence by action conditioned on that knowledge.5 
 
Not only does a Deweyan method of reconstruction suggest that social inquiry should 
not stop at facts alone, it is also an active ethical inquiry into existing conditions and 
the possibility of further action to change the conditions of our experience. 
 
     So, while this is a work on human rights, it is also about how we justify human 
rights, why we find them necessary, and, more broadly, about how we approach 
political ethics in world politics. Along with these wider issues of how we conduct 
ethical inquiry, the reconstruction carried out raises key questions of political theory 
regarding the nature of authority and community in world politics. Human rights, I 
argue, are a central political and ethical ideal in our contemporary world, and an 
inquiry into how they function in world politics reveals problematic aspects of human 
rights as an ideal and their place in political practice. Reconstructing this ideal 
requires addressing deeply held presumptions about the nature of moral principles and 
their relationship to the legitimation of authority in world politics. The first part of the 
work is dedicated to this task. First, I critique the dominant approaches to global 
ethics, which share a conception of morality as providing certain and absolute 
principles that, especially in the case of human rights, determine the requirements of 
                                                 
5
 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2002), 299.  
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legitimate political authority. Second, I examine two dominant accounts of the place 
of human rights in a just political order and critique their dependence upon idealised 
and static notions of political community and legitimate authority. The second part of 
the work reconstructs these key relationships – between ethics and politics, and the 
place of the rights-holding individual and the political community in world politics – 
in alternative ethical and political terms, which are what I term democratising and 
which emphasise plurality and contingency in political ethics. 
 
     Throughout, I use the terms global ethics and world politics, which are chosen with 
some care. The inquiry here contributes to the study of politics in specific ways. First, 
I am concerned with the ethical dimensions of politics, which is more than the attempt 
to determine normative principles that should guide political action,6 and includes 
understanding how we make ethical judgments, the role that ethical values and moral 
principles have in politics, and how political ethics are developed. The sphere of 
political ethics that I am concerned with, however, is explicitly global,7 which is 
distinguished most simply as the sphere of social life that involves political 
relationships that exceed the conventional social spheres marked out by the domestic 
state and the inter-state system. More refined distinctions, I fear, are only possible as 
the inquiry progresses, but the use of the term global ethics is meant to distinguish the 
focus here from a personal, domestic or strictly international ethics.8  
 
     Second, I am concerned to investigate the place of ethical values in world politics, 
or, the ways in which ethical ideals structure our understanding of legitimate 
authority, political community and the subjects that have rights and obligations in 
world politics. I use the term world politics as a way to distinguish the more 
                                                 
6
 Daniel McDermott, “Analytical political philosophy,” in Political Theory: Methods and Approaches, 
eds. David Leopold and Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 11-28.  While 
McDermott’s contribution quite starkly delimits the boundaries of normative political theory, the book 
as a whole raises important issues about the role of political theory as a form of evaluative inquiry. 
7
 A basic but clear discussion of the distinctiveness and ambiguity of global ethics can be found in 
Kimberly Hutchings, Global Ethics: An Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 1-7. 
8
 All of these terms are contested in various ways and I would not want to suggest that personal or 
“private” ethical matters cannot have a global dimension, nor that states and the inter-state system are 
not key actors and institutions in a global ethics. What I want to emphasise is that the work here does 
not take these distinctions as given or unproblematic and for that reason the ambiguity of “global 
ethics” is desirable. 
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ambiguous object of inquiry here from international or global politics.9 The first 
distinction pushes against the notion that we always and already know that the 
political structures and actors of concern are states, state-officials and their 
relationships. While the second distinction, between world and global politics, is 
meant to avoid the presumption that international politics is being transformed into a 
global (and therefore more consolidated) politics. What I want to preserve is the 
openness in the idea of world politics, which points beyond a politics of states, and 
their agents and institutions, without assuming a world of convergence toward 
increasing global governance, required by an intensifying and expanding process of 
globalisation.  
 
II. A Quest for Certainty: Rights, Authority and Community 
 
In his work The Quest for Certainty, John Dewey attacked a central presumption of 
moral philosophy, which he intended to unseat, which was the presumption that moral 
authority finds its justification in principles removed from contestation and change, 
made secure and near absolute by the techniques of moral theorising.  
 
If one stops to consider the matter, is there not something strange in 
the fact that men should consider loyalty to “laws”, principles, 
standards, ideals to be an inherent virtue, accounted unto them for 
righteousness? It is as if they were making up for some secret sense of 
weakness by rigidity and intensity of insistent attachment. A moral 
law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at 
all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when specified 
conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence are tested 
by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority rests 
finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be dealt 
with, not upon its own intrinsic nature – as any tool achieves dignity in 
the measure of the needs served by it.10 
 
Chapter 1 pursues this line of critique against contemporary philosophical 
justifications of human rights. The first claim is that theoretical accounts of human 
rights are engaged in this quest for certainty when they seek to justify universal moral 
principles, expressed as individual rights, so that they are rendered incontestable and 
                                                 
9
 For a further discussion of how “world politics” functions as a looser and more encompassing term 
see Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008), 9-10. 
10
 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), 264-265. 
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absolute, rationally acceptable and necessarily applicable to all humanity. My 
contention is that this quest is not only impossible but also undesirable. Yet, the quest 
for certain moral principles continues with great fervour in the literature on human 
rights and suggesting an alternative ethical theory for thinking about those rights is 
difficult. A large part of the difficulty is that human rights play an important role in 
justifying contemporary political theories, whether communitarian/nationalist or 
cosmopolitan in character. 
 
     The central claim in chapter 2 is that human rights are fundamental to 
contemporary accounts of legitimate political authority and community. In 
contemporary human rights thinking, the individual rights holder is thrust into the 
centre of legitimate sovereignty, as power must serve and protect the fundamental 
moral rights of the individual member of the political community. This vision of 
politics, however, is built upon idealisations of the political subject and the political 
community, which are actually contingent identities and formations, and thus are 
always at risk of being undermined by plurality or undone by contingency. This 
critique is developed, in part, from the work of Bonnie Honig, who argues for an 
understanding of ‘rights and law as part of political contest rather than as the 
instruments of its closure,’ and ‘that attempts to shut down the agon perpetually fail, 
that the best (or worst) they do is to displace politics onto other sites and topics, where 
the struggle of identity and difference, resistance and closure is then repeated.’11 Like 
Dewey, Honig provides a starting point for critiquing contemporary accounts of 
human rights as a cornerstone of contemporary thinking about legitimate political 
order.  
 
     Building on these critiques, the global dimension of human right as universal 
moral claims and their role in justifying visions of world political order are considered 
at length. The third claim that is developed in the first two chapters of the thesis is that 
this quest for certainty of moral principles and political ideals intensifies when we are 
addressing ethical questions of global scope and authority in world politics. In part 
this is a response to the diversity and pluralism we find between individuals and 
communities at the global level, which increases the anxiety at the root of our desire 
                                                 
11
 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (London: Cornell University Press, 
1993), 15-16. 
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for certainty. It is also that world politics is generally analysed in light of two opposed 
but highly idealised frames; on one hand the nation is the authoritative political 
community, the independence and sanctity of which provides legitimacy, while on the 
other, there is presumed to be a universal source of authority, which calls for 
transformations of world politics, whether towards federations of legitimate states or 
cosmopolitan institutions of global order.12 The conclusion of this inquiry into the 
nature of human rights is that they necessarily presuppose absolute moral principles 
so far as they are intended to legitimate idealised visions of world politics. This is the 
case whether we conceive of the human rights holder as a minimal or a substantive 
political subject, and whether the ideal political community, justified through its 
protection of human rights, is exclusive and particular, or maximally inclusive and 
cosmopolitan. Moving beyond this understanding of rights, then, requires both an 
alternative approach to global ethics that can embrace rather than seek to overcome 
plurality and contingency, as well as a different understanding of world politics, one 
not dependent upon idealised political subjects to account for legitimate authority and 
which does not seek to eliminate contestation of those ideals. 
 
III. Rights as a Democratising Ethos and the Politics of Humanity 
 
Moving from critique to reconstruction, in the second half of the work I engage with 
the work of a series of thinkers to develop the idea of human rights as a democratising 
ethos. To begin with, I look at Isaiah Berlin’s work on value-pluralism, the basic 
premise of which is that the values that give content to our moral principles and 
political practices are plural and incommensurable, rather than singular or ordinal. 
This account of values contrasts with dominant trends in ethical theory that seek to 
place some central value in a privileged position when defending human rights – such 
that human rights protect our autonomy13 or guarantee our basic needs for sustenance 
                                                 
12
 The framing of debates in these terms, between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism, owes much 
to Chris Brown; see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches 
(Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1992).  While I do not use this framing in the work done here, I 
do build upon work that analyses why these dichotomies arise rather than trying to adjudicate between 
them, in this regard the work of Kimberly Hutchings and Molly Cochran provide a critical starting 
point. See Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era 
(London: SAGE, 1999) and Molly Cochran, Normative Theory and International Relations: A 
Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
13
 For a contemporary example of this approach to justifying human rights, see James Griffin, On 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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and security.14 Further still, Berlin’s account of pluralism undermines rationalist 
attempts to guarantee value through a privileged procedure or form of insight, 
suggesting that affirming the central importance of any particular value is a political 
act that involves a form of existential commitment.  
 
     While elements of this pluralist sensibility are shared by many contemporary 
thinkers – including liberal theorist like John Rawls who try to overcome the reality of 
diversity15 as well as postmodern thinkers like Jacques Derrida who affirm difference 
and contestability16 – I argue that Berlin’s work can be developed in a unique way by 
focusing on its historical and psychological bases. The pluralism I want to develop 
from Berlin’s work, which I term a deep pluralism, denies privilege to any particular 
ethical value but maintains that we can still distinguish between what is and is not 
valuable. Yet, the objectivity that values may have does not allow us to authoritatively 
or finally settle moral disputes – such as what is it about human beings that human 
rights should protect – instead they provide a basis for understanding ethical 
commitments and judgments across the differences that divide human beings. This 
account of the deep pluralism of values provides a different starting point for thinking 
about human rights and in fact reveals the ambiguity inherent in an appeal to 
humanity as a singular and determinant moral identity. Where Berlin’s account, 
however, falls short is in offering an account of ethical judgment, a sense of how we 
make our ethical choices and how those choices play out in our social practices, such 
as our practices of declaring, fighting for, institutionalising and protecting human 
rights. 
 
     In further reconstructing the ethical basis of human rights I turn to the work of 
John Dewey, whose ethical theory and account of democracy as a form of social 
intelligence provide central supports to the reconstruction of human rights I defend. 
Dewey shared Berlin’s scepticism of moralities of certainty, but he provided a more 
developed account of ethical judgment under conditions of uncertainty and pluralism. 
Adding to the idea of deep pluralism, Dewey’s work suggest that we need to 
                                                 
14
 The most famous example of this justification is provided in Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, 
Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
15
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993). 
16
 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994).  
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understand the social and psychological function of ethics, importantly including the 
way that ideals function as guides to future action and the way in which rights are 
social customs that institutionalise political relationships based on accepted ethical 
claims. This analysis, however, is dynamic and not static. Dewey did not provide a 
defence of any particular ideal, instead affirming their plurality, nor did he try to 
articulate the correct set of rights required for a just society, in place of this quest for 
certainty he pursued the reconstruction of practical reason into what he called critical 
intelligence.17  
 
     Dewey’s ethics, which I characterise as situationist, begin with the idea that ethical 
judgments are required by problematic experiences, moments when our customary 
and habitual ways of acting fail us, when the correctness of our values are in doubt. 
The important ethical work is done, then, not in abstractions that guarantee certainty, 
but in the specific situation where judgments and action are required. This account of 
practical reason relocates the source of ethical authority from the universal and 
abstract to the specific and practical, resulting in a view of ethics as an always-
ongoing process of judgment and action, what Dewey described as the critical 
application of social intelligence. This is important for thinking about human rights 
and their place in world politics because the central ideals are opened up as sites of 
contestation rather than closed down as sites of authority. This reveals that basing a 
human rights claim on the moral significance of our common human identity not only 
affirms some particular aspects of what “being human” can mean, but it also responds 
to a particular situation in which an appeal to a universal and ambiguous status, like 
humanity, importantly dislocates established political ideals. So, along with opening 
up a politics of humanity, a pluralist and situationist ethics also reveals that human 
rights open up, rather than close down, a contest over the basis of legitimate political 
authority. The basis of legitimate authority is exposed to contestation through human 
rights because they are rights claims that appeal to a non-exclusive political identity 
(the human) that anyone can take up and undermine any particular institutionalisation 
                                                 
17
 This reorientation in ethics is similar to that found in virtue ethics, particularly as a critique of 
consequentialist and deontological moral theory, but differs in its positive articulation, which focuses 
on reforming institutions and habits through a future oriented experimentalism. For a collection of key 
writing on virtue ethics, see Roger Crisp and Michael Slote, eds., Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997). 
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of the authoritative political community.18 This function of human rights, I argue, is 
democratising because it enables fundamental challenges to idealised conceptions of 
world politics, including nationalist/communitarian accounts based on the enclosed 
moral community and cosmopolitan accounts based on a universal individual.  
 
     The final thinker I engage with in attempting to reconstruct human rights is 
William Connolly. I turn to Connolly’s work to provide a fuller and more 
contemporary account of democratic politics. The two key points that come out of an 
engagement with Connolly are, first, a clearer account of what human rights as a 
democratising ethos entails, and, second, a reconsideration of the political 
consequences of pursuing this reconstruction of human rights. In the first case, the 
democratising ethos of human rights responds to a central concern in Connolly’s work 
to reveal the violence inherent in attempts to eliminate ambiguity and uncertainty 
from political life. This concern with the disciplinary forces that construct the normal 
individual or the liberal nation-state as normalising ideas, including the construction 
of reasonable or limited forms of diversity, runs counter to the inherent ambiguity of 
humanity as a moral and political identity.19 Connolly’s pluralising ethos, in contrast, 
responds to this sort of ambiguity with a call to support the virtue of agonistic respect, 
which makes room for difference without converting it into otherness. Given the 
power of human rights, as a practical politics, to impose a conception of humanity 
upon diverse groups, this is a vital reconstruction, one that reorients human rights 
away from normalisation of identity and toward its ongoing contestation. Along with 
respect, a democratising account of human rights also requires an awareness of the 
exclusions generated by the values and identities we affirm in the name of humanity 
and which are implemented on a world political scale. These virtues are argued to be 
important basic commitments for the account of human rights defended here. 
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     The second contribution I take from Connolly’s work is his recent attempts to 
rethink the basis for legitimate authority. He is critical of both national and 
cosmopolitan accounts of sovereign authority and defends a form of democracy that 
does not depend upon an ideal of national communities or a universal individual – 
instead focusing on the contingent nature of social and political relationships which 
enable new claims to authority that exceed the nation-state and visions of a singular 
cosmopolis. In relation to human rights, this implies that we should not hope for or 
expect a single human rights regime, leading to a more comprehensive global system 
of cosmopolitan governance, nor should the democratic nation-state be granted 
exclusive privilege as a sight of authority. A democratising account of human rights 
would be institutionalised in plural ways, as well as being subject to ongoing 
contestation, resulting in a diverse human rights public or a human rights assemblage. 
This idea is further developed in the chapters that follow. 
 
IV. Human Rights: Ethos, History and Practice 
 
The reconstruction of human rights developed in the thesis does not issue in a 
definitive account of the universal values that justify those rights, nor does it result in 
a comprehensive list of rights that should be institutionalised at the domestic or 
international level. Instead, what is developed is a way of thinking about human 
rights, which are analysed as claims upon fundamental political relationships, defining 
both the individual and collective political subject, made by appealing to a 
substantively ambiguous but formally inclusive human identity. Along with this 
analysis, I defend the idea of human rights as a democratising ethos that calls for 
respect for difference and an awareness of exclusion and vulnerability, without 
sacrificing a commitment to the substantive goals of democratic inclusion and respect 
for individuals. Even this ethos, however, is only a general sensibility and the 
implication of the reconstruction pursued is that there will be many accounts of 
human rights that are affirmed. For this reason, human rights will not definitively 
support any particular vision of legitimacy in world politics, they grant no final or 
special privilege to nationalist or cosmopolitan orders, which leads to the suggestion 
that we think of human rights as a plural assemblage rather than a regime or singular 
movement. 
 
  19 
     This account of rights is further developed by looking to the history of human 
rights, with particular attention being paid to the drafting of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR). This historical study is intended both to clarify the 
analysis of rights set out here by attending to the plurality and contestation at what is 
generally taken to be the founding moment for contemporary human rights and to 
suggest that critical accounts of human rights have some historical president. This 
critical position is furthered in the final chapter, where I contrast an account of human 
rights focused on the use of rights by social movements seeking to democratise 
political authority and subvert existing forms of community with a those that seek to 
consolidate authority through human rights that privilege either the international 
system or a cosmopolitan vision. These are very different accounts of what human 
rights mean in practice, as one is an account of rights as tools to challenge and 
reconstruct social life, while the other treats them as values and principles that justify 
authoritative institutions of governance.  
 
     What is further clarified in the final chapter is the different levels of argumentation 
presented throughout the work: at the base of my reconstruction of human rights is an 
analysis of how humanity is mobilised as political identity to challenge or privilege 
particular political orders, in light of that analysis I argue that we should see human 
rights as a democratising ethos that is characterised by plurality and contestation, but 
broadly supportive of individuals and groups seeking to challenge existing power and 
institutions. More controversially, I make the case for an account of human rights that 
is radically democratic and concerned with transforming social structures in a 
fundamental way. These elements of the overall argument are related but do not build 
to a singular statement of human rights or call for an authoritative political 
transformation. The contribution of the work, I hope, is to provide a comprehensive 
critique of the place of human rights in world politics, an alternative pluralist and 
pragmatic approach to global ethics and a reconstruction of human rights that focuses 
on the ongoing contestation over the meaning of humanity and legitimate forms of 
political order.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Human rights and the ethics of uncertainty 
 
‘The imperative, like everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give up the search for a 
general formula of progress they will not know where to look to find it.’ 
-John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct 
 
I. Human Rights and the Morality of Certainty 
 
For supporters of human rights, my task must seem unnecessary – if not pernicious. 
Many who defend human rights see the job of justifying or grounding these rights as 
either accomplished or unnecessary. At the same time opponents of human rights see 
the case against human rights as already made and the work of trying to reconstruct 
them as fruitless.  
 
     In answer to both charges, I begin from the assumption that human rights are a fact 
of the contemporary world and an important feature of world politics. This does not 
imply that the moral priority of human rights is undeniable. What cannot be denied is 
that we live in a world where human rights are an idea with real effect, which has 
been institutionalised at various levels, from workplace policies to international 
institutions. Given this reality, it is necessary to understand human rights as moral 
principles. Whether we reject, accept or remain agnostic toward human rights, we 
must understand them in order evaluate them intelligently. This understanding is all 
the more important, as human rights have become a fundamental element of global 
institutions and discourses. Few areas of our social lives fail to generate human rights 
claims – corporate responsibility, the conduct of war, the protection of the 
environment, economic development policies, humanitarian intervention, domestic 
violence, reproductive rights, human trafficking and migration have all been framed 
in terms of human rights. At the same time, human rights have been used as 
justification for coercive political actions by many states and have a central place in 
most international institutions; the use of human rights in the legitimation of military 
interventions and the emergence of a functioning International Criminal Court (ICC), 
for example, attest to the effective political power of human rights. 
 
     The further reason for engaging with human rights requires more explanation. If 
one asks ethical questions in the context of world politics, then one is confronted with 
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questions of moral universalism. Are moral principles universal in scope? Do they 
apply to all human beings or do social and political borders mediate our obligations? 
Can (and must) these principles be universally justifiable? Perhaps more importantly, 
what does a universal justification entail? Answering these questions, as well as 
examining how we understand both the questions and the answers we find, is central 
to what it means to evaluate world politics and to suggest principles to guide those 
politics. Human rights have been the lens through which these questions have been 
addressed most often and influentially; they are, therefore, central to the study of 
global ethics. 
 
     Again strong opinions exist on both sides, as some writers claim that maintaining a 
comprehensive and coherent universal perspective is vital. Fred Halliday claimed that 
‘if we ditch rights we’re lost. Rights are the last grand narrative and if we get into the 
netherworld of relativism and identity politics then we are sunk.’20 Just as 
categorically, opponents of human rights universalism deny that grand narratives are 
possible, and claim that moral judgement is relative to one’s particular perspective. 
Arguing in favour of an anti-essentialist reading of “man” as a social construct, Slavoj 
Žižek passes judgment on human rights, saying they ‘are, as such, a false ideological 
universality, which masks and legitimises a concrete politics of Western imperialism, 
military interventions and neo-colonialism.’21 Given the central place of human rights 
in understanding moral universalism in global ethics, it seems an idea worth 
investigating at length if one hopes to understand or develop new ideas in the field. 
 
     It is important to ask why justifying human rights has been seen as vital, while – as 
the sheer number of rival alternatives attests – also being extremely difficult to 
achieve. Alternatively seen as a challenge and a necessary compliment to the norm of 
Westphalian sovereignty, human rights share prominence with sovereignty as a 
fundamental principle of legitimate order in world politics.22 The optimistic view is 
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that there is no necessary conflict between these two principles, which relies on the 
premise that legitimate state power can be held accountable to moral principle.23 In 
which case, human rights are vital to the moral acceptability of state power. Yet, 
recent history is a depressing testament to the inability of human rights institutions to 
constrain the power of states.24 Stronger critics of the state would suggest that the 
protection of human rights requires a more fundamental institutional transformation, 
undermining state sovereignty in a more radical way.25 In this case, the protection of 
human rights provides the justification for, and the goal of, a global political 
transformation. In either case – limiting the power of the sovereign state or the 
transformation of the inter-state system – the moral principles that justify such work 
must be of great and absolute importance, or so the conventional framing suggests. 
Yet, while the cosmopolitan activist or committed politician may use the presumed 
moral importance of human rights to motivate institutional change or political reform, 
a more troubling doubt about the universal principles at the heart of human rights 
lingers.  
 
     Critics of human rights have raised a number of fundamental objections to their 
suitability as universal moral principles. As was noted above, Žižek accuses human 
rights of foisting a liberal capitalist ideology onto the rest of the world in order to 
justify a coercive and oppressive politics. Further critiques include the suggestion that 
human rights reflect the experience of men, missing the exclusions and distinctive 
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forms of violence faced by women;26 and that they are based in a Western 
understanding of morality and society that presupposes its own superiority and the 
necessity of rescuing savage others from their own backwardness.27 Not only does 
this counter narrative question the universal foundations of rights, it also suggests that 
human rights enable powerful states engaged in destructive but “ethical” political 
activity, which is not limited to declared wars and military interventions, but includes 
more pervasive and less dramatic forms of control and interference.28 These critiques 
undermine the political work human rights are expected to do, leading to profound 
anxiety among supporters of human rights, who struggle to redeem the moral 
universality of human rights. Given the work human rights are expected to perform, 
the necessity of defending their status as important and absolute moral principles is 
clear. In what follows I want to trace out how the quest for moral certainty has been 
undertaken in attempts to justify human rights. 
 
     Chris Brown suggests ‘that some idea of natural law must underlie all genuinely 
universal approaches to human rights.’29 Using this as a starting point, I want to 
examine influential attempts to fill in this ‘some idea of natural law,’ giving specific 
attention to why the question of human rights and moral universalism is phrased in 
this way. The idea of natural law, in its most basic form, presumes that there is an 
objective order to the world, whether metaphysical or natural, that can justify moral 
principles applicable to all of humanity. And while many defenders of human rights 
loudly proclaim that their theories only depend upon reasonable and acceptable 
presumptions, this is a proclamation that I aim to undermine by exposing the quest for 
certainty inherent in conventional human rights theories. Accomplishing this, 
however, will require altering Brown’s charge, as the commitment to natural law as a 
specific tradition of political thinking is not as pervasive as he suggests. Natural law is 
only one form of justification that has been used to support human rights. Brown, 
however, is right about the logic at work in universal justifications of human right, as 
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they depend upon an appeal to some universally shared feature of human experience 
that justifies the limitations placed upon our actions, both individually and socially. 
Natural law thinking depends upon the identification of some privileged feature of 
humanity, inherent to human beings and imbued with moral significance. The other 
major line of universal rights thinking is rationalist in approach, looking to the a priori 
nature of reason to justify universal moral principles.  
 
     The demand for moral principles that legitimate and restrain politics is basic to 
political theory, but in the context of human rights this is a demand for universal 
principles of the widest generality. This need for generality brings the problem of 
universalism into stark relief – finding a universal moral principle for a social world 
that can seem incomprehensible in its diversity, if possible at all, requires profound 
sensitivity to difference in tandem with strong principles that apply to everyone. If 
some universal and essential human feature is lacking, it seems that there is little that 
can justify the system of human rights that has been built. Equal liberty, the rights 
bearing individual, the modern state and the legalised social relations built into the 
notion of liberal rights, which are generally taken to form the conceptual and 
historical foundation of human rights, are all called into question. Thus, the 
contemporary imperative is to find or construct a universal justification for human 
rights that is appropriately sensitive to global difference but preserves the dominant 
liberal political order.  
 
     If my framing of the issue is correct, then it is striking that the dilemma presented 
by human rights seems to also be the central dilemma of modern ethical and political 
theory, which is to justify moral principle in a social world where common custom 
and shared religion are no longer the basis for an account of the good, and in which 
the power of reason to replace conventional sources of authority is profoundly in 
doubt.30 What has gone unexamined is why we need a universal morality – the 
necessity of moral universalism to human rights is clear enough, but one might be 
tempted to forget the whole enterprise and resign oneself to the diverse and fractured 
moral world that we live in. What are human rights intended for that is so important? 
Minimally, defenders of human rights claim that they set limits on the legitimate 
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actions of states, which, for all the diversity of human cultures, are now the 
predominant political institutions that human beings live within.31 Human rights mark 
off a space where the state cannot legitimately intrude into the lives of its citizens or 
interfere with other sovereign nations. Yet, this minimal conception goes beyond a 
modus vivendi, as it articulates substantive understandings of the individual, society 
and legitimate political power. This individualistic and legalistic account of state 
legitimacy must amount to more than historical contingency if it is to have moral 
content.32 Even in a minimalist formulation, human rights depend upon a morality of 
certainty that grants legitimacy to a given social and political order, in this case a 
modern liberal order. This returns us to Halliday’s claim; the stakes for human rights 
defenders are high, as they represent a set of baseline moral principles that should 
mediate the relationships between all human beings, the loss of which seems to 
threaten the very possibility of making the sorts of moral judgments necessary to act 
ethically in world politics. 
 
     This quest is pursued, however, on a terrain defined by a particular tradition of 
moral thought that prioritises moral duties that are prior to and divorced from specific 
circumstances.33 Moral duty is expressed in universal moral principles applicable 
regardless of circumstance, which must find their justification in either an essential 
human nature or the demands of reason, as authoritative conventional justifications 
have been lost.34 It is this construction of the modern dilemma that creates the threat 
of subjectivism and relativism, undermining the possibility of morality as such. The 
failure to provide an essential or rational foundation for morality must result in world 
of incommensurable and irrational preferences, in which final justification becomes 
impossible. This unpalatable conclusion explains the importance given to the idea of 
moral right, expressed as truth or the condition of truth, in opposition to the good, as 
the merely conventional or contingently valued. Jürgen Habermas defends universal 
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principle in just these terms when he describes it as ‘like a knife that makes razor-
sharp cuts between evaluative statements and strictly normative ones, between the 
good and the just.’35 To maintain this distinction, to keep separate the good and the 
just, is not only to establish an objective normative order but it is also to locate the 
ultimate source of moral authority in a space where it cannot be questioned, or can 
only questioned in the proper way.36 
 
     The project of establishing the basis for moral right finds distinct expressions in 
both the essentialist discourse of natural rights and of rationalist a priori rights.37 In 
what follows I critique both traditions, but devote more space to the rationalist rights 
tradition as this line has been more influential in contemporary political theory and, as 
I will argue, offers a more sophisticated response to the problem of diversity in a post-
conventional age. While the accounts of rights offered by these traditions differ, in the 
conclusion I suggest that the vision that emerges from each of them is one of human 
rights as a way of mediating between the merely political and the moral. Human 
rights are intended to mark out where difference is legitimate and where it must be 
constrained, where it cannot be tolerated. Human rights embody the moral law behind 
the positive, or merely conventional, law of any given society. Much of the difference 
in the concept of rights advocated by the theorists I examine is a result of how 
extensively morality determines the content of the legitimate law, but the basic logic 
is the same. It is this logic that I attempt to reconstruct in later chapters.  
 
     In the rest of this chapter, I substantiate this analysis of human rights by offering 
an extended critique of contemporary accounts of human rights. My critique of human 
rights begins with the natural rights tradition, particularly the work of James Griffin 
and Martha Nussbaum, and then moves to a longer engagement with rationalist 
theories, which moves from Immanuel Kant to Jürgen Habermas and then to John 
Rawls. Throughout, I focus on the way these approaches to human rights seek to pre-
empt the political by privileging particular values and identities that are then excluded 
from further contestation. In addition, I point to the ways in which the model of 
human rights generated by these theories results in political prescriptions that are 
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unjustifiably limited, that disable our political imagination. In the end, the point of 
fundamental disagreement is how to respond to the misfit between moral principle 
and the world, or to the various ways of being and plural values that challenge human 
rights norms as they are articulated by philosophers and in the institutions of world 
politics. Rather than trying only to constrain the political, as a realm in which values 
are contested and exposed to contingency, I suggest that we should rethink the 
understanding of morality that lies behind human rights in a way that places 
contestation and contingency at the centre of ethical theory. 
 
     A few final comments about my own perspective are necessary before getting to 
the body of the argument. This is certainly not the first critique of human rights that 
takes aim at the objectionable assumptions of morality and politics contained within 
the idea. My own perspective is influenced by many of these, but in particular I want 
to point to the idea of remainders and the politics of epistemology, which inform my 
critique. The idea of remainders refers to that which is excluded and devalued when 
moral principles defining political legitimacy are held to be universal rather than 
partial. Bernard Williams identified ethical remainders as the values that are ignored 
in the principled response to moral dilemmas, as a loss of the good that the right 
cannot properly acknowledge or mourn.38 Bonnie Honig develops a related political 
notion of remainders, which highlights the values and identities that are marginalised 
in order to justify overly abstract conceptions of the just society, suggesting that these 
loses should be acknowledged and our politics open to ongoing agonistic challenge 
from different values and ways of being.39 In both critique and eventual 
reconstruction, I try to take this concern for remainders seriously, remaining sensitive 
to what is lost when one moves from critique to positive articulation. The second 
critical element that I draw upon is the importance of acknowledging the politics of 
epistemology, well articulated in Brooke Ackerly’s work on human rights.40 In her 
work, she offers a powerful critique of the theorist’s potential blindness when they 
take an uncritical stance toward their own experience and way of thinking, which 
compromises the universal ambitions of theories of human rights by limiting the 
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contest over values to those whose knowledge practices are presumed to be 
authoritative. 
     There are two further critical points that I press throughout this chapter, which 
reflect the primary contribution I hope to make to the discussion of human rights. A 
fundamental assumption of modernist moral theories is that moral principles should 
be complementary, that if there is not a single universal moral law, at the least the 
demands of morality will be coherent – the presumption Isaiah Berlin identifies as 
moral monism and which makes it difficult for conventional moral theory to fully 
acknowledge its own remainders.41 In response to this assumption, I develop an 
account of deep pluralism, which suggests that moral values are many and at times 
incompatible. A second resource I employ is the anti-essentialist pragmatic 
philosophy of John Dewey, using his perspective in place of approaches to moral 
philosophy that seek to establish objective standards that are absolute and permanent, 
instead focusing on the practical role played by moral principles in guiding concrete 
experience.42 These points are developed at length in chapters 3 and 4; for now it is 
only necessary to note that these ideas oppose fundamental assumptions in the type of 
moral and political theory examined in this chapter. 
 
II. Human Rights and Moral Essentialism: Natural Rights and Well-Being 
 
Griffin and Natural Rights 
Historically, the idea of natural rights develops out of natural law thinking, which is 
part of a broader historical movement in which the human good as defined by the 
nature of God is replaced by a vision of the good based on reason and laws of nature. 
While the arguments that define and justify the “naturalness” of these rights changes, 
the conception of right remains remarkably similar. Natural rights are rights that are 
held by human beings because they are human beings; these rights are distinctly pre-
social and pre-political, and further they entail claims not just on institutions, but also 
on other individuals.43 There is certainly an important story to be told regarding the 
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development of natural rights from Christian notions of natural law to secular 
accounts of natural right, but my concern here is with the contemporary legacy of this 
idea.44  
 
     From the inception of debates about explicitly institutionalised human rights, the 
natural rights perspective has served as a check on the ambition of both legislators 
seeking to define human rights as only those rights granted by state authority and 
advocates enthusiastically identifying all worthwhile social goals with human rights.  
A dominant strain of philosophical work on human rights attempts to clarify (or 
discover) which legal human rights are truly universal moral rights.45 James Griffin is 
a contemporary exemplar of this tradition, as he makes clear in his recent book where 
he suggests that has been no significant development in the basic idea of human rights 
since the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when the idea of natural rights was 
secularised.46 In his work he critically examines the UDHR and other United Nations 
(UN) documents with the intention of showing that contemporary legal discourses of 
human rights lack justification, requiring some bases for establishing true rights from 
the merely desirable or praiseworthy.47 In trying to develop a more philosophically 
sound argument for human rights, he begins with the concept of human dignity, as 
this vague idea is the lynch pin in human rights treaties that self-consciously avoid 
endorsing any particular ethical view.48  
 
     Griffin wants to give substance to the idea of dignity; he begins by asking, what is 
special about human beings that can ground human rights. His answer is agency, 
which he defines in terms of autonomy and liberty. The distinct importance of agency 
is that it is inherent to humanity and represents what is most distinctly human, and 
thus must be what we mean by human dignity.49 Rights in turn make claims upon the 
actions of others, whether institutional or individual, to enable and protect agency, 
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and in this Griffin’s account echoes Ronald Dworkin’s defence of rights as trumps we 
play against others to limit what they can do to us.50 
 
     This defence of both human rights, based on an essentialist account of humanity, is 
intended to reconnect the human rights discourse with the Enlightenment tradition. In 
connecting his moral essentialism to the political function of rights as protections for 
our agency, Griffin defends a conception of human rights that includes social and 
economic rights, but without expanding the idea of human rights to cover all possible 
human goods. Some economic and social rights are justified because of the role they 
play in supporting agency. We need food, shelter and education to live a life in which 
liberty and autonomy have meaning – but despite expanding the notion of natural 
rights beyond its conventional association with civil and political rights that preserve 
negative liberty, a characteristic reductionism is still maintained. The moral claim of a 
natural right is derived from the essential human capacity for agency, whatever the 
particular circumstances that give determinate shape to that right. This defence takes 
little account of attempts to widen the notion of rights beyond a primary concern for 
liberty and autonomy, and, because of its unapologetic essentialism, provides a 
contemporary example of the moral logic of classical natural rights thinking.  
 
     In response to this exclusive focus on agency, John Tasioulas argues that Griffin 
misses the point on a number of important rights that are related to agency only in a 
secondary way. Is a human right against torture really based on the damage it does to 
autonomy as opposed to the pain it inflicts?51 Similar questions can be asked about a 
right to education or economic subsistence, and in each case Griffin’s relentless focus 
on agency seems to marginalise many other important and distinctly human goods.52 
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By suggesting that human rights are founded on a variety of human goods, none of 
which are necessarily primary in the way Griffin suggests, Tasioulas poses the 
question: why should we privilege autonomy and liberty over other goods? 
Confirming Tasioulas’ argument for a plurality of human goods, Mark Murphy 
suggests that the natural law tradition acknowledges and can accommodate a core set 
of human goods that result in an objective and universal account of natural right, but 
do not require convergence among all de facto moral systems.53 Yet, what this 
concession to the variety of ethical life retains is the privilege granted to some pre-
social account of universal human goods, which remains problematic. Whether we 
base natural rights on a single value or a handful of human goods, we are suggesting 
that there is a common human essence that is not only shared, but exists prior to our 
social and political lives, which must be enacted through legal rights that serve as a 
barrier that protects what is most dear to us from the intrusive hands of others.54 
 
     This view of natural rights is questionable as a justification for moral and political 
duties, as it assumes that certain core values exert moral force on all people in the 
same way. It also depends upon the presumption that even if there are many human 
goods, these goods form a rational and knowable whole – which is to say that the 
commands of morality are accessible to our reason and do not fundamentally conflict 
– and if they appear to, then it is because of the limitations of particular women and 
men and not the possibility of moral knowledge. The essentialist argument depends 
upon unjustifiable presumptions, upon first principles that define humanity and moral 
duty, and in this way mimics a morality of faith.55 While the metaphysical version of 
this view is unconvincing to most philosophers today, the felt need for secular 
replacements of the certainty lost to contemporary conditions of scepticism and 
diversity is great and the search for an escape from uncertainty is pursued with no 
small degree of intensity. 
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     One could suggest that communal history and understandings underwrite the 
objective importance of values like autonomy and liberty, but when we try to define 
universal human rights this conceit simply cannot hold – either the full weight of 
human diversity overwhelms the notion of a common human nature that can provide 
distinct moral goods or we must insist that what reason tells us is valuable for one is 
valuable for all. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that trying to impose values developed in 
a particular cultural and historical context upon humanity defines the unanswerable 
question of modern morality.56 Arguing that natural rights are a fiction, he describes 
how they emerged from a ‘situation in which substitute artifacts for the concepts of an 
older and more traditional morality were required, substitutes that had to have a 
radically innovative character if they were to give even an appearance of performing 
their new social functions.’57 The natural rights perspective highlights the reason for 
our concern with how to reasonably accommodate difference; the lack of belief in a 
common conception of the good leaves us struggling to rebuild an ordered moral 
world with only the all too human tool of critical reason at our disposal, a task that 
haunts both domestic and international political theory. Next I look to defences of 
human rights based on an alternative essentialism, one focused on human well-being 
as a minimal form of moral universalism. 
 
Nussbaum and Human Flourishing 
An alternative response to this problem of human diversity has been to articulate a 
conception of the good that is based in human well-being, which is logically similar to 
but also revises arguments for human rights based on an essential human nature.58 
Where this approach differs is that the idea of well-being is argued to be acceptably 
universal, as the focus is not on what is essentially valuable in human nature, but on 
the essential conditions for leading a fulfilling human life. I will focus on the work of 
Martha Nussbaum, whose fundamental project is to articulate and defend the 
necessary and universal goods that we need for the enjoyment of any flourishing life. 
An approach to human rights based on well-being must address the tension between 
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the universal and the particular. On one hand universalism can be purchased at too 
dear a price, if the morally relevant needs are those of basic survival, then almost any 
political order could be justified so long as murder and starvation were prohibited.59 
As a general problem, minimal accounts of well-being run the risk of evacuating 
rights of all moral content. On the other hand, where well-being is interpreted as 
entailing robust duties the opposite problem emerges. Once we conceive of well-being 
as more than bare survival then the debate over what particular account of well-being 
to privilege returns.60 Determining which needs must be met, and to what level of 
satisfaction, in a just political order will require a more sophisticated account of well-
being as a political concept. We find responses to these important questions in Martha 
Nussbaum’s work on human capabilities, which I turn to now. 
 
     The goal of Nussbaum’s moral theory is to develop a universal and substantive 
account of human well-being as flourishing, while also allowing that the way in which 
that flourishing finds expression will be diverse, claiming against sceptics of 
universalism that  
 
it is one thing to say that we need local knowledge to understand 
the problems women face, or to direct our attention to some aspect 
of human life that middle-class people tend to take for granted. It is 
quite another matter to claim that certain very general values, such 
as the dignity of the person, the integrity of the body, basic 
political rights and liberties, basic economic opportunities, and so 
forth, are not appropriate norms to be used in assessing women’s 
lives in developing countries.61 
 
The overriding moral end is to maximise flourishing, but flourishing takes many 
forms depending on the broad social context in which we find ourselves and on 
individual choices. The general account of human flourishing is based on what 
Nussbaum takes to be a consensus on the human capabilities necessary to any good 
life. Her account of human capabilities begins from identifying those things that 
people value as part of a worthwhile human life, and she then goes on to analyse the 
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social conditions necessary for the development of our faculties, which then enable us 
to choose how we further develop our capabilities.62 It is the full development of our 
human faculties that is demanded by justice, as these provide the basis for the creative 
development of our capabilities, through our free choice and action, which is 
characteristic of a flourishing life.63  
 
     Her account of human capabilities is partly empirical, as Nussbaum says, ‘it is an 
attempt to summarize empirical findings of a broad and ongoing cross-cultural 
inquiry.’64 Yet it is an empirical inquiry into the conditions that make up a universal 
conception of the good, and for this reason it is evaluative and there are normative 
limits to the empirical inquiry. Nussbaum takes her list of central capabilities to be a 
form of overlapping consensus but while it may be the result of cross-cultural 
investigation, that investigation does not result in a simple factual account of what 
human beings value. The capabilities approach provides the frame for the question, 
such that the account of truly human functioning and the imperative to enable 
flourishing give one reason to reject the moral significance of particular values.65 So, 
while Nussbaum is clear there are many ways for human beings to flourish, there are 
also clear limits to acceptable diversity – she argues that these limits are vital to the 
protection of individuals as ends in themselves, who should not be sacrificed to the 
will of others.66 There is a tension in Nussbaum’s work between her Aristotelian 
influences, which implies a contextual account of the good achieved through the 
embedded experience of developing our capabilities in community with others, and 
her Kantian aspirations, which lead her to defend the independence and irreducible 
moral value of individuals.67 Her later works document a trend towards a universal 
and liberal account of the capabilities approach focused on the individual’s ability to 
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choose her own account of flourishing, which seems to be the necessary development 
if one is going to defend a robust and universal account of well-being.68 We can see 
this move, and its limitations as a defence of moral universalism, by considering how 
the capabilities approach is applied directly to human rights. 
 
     In the context of capabilities, the question of rights explicitly becomes one of 
legitimacy, as they suggest ‘a set of basic human entitlements, similar to human 
rights, as a minimum of what justice requires for all.’69 Legitimate government must 
provide for minimum human capabilities by ensuring that individuals are able to 
develop the full range of human faculties necessary to freely develop and lead full 
lives. This is a not an austere minimalism but a demand for the necessary basis to lead 
a full life. Once these functions are provided for, the multiple ways that individuals 
develop their capabilities will be legitimately diverse. Nussbaum provides a 
comprehensive list of capabilities that must be enabled, but not necessarily privileged, 
by any just political order.70  
 
     Referring to the necessary process for legitimating the human rights regime, 
Amartya Sen clarifies the conditions under which such a consensus attains moral 
force: 
 
The universality of human rights relates to the idea of survivability in 
unobstructed discussion – open to participation by persons across national 
boundaries… through an interactive process, in particular by examining 
what would survive in public discussion, given a reasonably free flow of 
information and uncurbed opportunity to discuss differing points of view.71 
 
While Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is open to revision, it provides a robust and 
universal account of the demands made upon political power, expressed in terms of 
human rights – a right to the social basis for full human capabilities. Sen adds 
important qualifications to capabilities approach to rights; first, he limits the idea of 
human rights, even before we engage in an open discourse, to those capabilities that 
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are both of very high importance and open to social influence,72 and second, he is 
more cautious of definitive lists, acknowledging that they may need to be modified 
more often and may be less universal than Nussbaum is inclined to make them.73  
 
     Even with these additions an important assumption is unexamined, namely, that we 
find consensus in-itself a compelling moral justification. The discovery of an actually 
existing consensus on what people take to contribute to their well-being does not 
necessarily provide us with a reason to give those valuations moral primacy. The final 
moral importance of this consensus can only be made clear when we include further 
normative premises regarding the importance of the capabilities necessary for human 
flourishing. For the capabilities approach the premise is not clearly identifiable, as 
what makes capabilities valuable is their contribution to flourishing, but flourishing, if 
universalism is to be maintained, must be defined by some further account of the 
human good beyond a de facto consensus.74 For both Nussbaum and Sen this further 
account involves a defence of the moral value of autonomy, as their concern is to 
provide for a range of choices that individuals can develop freely. Consensus is 
therefore valuable because it is itself an expression of the autonomous choices of 
individuals, and those values that harm or undermine autonomy can therefore be 
excluded. As Aristotle’s account of the virtues, in the end, depends upon a best life for 
human beings (the life of rational contemplation, which is the life of the most certain 
fulfilment), the capabilities approach depends upon an account of the best life – 
namely the life that expresses our freedom and creativity in pursuing our distinctive 
conception of the good expressed in a community of equals.75 
 
     For Nussbaum in particular, there is an emphasis on the need to defend 
universalism so that we can critique accepted cultural practices, particularly as they 
relate to the treatment of women.76 This leads her to privilege the capabilities of 
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practical reason and autonomy as vital to every flourishing life.77 This is necessary, 
she argues, in order to preserve the equal recognition that is so often denied to women 
as active subjects. In earlier works she argued for the objectivity of a virtue ethics 
drawn from Aristotle, which required dropping Aristotle’s account of the inherent 
superiority of a certain kind of male subject over inferior subjects such as slaves and 
women.78 While her work on the importance of emotions and particular circumstances 
in our moral thinking suggests an opposition to overly rationalistic and formalistic 
forms of moral reasoning, it is hard to square this with her work on cosmopolitan 
universalism – which seems to suggest the superiority of an abstract and principled 
moral logic that constrains the pluralism that might be expressed in diverse contexts. 
Perhaps the best way to understand her position is that context is morally valuable 
only so far as the contextual elements of life, the particular relationships and practices 
that define us, enable and express equal and universal moral personality, instantiated 
by freely developing our capabilities, as determined though our privileged faculty of 
practical reason.  
 
     In many ways it is difficult to oppose Nussbaum’s account, she expresses a 
substantive concern for the importance of diversity, a broad basis for defining human 
flourishing and a tough-minded insistence that individual human beings have a value 
that cannot be denied. The political ethics she defends is a robust but tolerant 
conception of global justice that seems to endorse a wide-ranging definition of human 
rights, while allowing that different states will protect, promote and institute human 
rights in different ways. Yet there are reasons to be critical – reasons revealed most 
clearly in the inherent tensions of her work. First, the tension between the capabilities 
that every individual must have the opportunity to develop and particular expressions 
of the good life that may deny the value of certain capabilities, which is resolved 
though an appeal to a universal form of situated but autonomous moral agency that 
requires the full development of our faculties. This requires a universal account of 
moral identity, a claim that all humans have the same moral nature, which remains an 
ungrounded assumption. Second, in her reliance on the notion of consensus 
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Nussbaum presupposes the terms that make such a consensus meaningful – it supports 
autonomous moral agency – and in doing so claims the voice of the women to whom 
she attributes the work of developing this consensus as her own. She does this by 
taking the existence of shared values – a fact about the world – as a morally important 
fact, without making this move explicit, which raises the question of why there is not 
a further engagement with how and why those women value what they value. Instead, 
she claims that the capability approach is ‘a freestanding moral idea, not one that 
relies on a particular metaphysical or teleological view.’79 Yet the force of this 
freestanding moral idea clearly comes from the role it plays in supporting human 
development aimed at the moral end of developing situated and autonomous moral 
agents. While this is an improvement on less subtle accounts of human essentialism, 
the end toward which Nussbaum puts here theory is underpinned by a teleological 
sense of the best human life and presumptions about true moral agency.80 
 
     There is a further assumption that human capabilities are a harmonious whole and 
that joint and fundamental commitments to autonomy and equality are not only 
justified as such, but they lock together in an important way. What if this is not the 
case?81 From an individual perspective, we may not be able to develop capabilities 
that we value in tandem, but is this a failure to flourish or moral maturity? We may 
have to sacrifice one capability for the sake of another as they conflict either 
practically or conceptually. For example, the exercise of independent practical reason 
conflicts in both practical terms with our commitments and affiliations, not only 
practically but also at a deeper level where independence and communion push us in 
opposite directions. Further, we may be attached to multiple communities and be 
pulled to prioritise certain capabilities at the same time, which may not be possible. 
While from a social perspective we may not be able to enable all functionings at all 
times because of a lack of the necessary resources. Or worse, we may find that 
enabling the development of some capacities results in being unable to ensure the 
requisite level of provisions for all other functionings. The need to make “hard 
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choices” is often abused in the course of politics, but it is a real dilemma we must face 
in ethical life.  
 
     Also, Nussbaum sets certain choices off limits because they undermine autonomy 
and equality. They can be done with one eye open, so to speak – subsuming one’s will 
to God, for example, but insisting that one can only do this where one has the freedom 
to choose for oneself. This seems to involve what Bernard Williams calls ‘one thought 
too many,’82 as the force of religious devotion is not first justified by whether it 
affords me autonomous and rational choice.  
 
     The level at which these criticisms are aimed is important. The primary concern is 
with the meta-ethical framework, particularly the presumptions about the necessity of 
universal principles to establishing moral certainty. This should not obscure that there 
is much to be said for Nussbaum’s work, not only in developing a richer account of 
well-being as a moral value to guide political life, but especially in exposing often 
neglected capabilities of the poor, of women and of the disabled, who are often 
unconsidered. Rather, what is problematic, and revealed in her defence of universal 
human rights, is the presumed need for an ethics of certainty that can discipline 
pluralism and control political life, and which deploys an account of an essential 
human nature to justify this effort. 
 
     How should we respond to the difficulties encountered in grounding human rights 
in something essential to human being? It seems that Brown is right, universal rights 
require a shared notion of human nature, but this approach is deeply problematic and 
necessarily involves a form of unjustifiable moral absolutism that constrains and 
disciplines. Not only do the many peoples of the world value different things, even 
within the Western tradition the exalted value of liberty and autonomy has often been 
wilfully abnegated or left intentionally unclaimed. Drawing on a colourful allusion by 
Alexander Herzen, when suggesting that most men prefer good government to 
freedom Isaiah Berlin makes the point that ‘men desire freedom no more than fish 
desire to fly. The fact that a few flying fish exist does not demonstrate that fish in 
general were created to fly, or are not fundamentally quite content to stay below the 
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surface of the water, for ever away from the sun and the light.’83 It is the need to 
overcome this impasse that leads me to a consideration of rationalist theories of rights, 
as the thinkers in this broadly Kantian tradition seek redeem moral universalism by 
locating its warrant not in an account of human nature but in the nature of reason 
itself. 
 
III. Human Rights and Rationalism: Transcendental, Communicative and Public 
Reason 
 
Kant and Transcendental Reason 
The failure of the theory natural rights to ground freedom, or any other value, in 
something more than convention leads to the rationalist theories of morality and 
human rights, in which we see a sharp dividing of the moral from the good, as the 
notion of morality becomes more closely associated with notions of undeniable truth 
or validity. In examining this influential perspective on rights I begin by looking at 
Kant who laid the groundwork for rationalist theories of rights.  
 
     It is useful to consider Kant’s own interpretation of his task – his critical 
philosophy and appeal to transcendental reason were an attempt to reconstruct 
philosophy, which he saw as threatened by the ‘dangers of unfounded dogmatism on 
the one hand and rampant scepticism on the other.’84 Not only did David Hume’s 
scepticism inspire Kant’s epistemological work,85 the implications of Hume’s 
empiricism undermined the possibility of human autonomy, which was central to 
Kant’s moral theory.86 Hume was content for morality to consist in inclination 
supported by habit, for Kant this made an adequate defence of human freedom 
impossible, since it is often sacrificed to these very forces, thus moral obligation 
‘must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason.’87 Kant gave the value 
of autonomy a rational basis, but it is not enough to assert that reason tells us that man 
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is free despite his chains, as natural rights thinking does. A critique of reason itself is 
necessary before we can be confident in our understandings and intuitions. The value 
of human freedom, of autonomy, must be absolute, and to complete this task Kant 
argued that this value was written into practical reason itself. 
 
     As a result of Hume’s scepticism, concepts such as time and space could not be 
established empirically, therefore in Kant’s formulation they were necessary to reason 
as such.88 The rules that regulate understanding, implicit in cognition, also imply 
rational ideals such as freedom. Because the force of causation cannot be empirically 
proven, it must therefore be a constitutive idea of understanding; therefore, our 
understanding of causality entails free will. It is an ideal that does not exert influence 
as a necessary orientation until we consider practical reason and its attempts to 
influence the world.89 As beings limited by reason but existing in the material world, 
the human will is motivated by both the reasonable and the sensuous, and where we 
act from reason we demonstrate a transcendental freedom of the will. When we act 
upon inclination, our will is merely determined and not free, and so cannot be moral. 
 
     Free action is moral to the extent that it accords with the good will, which is 
initially defined by a categorical imperative to will only those actions that could be 
made a universal law.90 This implies that moral freedom must take a universal form, 
that the imperative of the good will is the same for everyone, as a matter of reason – 
not convention or faith. The good will is, essentially, rational freedom; its rationality 
is defined by the obligation to respect every other rational will as an end in itself, 
which the principle of universalisation ensures.91 Transcendental freedom is 
necessarily moral freedom, because the imperative of the good will is expressed as the 
inexorable logic of autonomy, of the will as an uncaused cause. The rational will is 
the self-legislating will and its highest expression is found in a kingdom of ends, 
where there is no external law and every autonomous will is respected.92 This is why 
morality becomes concerned primarily with duty, as our obligation to respect the 
autonomy of every reasonable will supersedes any conventional good we may wish to 
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pursue. This moral law of the categorical imperative is not based in any phenomenal 
desire or interest, and in turn, it serves to define and limit the just pursuit of ends. 
 
     While Kant’s formulation of moral obligation seems to avoid the problems 
associated with the natural rights tradition – morality is a postulate of practical reason 
itself, neither an empirical nor God given end –a new set of problems is created. First, 
not only are Kant’s examples of moral duty notoriously unconvincing, many have 
suggested that the categorical imperative is incoherent, as it can be taken to be both 
overly abstract, implying that nearly any rule could be justified, and, alternatively, 
that any just rule would be far too demanding to be practical. Second, the gulf created 
between the worlds of reason and experience, morality and inclination, seems to be 
unbridgeable. Which suggests that Kant has bought the rational grounding of the 
moral law at too high a cost, since it is not clear how it can exert influence on human 
action or become effective in political and social life. 
 
     A common criticism of Kant is that his view of duty requires us to expunge all 
inclination if our actions are to have moral worth. This criticism is based on his 
examples in The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, particularly the lover of 
mankind who loses his sympathy for humanity. As Peter Singer puts it,  
 
it is only when such a person somehow “loses all sympathy with 
the fate of others”, so that the person is no longer moved by an 
inclinations, but acts from the sake of duty along, that “for the first 
time his action has moral worth”. Here is a doctrine that might 
wring a grimace of recognition from an early Christian saint 
mortifying his flesh in the desert.93  
 
Barbara Herman convincingly argues that we can make sense of Kant’s view by 
distinguishing what is done for the sake of duty versus what is done in accord with 
duty.94 The true meaning of duty is seen clearly in moments where we have lost all 
inclination to act in accord with duty and our only motivation is to do what is right. 
Duty plays two roles: partly it limits justifiable inclinations where there is no positive 
duty, asking if an act is permissible; while when we act for the sake of duty we do 
those things that the good will demands of us, and only then do our acts have moral 
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worth. Though this moral worth need not preclude a good inclination, so long as duty 
is our motivation.95 ‘Morality sets limits to the ways in which and the means by which 
we conduct our lives; it does not give them direction. Thus morality apparently 
sanctions any way of life which is compatible with keeping our promises, telling the 
truth and so on.’96 Kant’s perspective is not so severe as it may seem, he did not 
demand that we behave as saints in order to act morally. 
 
     Kant’s intention was to explain our common sense notions of right and wrong, 
which entails both freedom and responsibility, rather than offer a radical critique or 
suggest new moral conceptions. As our attempts to act within the phenomenal world 
reveal a determined natural order, our sense that we nonetheless choose between right 
and wrong reveals the transcendental freedom that is the basis of the moral will. The 
more profound problem with Kant’s moral theory is that by separating the 
phenomenal and noumenal realm, he suggested a profoundly subjective will that is the 
sole author of legitimate values and ends.97 While Kant argues that reason ensures that 
every will would pursue the same moral ends, this is done via the test of 
universalisation in the categorical imperative, which has proved unconvincing as it is 
practically possible to fit nearly any end to the universalisation test.98 As MacIntyre 
argues, the rationalist claim of Kant’s imperative was that the demand to treat all 
humanity as a means and not an end could not consistently be violated, yet we can 
‘without any inconsistency whatsoever flout it; “Let everyone except me be treated as 
a means” may be immoral, but it is not inconsistent and there is not even any 
inconsistency in willing a universe of egoists all of whom live by this maxim.’99 
Kant’s formulation of transcendental freedom and abstract moral reason has 
unexpected consequences: if we are unconvinced by the ability of reason to give the 
categorical imperative substance, then what is left is an existential subject free to 
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choose nearly any end for themselves100 or a deeply conventional moral subject that is 
compatible with any given ends.101  
 
     Kant was not unaware of these problems and in the Critique of Practical Reason 
he suggested that reason presupposes a teleological framework for his moral 
project.102 This not only provides a way to bridge the gap between the good will and 
inclination, as moral education and cultivation of virtue support rather than undermine 
moral action, but it also makes clear why Kant believed convention imperfectly 
reflected the moral-will. Conscience is a natural faculty drawn to the consideration of 
the good will, making progress toward closing the gap between morality and 
inclination possible, though never complete.103 Further, the development of human 
freedom is a natural end, it is in a sense what humanity was made for, and the 
development of virtue and the possibility of moral education give us reason to hope 
that we may yet get closer to the moral ideal.104 While this framework cannot be 
proven, it is a hopeful supposition; it gives some determinate content to Kant’s moral 
theory, as reason, partially expressed in our moral intuitions and customs, is moving 
toward a more perfect realisation. Yet if we find the metaphysical presumptions of 
Kant’s noumenal-self unconvincing, it seems unlikely that his theory of the perpetual 
progress of conscience sentiment would resolve the problem. A formal moral law 
attached to a particular and largely Protestant conception of human nature, which is at 
best a historical artefact, hardly seems to provide a convincing reason to accept Kant’s 
moral theory.105 From this perspective we can make sense of the surprising fact that 
Kant set the stage for Hegel and Kierkegaard, for both historicism and existentialism. 
 
     While Kantian moral theory aims to provide a surer basis for establishing a 
universal moral order in the face of diversity, the metaphysical system it depends 
upon leave us with an unattractive formalism106 – so what explains the continued 
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influence of his deontological approach? In liberal political theory, Kant’s distinction 
between the moral and ethical has set the terms of debate, and those inclined to accept 
the autonomous subject at face value can jettison the troublesome metaphysics. This 
leads to a Kantian legacy in which universal moral rights are based on the necessary 
conditions for the respect of autonomous and rational agents, and the messy world of 
politics, with its diversity, change and many goods, is duly limited by the demands of 
equal moral respect.107  
 
     For Kant, however, the struggle of practical reason to remake the world was of 
primary concern and a direct result of his critical philosophy.108 This broader context 
explains his approach to law and politics as imperfect tools for drawing the 
transcendent and the practical closer together, so that the moral law can be expressed 
in the world, though this process is neither guaranteed or smooth.109 Right is 
concerned with the external relations of wills, not with motivation, thus the right that 
is derived from the moral law is only an a priori standard to be met by positive law 
that can coerce one’s action. Right action is that which accords with universal law, 
where right choice respects the autonomous choice of others.110 I do not want to 
consider Kant’s political theory here, but merely point out his sensitivity to the 
problem created by radical separation of moral principle from the world of 
experience, which is rarely considered by Kantian-inspired liberals. The moral law 
does not sanction or demand any particular conception of the good state, instead it 
articulates minimal conditions of representative legitimacy and disavows 
revolutionary action, leaving the achievement of political further reform to forces of 
natural history and the persuasive force of republican ideals.111 This political 
quietism, which is a result of the separation of the moral realm from the political, 
                                                                                                                                            
maintain the authority of moral principle in their revisions to Kant’s theory, whereas I am taking issue 
with the problem Kantian theory sets for itself. See, for example, Onora O’Neill, Constructions of 
Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); 
and Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
107
 See for example, Brian Barry, Culture & Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2002).  
108
 Hutchings, 21-2. 
109
 Ibid., 39-40. 
110
 Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” ed. H. S. Reiss, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 132-6.  
111
 Hutchings, 41-57. 
  46 
brings out a persistent feature of the quest for certainty, which is that it affirms or 
permits the political status quo to remain unchallenged.  
 
     Kant’s rationalist deontological theory fails to convincingly liberate morality from 
an unjustifiable particularity, and his articulation of a transcendental moral 
universalism raises further problems. Practically, the sharp distinction between 
abstract morality and political life means that ‘while saints are engaged in 
introspection, burly sinners run the world.’112 At the same time reasonable morality 
‘lays down principles which are universal, categorical and internally consistent.’113 
Meaning that oppositions to the good will are seen as ‘dispositions and appetites for 
the merely contingent, inessential but always troublesome phenomenal self.’114 Rather 
than provide an adequate moral universalism, Kant seems to highlight the remainders 
left by his abstract rationalism: morality loses its effective power in political and 
social life, motivations other than respect for free choice become inessential in an 
ideal order of universal moral right, as all values must pay service to the value of 
autonomy, whose supremacy is determined in abstraction from all actual conditions 
and concrete experience.  
 
     I turn to the work of Habermas next as an extension of the rationalist defence of 
moral universalism, and for his explicit defence of contemporary human rights. I have 
chosen Habermas because he gives significant weight to the critical aspects of Kant’s 
work, such that, while liberal political theory tends to accept the presumption of the 
autonomous individual as well as modern political conditions without much anxiety, 
Habermas’ theory only offers a more critical version of moral universalism. Finally, 
in explicitly trying to rescue the Kantian project, Habermas responds to a number of 
critiques mentioned above, particularly those of MacIntyre regarding the troubling 
effects of modernity on ethics. 
 
Habermas and Communicative Reason 
Habermas’ discourse ethics, particularly in combination with his theory of law and 
politics, responds to the claim that Kant’s rationalist moral theory was unacceptably 
metaphysical and individualistic. Further, Habermas claims that his theory of 
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communicative action presents a critical perspective on our contemporary condition 
that recognises particularity, while making good on the promise of a legitimate 
commitment to universality – and in this recasts classical notions of practical 
reason.115 First, I will examine how Habermas defends moral universalism via the 
nature of normative discourse. Second, I turn to his understanding of our current 
social and political condition, and how, in that condition, we find normative validity. 
The breadth and complexity of Habermas’ work limits the scope of this analysis, and 
here my focus will be on Habermas’ explicit defence of human rights, discussing 
other aspects of his thought only in the necessary depth. 
 
     As quoted earlier, Habermas draws a sharp distinction between the just and the 
good – what he terms the normative and the evaluative. This distinction is a legacy of 
Kantian moral theory, which Habermas intends to revise without recourse to 
metaphysical claims or unacceptable formalism. To make good on this promise 
Habermas develops a theory of communicative action, which analyses the forms of 
reason oriented toward understanding.116 This is opposed to systemic logics that are 
oriented toward successful action. This communicative rationality replaces Kant’s 
pure reason, and thus provides a critical perspective without recourse to the 
transcendental.117 Reason’s orientation toward understanding is key, as it implies that 
rational agreement is based on the inter-subjective recognition of criticisable validity 
claims. There are three types of claims that communicative action is concerned with: 
the factual, the normative and the authentic, each of which represents different 
motivations for action: determining the truth, the right and the sincere in expression. 
My concern here will be to show how communicative action concerned with 
normative validity responds to the limitations of Kantian moral theory. 
 
     In discourse ethics the source of moral obligation comes from the idea of inter-
subjective agreement through rational discourse, rather than as an imperative of 
reason to follow the good will, as expressed in the categorical imperative. Building on 
his more general discourse theory, Habermas argues that the claims we make when 
seeking mutual understanding – in the case of normative statements, agreement 
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regarding their rightness – contain the conditions for their own validity.118 What this 
means is that while the process of normative discourse is intended to produce 
rightness, the process by which this occurs limits places limits on the forms of 
agreement that can be considered valid, as a function of communicative rationality. 
The general principle of discourse ethics is based upon the conditions of possibility 
for the transcendental-pragmatic justification of moral principle, which is established 
by revealing the ‘assumptions that are inevitable in any argumentation game aiming at 
critical examination,’ the derogation of which results in a performative 
contradiction.119 The act of giving reasons for a normative statement necessarily 
involves stepping outside of any given ethical discourse, and engaging in a practical 
discourse that supplies the conditions for normative validity as such. These conditions 
are intuitively known but theoretically restated in the universalisation principle, which 
concludes that a contested norm cannot meet with consent ‘unless all affected can 
freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a 
controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each 
individual.’120 For Habermas, this is the only moral principle, and like the categorical 
imperative, it functions as a test of acceptability for any further moral principle. This 
is restated as the principle of discourse ethics, which is that ‘only those norms can 
claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their 
capacity as participants in a practical discourse.’121  
 
     Habermas argues that this derivation of moral principle avoids Kant’s problematic 
transcendentalism and does not make unredeemable metaphysical claims, as it is a 
necessary consequence of communicative reason. If we are arguing in order to reach 
an understanding, we must accept the rationality behind that activity – this is 
transcendentalism through pragmatic semantics. The theorisation of our intuitive 
expression of these conditions is fallible, but the necessary logic of communicative 
action is not.122 Also, discourse ethics are not susceptible to the criticism of excessive 
abstract individuality, such that anyone can discourse with themselves in order to 
produce valid norms for everyone else, instead it must involve actual discourse that 
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results in inter-subjective consensus among all those affected. The reality that this 
may at times only be approximated does not mean that discourse ethics relapses into 
abstract individualism, only that it has practical limitations.123  
 
     Thus far discourse ethics seems to effectively respond to major criticisms of the 
Kantian project; yet, it is still a formal principle that seems to lack any content, and as 
such it suffers similar objections.124 Habermas deflects this concern by admitting that 
the universalisation principle is indeed empty and formal, but this only means that the 
content of practical discourse must be supplied from somewhere else. ‘It would be 
utterly pointless to engage in a practical discourse without a horizon provided by the 
lifeworld of a specific social group and without real conflicts in a concrete 
situation.’125 The argument thus far seems convincing, but the fact that we are 
required to assume the intuitive validity of the conditions for finding argumentative 
agreement seems to beg the question; as we rightly asked of the categorical 
imperative, we can ask of the discourse principal: why, given all the ways in which 
we communicate must valid normative agreement follow this logic?126 The 
performative contradiction that supposedly results from seeking normative validity 
without acknowledging the principle of discourse, the injunction to seek and respect 
the approval of all affected, already presupposes a particular account of validity. 
While performative contradiction in the manner Habermas’ describes may undermine 
normative validity so stipulated, the account of validity does not benefit from the 
same analytic necessity. This goes beyond the claims of the sceptic – who Habermas 
relentlessly pursues throughout Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action – as 
it is certainly possible for communication, and even understanding, to take place 
under less egalitarian conditions. Validity derived from other forms of communicative 
action, not based on egalitarian ascent, but authoritative interpretation, for example, 
would result in very different normative principles. Habermas is not unaware of these 
issues. If we are not immediately convinced by the semantic arguments, Habermas 
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appeals to the empirical evidence of moral psychology and social evolution to support 
his linguistic analysis. 
 
     To further defend his discourse ethics Habermas uses the psychological theory of 
moral development elaborated by Lawrence Kohlberg. In his discussion of the 
development of moral consciousness he uses Kohlberg’s theory, in which higher 
levels of moral development are correlated with a greater capacity to take on the 
perspective of others and to seek abstract and universal rules. While Habermas 
acknowledges Kohlberg’s Kantian presumptions in classifying higher levels of 
development, and considers the empirical divergence in the actual studies, he is 
convinced it provides empirical evidence for his transcendental pragmatic argument 
by showing that psychological development leads one to adopt the form of normative 
validity elaborated in discourse ethics. He also argues that the social development of 
subjectivity compliments Kohlberg’s work and further strengthens the case for 
discourse ethics. The transition from a subjectivity based in a given way of life to a 
decentred understanding of the world correlates to higher levels of moral reasoning 
and reveals the intuitive power of the universalisation principle. But it is not clear that 
this empirical evidence is innocent or wholly convincing, as Habermas’ distinction 
between logics and dynamics of development suggests, wherein the logic of 
development is distinct from the actual empirical dynamics. The logic of development 
is based once again on the semantic linguistic analysis of communicative reason, so 
the question as to why we should accept the theoretical interpretation of the empirical 
evidence remains open.127 
 
     Habermas sees the development of communicative reason as bound up with social 
development more broadly. While the logic of communicative action may be inherent 
to speech acts, the importance of this type of reasoning is increasingly relevant 
because of the development of the social world. Fundamental to his view is the 
distinction between lifeworld and system, which embody the alternative logics of 
understanding and successful action.128 While the modern lifeworld is defined by the 
fracture of conventional religious belief, leading to separate fields of scientific, moral 
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and bureaucratic activity developed as a result of technical and social changes, it is 
threatened by system logics that support structures oriented only towards successful 
action. Communicative reason is central to preventing systemic orders from 
colonising the lifeworld, which has been weakened by the collapse of conventional 
belief systems, and the critical and constructive task of reason can only be performed 
through an orientation toward shared understanding. It is in this broad context that 
Habermas sees the theory of communicative action reconstructing practical reason in 
a way that validates not only the liberation of the individual and the power of reason, 
but also provides new grounds for legitimate moral critique.129  
 
     There is a further step in Habermas’ argument that moves from deriving moral 
principles to justifying an institutionalised human rights regime as the legitimate basis 
for domestic and international political authority.130 Beginning with the idea of a 
social order in which authority is held by an organised political power, it follows that 
such order requires legitimacy. In the modern state, political power is constituted 
through positive law, or law which is enacted and coercive. This law, therefore, 
makes an inherent claim to recognition. This is a claim that the law should be 
followed not only because it is authoritative, but also because it is legitimate. The 
modern conception of the legal person and the legal community requires individual 
rights to render authority legitimate. These individual rights are moral rights derived 
from reciprocal moral duties, which in turn justify and limit the legal entitlements of 
legitimate authority to act coercively.  
 
     For Habermas, the moral universe is unlimited, including all people regardless of 
social space and historical time, while the legal community is a specific and historical 
social structure. The validity of the state’s enforcement and implementation of the law 
is intertwined with the legitimacy of the purportedly rational procedure for law 
making. This legitimacy gives individuals a reason, beyond strategic self-interest, to 
follow the law and to accept the state as the guarantor of legitimate authority. Such a 
scheme of legitimacy, however, generates a difficult problem: how can we ground the 
legitimacy of procedures that can be changed by the legislative authorities? For 
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Habermas, this illustrates the illegitimacy of non-democratic states, as they cannot 
justify their power in moral terms. The challenge is made greater by the fact that we 
cannot call on religious and metaphysical notions of natural law, which could hold 
positive law in check; this is especially problematic in pluralistic modern societies 
where such integrating world-views and collectively binding ethical systems have 
disintegrated or never existed. 
 
     The solution to this problem is found in popular sovereignty and individual rights. 
Within the legal community individuals are protected when they take on the artificial 
status of individual rights bearers.131 The democratic features of popular sovereignty 
presuppose rights to communication and participation, and also secure the autonomy 
of the politically enfranchised citizen.  Individual rights are grounded in the need to 
protect the life as well as the private and civic liberty of the individual subject to the 
state.132 This solution presents us with an idea of human rights as the basic rights that 
free and equal citizens must accord one another if they want to regulate their common 
life legitimately by means of positive law. An important assumption here is that a law 
may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly affected could consent to it after 
participating in a rational discourse to arrive at shared opinions. Human rights, then, 
institutionalise the communicative conditions for a reasonable political will-
formation, and both civil democratic and classical liberty rights are necessary to 
maintaining this legitimate legal community of legal individuals.133 
 
     A first objection to this argument is that human rights refer to all humans, but as 
legal norms they only protect individuals so far as they belong to particular types legal 
communities. There is a tension here, which leads us to ask if human rights should not 
have unlimited validity in all contexts.134 This raises the concern that these standards 
hide an unjustifiable claim to superiority by the West based on the false universality of 
rationalist moral principle and the necessity of a legalised political order. This objection 
is unsustainable in Habermas’ view. The critique of universal reason fails to notice the 
self-reflective character of the discourse of modernity. In this context, human rights are 
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set up to provide every voice with an equal hearing and provide the standards by which 
latent violation of its own claims can be discovered. Human rights demand universal 
inclusion and function as ‘sensors for exclusionary’ practice that marginalise the other 
in the name of human rights.135 The further claim that the normative language of law 
reflects nothing else but the factual power of political authorities misses the power of 
law to domesticate political power by legitimating law through processes that respect 
moral rights. 
 
     These objections are misdirected and unconvincing for Habermas, because other 
cultures and world religions are also exposed to the challenges of social modernity, 
which are the conditions in which human rights and constitutional democracy were in 
some sense ‘discovered’ or ‘invented.’136 Human rights stem less from the particular 
culture of the West than from the attempt to respond to specific challenges posed by 
modernity. Further, human rights are not metaphysical truths but social constructions 
that protect our individual and collective autonomy. The model starts with the 
horizontal relationship between citizens, rather than with the second-level relationship 
to the functionally necessary state, which must reconstructed after the social 
transformation of modernity. The legalised authority of the liberal state produces an 
abstract form of solidarity among strangers who wish to remain strangers by granting 
each their due rights, but the state is not privileged as such. Given the reality of 
modern legal states and globalised market relations, human rights and constitutional 
democracy provide the rightful basis for legitimate political power and social order. 
These developments increase human freedom by limiting illegitimate social coercion, 
while allowing for a diverse range of social arrangement and ethical beliefs that are 
only constrained by those moral principles acceptable to all citizens, as equals.  
 
     While this is clearly a fuller response to the objections I have raised against the 
moral universalism of human rights up to now, two objections remain. First, the use 
of discourse ethics is unconvincing for a number of reasons. As has been pointed out 
by critics, the ideal speech situation is essentially impossible to set up in the real 
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world.137 Yet the hypothetical discourse and agreement that should emerge seems 
unrealistic in a deeper sense; as it begs the question of whether an agreement could be 
reached yet remains committed to the strong moral principles that Habermas draws 
from it based on a merely hypothetical consensus.138 Related to this line of critique is 
the objection that discourse ethics assumes the superiority of abstract and general 
moral principles, but there are other forms of moral reasoning and other basis of 
discourse that could be considered inherent to moral reasoning.139 We do not have a 
priori reasons to start with the sorts of usage of moral claims that Habermas does, 
other than his own initial privileging of abstract and universal principles.140  
 
     The second objection, and for my perspective the most substantive criticism, 
discourse ethics conflates justifiability and necessity. There is no necessary 
connection between my assertion of a moral claim and the presumption that it holds 
universally.141 Habermas endorses a view of moral reasoning that results in a 
comprehensive vision of the right – which implies that when our values conflict they 
only conflict part way down, that the right cannot entail moral loss.142 I want to 
suggest instead that moral claims can reflect a plurality of values that remain in 
conflict all the way down. This implies that moral validity is situational and 
contestable, that if there is something we want to call moral truth, we can only aim for 
the more modest goal that a moral claim is understandable as a specific value 
judgment, reflecting special circumstances and a particular act of judgment. This 
point highlights the costs of the rationalism of discourse ethics, which assumes the 
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superiority of abstract and unchanging moral principles, if we were to privilege a 
more responsive and contextual form of moral reasoning the requirements of 
discourse ethics would seem counter productive and the procedure of justification 
would look very different.143 
 
     My second objection to Habermas’ defence of universal human rights is based on 
the connection he makes between his emancipatory ethic and a progressive response 
to social modernity. Even if we accept the foundational value of freedom, it is less 
than obvious that the ideal story of “our” response to social modernity is one that can 
be convincingly framed as one of increasing human freedom. Not only does 
Habermas’ theory seem to presuppose a teleological view of history and social 
development, in which our ideal end is taken to be a maximisation of equal human 
freedom, his view of freedom seems overly prescriptive. The freedom of individuals 
to act as they please is conceptually distinct from the value we find in equality and 
democratic participation, and it is problematic to conflate such notions and ignore the 
extent to which they conflict both conceptually and practically.144 Not only do such 
packaged readings of important values obscure the complex texture of our moral 
world – tending to obscure the tensions between freedom and order, for example, with 
a utopian view of necessary compatibility – they also encourage an account of 
morality that is unable to take the depth of the plurality of ethical values seriously. 
Further, taking the modern state and global market economics as not only given, but 
also as enabling the realisation of greater human freedom further compromises the 
critical capacity Habermas’ theory. It seems to limit critique of the social order, 
excluding perspectives that question the prescription of a constitutional and social 
democratic social order as the necessary and best response to the logic of market 
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exchange and bureaucratic rationality, for instance it excludes more radical forms of 
economic egalitarianism or participatory democracy. 
 
     While I can hardly presume to have refuted Habermas’ impressive theory, or even 
dented the considerable amour of his intellectual achievement, I hope to have 
presented a convincing view of what is sacrificed in his move to a communicative 
moral rationalism. In reading Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action one is 
struck by the language Habermas’ uses – in chasing down the moral sceptic to an 
‘existential dead end’ we get an illustrative metaphor of the rationalist project to bring 
the unruly nonconformity of diversity, particularity and pluralism to heal.145 If this is 
a project that is doomed to failure another sort of inquiry is necessary – but before I 
turn to this positive articulation, I want to consider the work of John Rawls, who 
sought to revise the Kantian rationalist tradition of rights thinking using an alternative 
strategy.  
 
Rawls and Public Reason 
Many of the strongest defences of both moral universalism and human rights come 
from the contractualist tradition of liberal political philosophy.146 Yet one of the key 
figures, John Rawls, was reluctant to elaborate a robust conception of international 
human rights. In A Theory of Justice the argument is that any individual participating 
in the original position would agree to Rawls’ principles of justice, which entails that 
each person should have an equal right to the most extensive set of basic liberties that 
is compatible with a similar set of liberties for others, along with equality of 
opportunity and a distribution of goods that benefits the least well-off.147 As each 
person chooses without knowledge of their particular interests, abilities and social 
standing, impartiality is maintained and both basic rights and principles of social 
justice are established. Yet, the terms of this agreement seem to presuppose what it 
purports to justify, namely a universal scheme of equal liberties provided to morally 
equal rational agents. If we do not presuppose the value of liberal egalitarianism, then 
there is no inherent reason the terms of this contract are compelling. Rawls famously 
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restated his position to make clear that his contractual justification was limited to 
liberal democratic societies,148 leading to the defence of basic human rights in The 
Law of Peoples. 
 
      In Rawls’ original work, the moral force of the original position came from his 
assumption that we have shared ideas that underlie any conception of justice. We 
assume that individuals have the freedom to form and pursue a vision of the good life, 
and that they are able to cooperate with others in the pursuit of that life. Further, this 
freedom applies equally to everyone with the necessary capacities. Therefore, the 
terms of cooperation in society should not be based our particular interests, 
convictions, abilities or social position. Given this starting point the contract that 
results from the original position may seem unproblematic, but these assumptions are 
substantive and fail to give those who do not take them on a reason to consent to 
Rawls’ conception of justice. The original argument, however, was intended to work 
out a theory of social justice concerned with discrete political communities, which 
limits its scope to the domestic politics of liberal democratic states.149 The later move 
to a political conception of justice displayed Rawls’ sensitivity to the charge that his 
theory of justice was a partial one and highlights the Kantian legacy in his thought. 
Because he wanted to establish basic rights, and by extension moral principles, on a 
priori grounds Rawls was forced to reconstruct the categorical imperative not simply 
as a hypothetical contract but as an expression of situated rather than transcendent 
reason. Initially, Rawls tried to establish the rational necessity of the original position 
by appealing to an ongoing process of finding reflective equilibrium between our 
given moral presumptions and the results of a rational analysis of those principles – 
his Kantian constructivism was present from early on150 – which is why the charge of 
partiality was more damaging to Rawls’ theory than other liberal philosophers. If we 
lack shared starting assumptions, then reason risks becoming powerless in 
determining what justice demands. 
 
     In response to the challenge that human diversity presents to his theory, Rawls 
made two distinct moves. First, he distinguished between a conception of justice 
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based on substantive metaphysical premises (about the nature of the individual or the 
inherent value of autonomy) and a political conception of justice based on the 
requirements of political reason, which allow for diverse individuals to find justice 
terms of coexistence without recourse to substantive presuppositions. Second, he 
more explicitly differentiated his domestic and international accounts of justice. 
Because the social conditions between communities are different then within a self-
contained society, and the problem of ethical diversity is only magnified by 
considering the question of international justice, Rawls’ international theory was by 
necessity less ambitious, making his defence of universal human rights minimalist in 
both justification and substance. Human rights set a minimum standard for the 
legitimacy of political power, both for authority within states and as limiting 
conditions for rightful interventions by outside power. These basic rights, which 
include a right to life, liberty, property and formal equality,151 are required by the 
presumptions of public reason, which provides the conditions for a legitimate politics 
without a deeper consensus. 
 
     This political account of justice is first developed in his defence of political 
liberalism, in which disagreement on comprehensive visions of the good within a 
society precludes the common sense of justice he employed in A Theory of Justice. In 
its place he argued for a political conception of justice based on an overlapping 
consensus of principles necessary to a just liberal society, though the reason we 
support those principles may be different.  
 
While in a well-ordered society all citizens affirm the same political 
conception of justice, we do not assume they do so for all the same reasons, 
all the way down. Citizens have conflicting religious, philosophical, and 
moral views and so they affirm the political conception from within 
different and opposing comprehensive doctrines, and so, in part at least, for 
different reasons.152 
 
The goal of such a consensus remains the establishment of some universal basis on 
which to ground the validity of principles of justice – as a moral law or imperative 
that is beyond the realm of ongoing disagreement. In this overlapping consensus we 
find consensus on some basic moral principles, even if we do not find common and 
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undeniable reasons for that agreement. To base human rights on the results of a 
political contest between cultures, ideologies or states would have been political in the 
wrong way for Rawls, hence he appealed to the notion of public reason, which leads 
us to an agreement on human rights.  
 
     In Justice as Fairness, public reason is intended to support an agreement in a 
liberal context, but in The Law of Peoples this notion is put to use in an international 
context of increased diversity.153 The first demand of public reason is for reciprocity, 
requiring political decisions to be expressed in terms that are agreeable to all members 
of a society.154 In the case of the society of peoples there is not a shared liberal culture 
to draw from, but a variety of cultures, which means that human rights must provide a 
minimal standard of legitimacy as part of the shared conceptions entailed by the law 
of peoples, or the idealised account of the contemporary international order.155 In turn, 
human rights are intended to prevent abuses of individuals that make any just society 
impossible. However, the important values that underwrite the notion of public reason 
are not politically innocent. 
 
     An agreement in accord with public reason is one that affirms the norm of 
sovereignty and preserves the autonomy of the members of a society of peoples, as 
well as dictates that fair procedures are the first requirement of justice. What is not 
clear is why these would be reasonable terms for someone unconvinced by the current 
international order – and this would importantly include liberals with a cosmopolitan 
orientation or who support a more substantive account of human rights. Rawls 
defended his assumptions through an appeal to ideal theory, but the broader critique 
remains, especially in light of his professed political turn. By attempting to provide an 
ideal version of existing international norms, Rawls uncritically endorsed notions of 
sovereignty and international law without considering problems inherent in such 
ideals.156 While he argues that to base our decisions on the merely political 
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contingencies of power, interest or coercion would be political in the wrong way, I 
want to suggest that his attempt to game the politics ahead of time is ethical in the 
wrong way, in that it assumes existing ideals to be an ethically acceptable starting 
point without interrogating their history or consequences. Under the pretence of 
accommodating what he terms the facts of “reasonable pluralism” we get a political 
order that places a number of key moral assumptions beyond consideration – that the 
inter-state system is the best possible order, that communities should ideally be self-
sufficient, and that fair procedures are the markers of justice – they may only be 
political (as opposed to metaphysical) but their “reasonableness” ensures that they 
should not be challenged. 
 
     One of the most problematic aspects of the Rawlsian endeavour is that it is set up 
so that any contracting parties would accept the terms of the contract – or more 
specifically, that any reasonable people would accept the particular set of human 
rights that comes out of the law of peoples. Even as Rawls’ emphasised the political 
rather than metaphysical nature of the necessary agreement, it is still problematic, as 
the question remains open as to why those with significantly different moral, political 
and social understandings would agree to a political understanding of justice that 
reinforces the liberal capitalist nation-state and the contemporary international order 
based on sovereignty. This proposition does not only impact the presumably 
conservative culturist that much liberal theory imagines as the key dissident voice, but 
it also limits more radical progressive critiques of the political and economics order. If 
the basic structure of the state, the contemporary capitalist economy and the terms of 
international order are assumed to be analytically basic and the subject of necessary 
reasonable consent, then the moral universalism and human rights regimes that 
emerges from this represents a deeply political agenda, as a particular perspective is 
written into the supposedly impartial meaning of justice. This is perhaps most clearly 
seen in Rawls’ focus on clarifying when intervention by liberal and decent peoples 
(practically, powerful liberal states) into the affairs of burdened societies and outlaw 
states is just; resulting in the affirmation of a right to intervention but no duties of 
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distributive justice.157 In the end the non-liberal (or non-decent) world is subject to the 
moral authority of the liberal world, but that liberal world bears no further obligations 
to the non-liberal world beyond toleration and adherence to the law of peoples. It 
would seem that Rawls’ attempts to be political in the right way are unsuccessful, 
given that the consequences of his political conception of justice so fully re-inscribe 
the constellation of international political power, only now in idealised terms of 
public reason. 
 
     In his article “Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?” 
Joshua Cohen defends a conception of human rights that is minimal in its 
justifications, meaning it seeks to be political and not metaphysical in the Rawlsian 
sense,158 while at the same time he argues against taking up substantive minimalism in 
the way Rawls did, and in doing so he opens up the possibility for a stronger critique 
of existing international politics. He sees human rights as having a different role to 
play in providing a shared outlook about the standards to which political societies can 
be held. Cohen goes on to suggest that human rights should be thought of as 
guaranties of legitimate membership in political society – they express what is due to 
each person who belongs to a society.159 This move recaptures some of the disruptive 
potential of human rights by focusing individuals can demand of any authority, rather 
than the demand made amongst political communities.  
     
     Cohen argues that the rights that are required if individuals are to be treated as 
members are essentially those articulated in contemporary human rights treaties. 
While the practical import of this project is assumed to be acceptable, that human 
rights define just membership, Cohen thinks that the disagreements that exist over 
what is required can only be resolved through what he terms global public reason. 
Human rights are an independent normative enterprise to establish reasonable global 
norms to which political societies are to be held accountable. Global public reason, 
which is Cohen’s development of Rawls notion, provides the basis for a political 
agreement that takes no account of how or why a particular world view could find the 
human rights regime acceptable, but focuses deliberation on the necessity of just 
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political membership to legitimate authority. Though Cohen does encourage different 
ethical traditions to articulate their own most compelling vision in accord with the 
demands of global public reason, it is a curious engagement with diversity, which 
basically amounts to: we don’t care how or why you take on these norms defined by 
the need for legitimate membership, so long as you take them on!  
 
     This silence on the how and why of our political agreement, in favour of focusing 
on what is agreed, is what Cohen refers to as “un-foundationalism,”160 which he takes 
to be the necessary tolerant and disinterested perspective on why a given political 
society will embrace human rights as a standard of legitimacy. Ackerly is rightly 
concerned with the way in which Cohen’s theoretical perspective allows him to 
essentially speak for all those that might be resistant to this idea, which is particularly 
apparent in his reconstruction of Confusion and Muslim defences of his program of 
rights.161 As worrying as this tendency to speak with a voice that is authoritative for 
everyone, is the claim that there is a need for a universal reformulation of political 
ideas in light of a undeniable truth about the human person that modern experience 
has made manifest – which is a call to reformulate political principle not in light of 
any particular world view but in light of the requirements of legitimate membership. 
By defining this as the legitimate question, Cohen “allows” those who are not already 
supporters of liberal human rights to answer his central question in their own terms, 
but without contesting the terms of the question – which is the question of how to 
legitimate the contemporary bureaucratic state, or how to justify the liberal norms of 
justice either as a universal standard for all states or through the creation of 
institutions of global governance.162 Given that there is little development of this idea 
of global public reason beyond Rawls’ conception it is hard to find this proposition 
convincing or appealing if one does not already and always agree with the priorities 
established by global public reason: equal respect for autonomous states in forming a 
consensus on the terms of (in Cohen’s argument) political membership, which 
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simultaneously reaffirms the primacy of the bureaucratic nation-state and limits the 
question of human rights to that of determining what values and goods are necessary 
for just political membership. The problem is less the notion that considering what 
legitimates standards of political membership should be (as there may be good 
practical reason to focus on these questions) and more with the notion of how these 
standards are developed and implemented as postulates of public reason and 
fundamental markers of political legitimacy. An constructivist justification of moral 
principles (whether as presented by Cohen or by Rawls) that lacks a fuller analysis of 
the contingency and consequences of the institutional world its ideals are drawn from 
will always risk dressing up established power in the garb or disinterested reason.  
 
IV. A World Without Certainty 
 
The Rawlsian iteration of rationalist moral universalism illuminates the limits inherent 
to the tradition. There seems to be no way to square the circle, even with a 
metaphysical account of reason, which provides substantive principles and norms, the 
critique that always remains open and only partially addressed is that what reason 
deems necessary is little more than what power finds acceptable. This is the defining 
anxiety of universal moral theories because the very end they are aiming at – 
universal principles that are of absolute importance – ceases to be a certain and 
transformative one and becomes a contingent and often merely conventional end. This 
is the same failing that undermines moral essentialism, as presuming that some 
features of humanity have moral priority and define what is distinctive about being 
human requires the same quest for certainty, which assumes that the regulative 
function of morality can only be fulfilled if our moral principles are objectively and 
universally true in an absolute sense. These very large questions are at the heart of the 
idea of human rights, an idea that constantly undermines its own need for universal 
justification. It does this by appealing to humanity as a maximally inclusive category 
of moral concern and political identification, to privilege some expressions of 
humanity, some ways of knowing or living, over others suggest that there are those 
who are more fully or properly human than others – this is tension human rights 
always struggles with and which is caused by how we understand the task of moral 
theory. 
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     The primary goal of this chapter has been to analyse and asses dominant 
perspective on human rights and universal morality, and in particular to test them 
against a set of presumptions regarding the nature of ethical and political experience. 
Beginning with the idea that moral principle and political right when expressed, 
particularly as imperatives, create remainders. That is, they ignore, isolate, demean 
and discredit what does not fit. Throughout I have tried to show that modern and 
contemporary theories of rights are in a sense already alive to this problem, in so far 
as there is a concern with the messy particulars of actual experience. Yet, by and 
large, the response of moral theory, and in turn theories of human rights, is to provide 
a universal justification that cannot be denied, to eliminate rather than engage these 
remainders. What provokes this will to universalise? In part it is a historical tendency 
within the philosophical tradition I am examining, as we assume that rational answer 
are singular, or at least come in the form of a harmonious plurality, and that they 
provide undeniable reasons for acting. This requires in turn that the irrational is a 
subject for punishment, education or toleration, but remains deviant as a remainder. 
This is further affected by a tendency to seek absolute answers that hold everywhere 
and at every time. And the suggestion that answers do not hold in this way invites the 
cardinal sins of relativism and subjectivism, which threatens the political and moral 
order. In the following chapters I want to draw on traditions of thought that do not see 
pluralism or contingency as problems to subdued, but rather as facts with good and 
bad consequences, of which our ethical and political thinking must take account. That 
work, however, requires a further critical task. A key element of the critique thus far 
has been an insistence that we not deny the political content of ethics, that we not 
expect final and universal justifications. Yet, this presupposes a problematic 
relationship between morality and politics that I have only hinted at thus far. Where 
this chapter has been concerned with the attempt to provide certain grounds for moral 
principles, the next looks at the relationship between ethics and politics that seems to 
generate the need for certainty.  
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Chapter 2  
Human rights and the politics of uncertainty 
 
‘Life is the living of it, the walk is the walking of it, the song is what I compose or 
sing when I compose or sing it, not something independent of my activity; creation is 
not an attempt to copy some already given, fixed, eternal, Platonic pattern.’ 
-Isaiah Berlin, European Unity and its Vicissitudes 
 
I. Political Ideals and the Morality of Certainty 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that contemporary defences of human rights as 
universal moral principles are caught up in an impossible quest for certainty. The 
result of this search for certain and absolute principles, whether conducted in terms of 
essential human characteristics or the a priori demands of reason, is an account of 
human rights in which moral principles must be above contestation and work to 
constrain contingency and difference. This certainty is necessary so far as we expect 
moral principles to constrain political life, providing a rational ground for critique and 
reform of existing conditions. This dynamic not only generates the quest for certainty 
and the imperative to constrain pluralism, but it limits our political imagination. If the 
ideals that structure our understanding of world politics – whether the nation-state or 
the cosmopolis – and the terms in which they are defended, though moralised 
accounts of legitimacy and membership, are taken to be certain, not open to ongoing 
contestation and revision, then we risk limiting our moral and political imagination. 
The separation of moral principles from political conditions and contestation leads to 
shallow and repetitive calls for rival and incommensurable political orders. Calls 
either conservatively grounded in existing conditions or oriented toward distant 
utopian ends. As Kimberly Hutchings argues, the tensions between different ideal 
orders ‘are irresolvable in principle, because they represent a clash at the level of rival 
idealised ontologies which are mutually exclusive; they are unhelpful or inapplicable 
in practice, because of the perennial lack of fit between the “first best” world of ethics 
(morality) as against the “second best” world of politics.’1 The central task of this 
chapter is to examine this relationship and to suggest that an alternative account of 
human rights requires rethinking the relationship between morality and politics. To 
begin this process I look at the relationship between the account of human rights, and 
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the understanding of world politics in the work of Andrew Linklater and Michael 
Walzer.  
 
     How we understand ethics, the individual and society, the nature of politics, and 
even the process of historical change are interconnected, and while I want to present 
both Linklater and Walzer as offering compelling accounts of world politics, I also 
point to the problematic assumptions they make regarding these issues – in particular 
their tendencies to reduce plurality (whether in terms of fundamental moral values, 
moral identities, sources of political legitimacy or effective social forces) and to focus 
on the need for certainty. These criticism may be somewhat surprising, as both 
thinkers are sensitive to the distance that can arise between abstract theory and 
concrete experience, but I believe this reveals a tension within their work between 
their ideals and, for want of a more original phrase, their sense of reality.2 I conclude 
that this leads to a moral perspective that constrains plurality in the name of certainty 
and limits political imagination, despite the best efforts by both authors to bring 
together the moral and political. While they might accept Dewey’s claim that 
‘Judgment and belief regarding actions to be performed can never attain more than a 
precarious probability,’3 neither thinker is willing to give up the prospect of 
‘deliverance’ from uncertainty ‘by a knowledge to be attained apart from practical 
activity.’4 In Linklater’s case attained through universal rights granted to all 
individuals, while for Walzer deliverance comes in the form of the priority granted to 
the self-determining moral community. In the final section of the paper I suggest that 
an ethics that not only acknowledges but is also generated from irreducible plurality 
and the constancy of change leads to a different vision of world politics. 
 
     The success of human rights as a political project is perhaps best illustrated by the 
simple fact that supporters and sceptics alike must address their role in international 
political life. For both Linklater and Walzer, I will focus on the way their 
understanding of human rights is tied to their broader vision of political life. Crudely, 
Linklater views international human rights as an imperfect instantiation of universal 
moral principles that have a vital role to play in achieving a more just world politics in 
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which exclusion, violence and harm are reduced, and inclusion, democracy and 
cosmopolitan justice are increased. Human rights provide a set of principles that 
justify and structure this improved world politics. Walzer, by contrast sees rights as 
necessarily dependent upon strong institutionalisation and coherent social meanings. 
So, while a robust set of human rights might be an admirable ideal it is unlikely in a 
world of disparate communities. Further, an overly robust and determinate set of 
rights would threaten the central good of communal self-determination. These 
reservations aside, Walzer does suggest that we do have a minimal account of 
illegitimate politics that can be made more effective, and possibly more 
comprehensive, in our aversion to mass killing, starvation, forced migration, systemic 
torture and other grave wrongs. For Walzer, these minimal but vital universal 
principles provide limits to the justifiable actions of governments and communities.  
 
     In the final section of this chapter I argue that the contemporary idea of human 
rights is defined by a tension between distinct but equally unsatisfying conceptions of 
legitimate authority and political community. In both Linklater’s cosmopolitan ideal 
and Walzer’s vision of community an essential human truth finds expression in a 
distinctly moral form of community that justify human rights, which in turn provide 
conditions of legitimacy to institutionalised political power. Not withstanding the very 
different conclusions they draw, both thinkers pursue a reductionist ethics that 
supports a determinate vision of politics. By turns they present a global politics of 
multiple and overlapping loyalties, ensured by a cosmopolitan order that includes 
robust legal institutions and protections of global citizenship rights, and of an 
international politics of self-determining nation-states expressive of distinctive social 
values and meanings, but constrained by minimal universalism that recognises the 
unacceptability of grievous forms of cruelty and violence.  
 
     However attractive these visions of moral politics may be, they are not accurate 
descriptions of world politics, and while no ethical vision – necessarily oriented 
towards what might be – should aspire to provide such a description, the ideal 
presented is problematically determinate and limiting. The contemporary idea of 
human rights cannot fully acknowledge the remainders it generates. Honig rightly 
acknowledges that Walzer and the Critical Theory that inspires Linklater are both 
alive to the danger of exclusion generated by universal principles and determinate 
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identities,5 but this acknowledgement is only partial, as difference is acknowledged 
only so far as it does not upset the desirability of a universal human rights bearer or 
the morally privileged political community. A fuller affirmation of the persistence of 
plurality and contestation would treat ‘rights and law as part of political contest rather 
than as the instruments of its closure.’6 This leads to an alternative starting point, one 
that accepts ‘that attempts to shut down the agon perpetually fail, that the best (or 
worst) they do is to displace politics onto other sites and topics, where the struggle of 
identity and difference, resistance and closure is then repeated.’7 This is necessary not 
only to appreciate the values, forms of community and political order that 
contemporary human rights explicitly denies, it is also to ensure a place for the 
experiences, aspirations and imaginations that cannot find expression without 
challenging the vision of world political order that contemporary human rights are 
based upon.8 
 
II. Linklater’s Critical Cosmopolitanism 
 
For Linklater, the fundamental tension that calls for resolution within the current 
inter-state system is the distinction between man and citizen.9 This focus on the 
difference between membership in and exclusion from political community shapes his 
account of human rights. On his account, the evolution of citizenship rights in the 
European state-system reflects both increasing inclusivity of concern and the 
expansion of democratic politics – a pattern of development with wider implications 
that should be continued at the global level.10 The justification for expanded 
citizenship rights within the nation-state generates the problem of unjust national 
exclusions – if equal rights are accorded universally within the polis, the justification 
for drawing distinctions of right and duty at the national border is put into question.11 
While he is keen to give an historical account of the expansion of these rights, he also 
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argues that there is a universal moral right to exercise control over decisions and 
activities that affect one’s life, and a corresponding responsibility not to cause 
unnecessary harm to others through the exercise of this rightful power self-
determination. These two commitments shape Linklater’s defence of human rights, 
leading him to argue not only for strong protections from harm and violence, but also 
for robust rights of political participation. Further, this program of rights can only be 
fulfilled and ensured in a global political order defined both by cosmopolitan 
citizenship and the “good international citizenship” of reformed post-Westphalian 
states.12 
 
     The first issue to be developed here is why Linklater takes the distinction between 
man and citizen to be of central importance. The bare fact that we accord preferential 
treatment to co-nationals is not self-evidently objectionable, which is why Linklater 
emphasizes the harmful effects of such national exclusivity. In limiting political rights 
and moral responsibility to citizens of a discrete community we are potentially the 
victims and perpetrators of serious harm. ‘The establishment of appropriate global 
legal and political arrangements, supported by commitments to world citizenship, 
would ensure that all persons would be protected from unnecessary harm.’13 Nation-
states have capabilities to effect physical destruction and political instability on a 
global scale, both through the power of modern weapons and as a result of the 
propensity of the state-system to conflict and military engagement. Further, 
uncontrolled social forces, both political and economic, are increasing global 
interconnectedness and thus making all of us more vulnerable to serious harms. 
Finally, the global threat posed by environmental destruction is another global 
concern that calls the conventional account of citizenship into question.14 As the 
nation-state has become the primary form of social organisation globally it has created 
conditions of instability and interconnectedness that undermine it as an adequate form 
of political community. Thus in order to both control the social forces that affect us 
and to properly honour our moral duties to humanity, new forms of citizenship, based 
on a cosmopolitan political order and universal human rights, are necessary. 
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     This is not a purely practical argument – it is not only the need to control our social 
lives more effectively that generates the need to overcome the exclusivity of national 
citizenship; there is also a moral argument to be made. First, Linklater claims that we 
have a moral right to participate in decisions that affect us.15 This suggests that even if 
an exclusionary political order were better able to control social life, it would be 
immoral because individuals would not have a say in important decisions affecting 
them – this justifies a right of participation, to political self-determination. The second 
moral claim that calls the distinction between man and citizen into question is the duty 
not to cause undue harm to others.16 This calls the current state-system into question 
because national borders separate humanity in a way that both enables committing 
such harms and makes it difficult to prevent them. Any legitimate political order, in 
Linklater’s view, must enable us to confront grievous harms such as ethnic cleansing, 
large-scale war, severe poverty and environmental catastrophe. Merely claiming these 
moral principles is not enough; therefore I turn next to Linklater’s defence of moral 
universalism, which draws on both discourse ethics and a sociological account of the 
development of global harm conventions. 
 
     Linklater’s use of Habermas’ discourse ethics is at the centre of his argument for 
cosmopolitan moral duties. He broadly endorses Habermas’ account of 
communicative reason as the search for an inclusive consensus on moral questions.17 
This process of reasoning requires and legitimates the egalitarian moral agency that 
animates Linklater’s opposition to all forms of unjust exclusion.18 Discourse ethics 
suggests that within and between polities all norms are subject to critique in two 
ways. The first is that to be morally legitimate political arrangements must uphold 
principles of universal moral respect and equal regard. The second is that accepted 
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norms, laws and social arrangements can be challenged and held up to reflective 
scrutiny in a representative political system, reflecting a more or less ideal speech 
situation, in which all participants have an equal right to make arguments and 
agreement is based on the force of the better argument and not some other source of 
coercive power.19 But there is a tension here, as universal rights place limits on the 
legitimate self-determination of the political community; there are forms of self-
legislation forbidden by moral principle. Where moral principle is not respected and 
the will of the community or the sovereign violates the integrity of the universal 
individual, then legitimate authority is lost. In political terms, this paradox is 
expressed in the conclusion that the spread of moral equality, expressed in human 
rights norms, requires the expansion of democracy beyond the national state, the 
conventionally authoritative political community.20 In world politics this means that 
exclusions based on a presumption of sovereignty or communal identity are 
insufficient and open to criticism, especially by those who are affected by these 
arrangements but without a voice in the decision process.21  
 
     Following Seyla Benhabib, Linklater focuses on the split between the right and the 
good within discourse ethics, as the norms required by communicative reason, aimed 
towards practical understanding, provide only a procedural morality that allows 
considerable space for the expression of difference. Discourse ethics requires only a 
commitment to those principles that make practical agreement possible, such 'that 
only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
all concerned in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.'22 This entails 
universal moral respect and equal access in the decision-making processes that affect 
one's life. 'The discourse theory develops a normative and critical criterion by which 
to judge existing institutional arrangement, insofar as these current arrangements 
suppress a "generalizable interest."'23 For this reason, Benhabib thinks it is important 
to emphasise that while the principle on inclusion involves a substantive commitment 
to universal moral respect, this does not lead to a narrow range of legitimate 
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understandings of the good. Therefore, while we come to any discourse with a 
substantive conception of the good, we must seek to take on the moral view point of 
the concrete, and not merely abstract, other – one figure representing the universal 
and equal presumptions of moral thinking and the other those specific relationships 
and understandings of ethical life that cannot and should not be avoided in the process 
of discourse. An appreciation of the real effects of difference between participants in a 
given discourse may lead to the conclusion that consensual principles are not a 
possible outcome in every situation.24  
 
     Linklater endorses Benhabib’s view, claiming that these reconsiderations of 
discourse ethics respond to the ‘contention that critical theory is committed to modes 
of thought and action that would subsume difference within one totalising identity.’25 
He argues that the goal is not total consensus and that moral-political understanding 
has two dimensions: ‘to understand the plurality of moral views in order to reach 
agreement about the principles of inclusion and exclusion, and to comprehend the 
rules of coexistence, which agents could accept for pragmatic reasons should a 
consensus elude them.’26 While this argument does much to make the process of 
discourse more realistic, it weakens the justification for the presumptions of universal 
moral respect and equal voice in decisions that affect one’s life, because the principles 
of discourse must give way where difference overwhelms consensus. If the reality of 
difference between individuals is such that consensus is not possible, the status of the 
principles and evaluations that emerge from the process of discourse becomes 
questionable. While practical rules of coexistence may be both necessary and useful 
in political life, it would seem they lack moral legitimacy as the reasons for agreeing 
to them was not the unforced force of the better argument. If we introduce other 
practical concerns as reasons for coming to some agreement the distinctive features of 
discourse as a form of communicative rationality are undermined. This has at least 
two potential implications: first, moral legitimacy is dependent upon consensus, but 
because of the degree of difference between some individuals’ moral evaluations, 
common moral principles are not always possible. The second is that practical 
considerations such as power-inequality, self-interest, sympathy or guilt could prove 
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critical to finding principles of coexistence that are not “rational” but could be moral. 
Either conclusion is unattractive to a thinker committed to the moral universalism that 
discourse ethics justifies, which is the reason that Linklater does not rely solely on the 
necessary presumptions of moral discourse to justify his position. Without explicitly 
acknowledging this failure of discourse ethics, he does include additional arguments 
to justify the principles of universal moral concern and equal access to decision-
making – which could be seen to give good reason for maintaining these principles 
where moral consensus is not possible.  
 
     In his more recent work Linklater has focused on the issue of harm, and while 
there will be more to say about the issue of cosmopolitan harm conventions within 
state-systems in what follows, the moral importance of harm itself needs to be 
considered. First, Linklater argues that the increasing severity and range of harms we 
are exposed to gives reason to seek more universal forms of community. Because the 
nation-state and the state system concentrate massive military power in state agencies, 
and enable both inter- and intra-state warfare, it generates new demands for wider 
solidarity.27 Added to this, economic interconnectedness, technological advances in 
communication and transport, and environmental degradation increase the exposure of 
individuals to transnational and global harms that cannot be controlled or responded 
to adequately at the national level.28 Linklater self consciously takes forward the 
Stoic’s claim that we have a duty to prevent harm to all of humanity – and what he 
seeks to show is that while discourse ethics may not provide a fully convincing 
justification for universal principles, a duty to prevent harm does, as a matter of 
contemporary fact, require us to embrace cosmopolitan duty. 
 
     Appreciating that this appeal to a duty not to harm and the existence of global and 
transnational harms is not self-justifying, Linklater points to shared human 
vulnerabilities and capacities for sympathetic understanding. In making this move he 
explicitly references an earlier generation of critical theorists, who based human 
solidarity in the shared experience of suffering and mortality.29 Linklater appeals to an 
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‘ethic of human concern that is, in some respects, more fundamental than the social 
moralities that usually shape individual and group behavior,’30 which begins with 
human vulnerability and a sense that however much we may want for a universal 
good, we have an experience of universal evil. This common vulnerability is 
recognised through a sort of primordial form of human identity, a process of 
connection that is experiential, emotional and sympathetic – rather than rational, 
linguistic and procedural. His claim is that we do acknowledge the moral motivation 
of the suffering of other human beings as human beings rather than as co-nationals or 
co-members of any community, such that an automatic impulse to rescue, to respond 
to threats to survival, are immanent if not always actual in human society.31 This 
emphasis on vulnerability provides a contemporary defence of the stoic duty not to 
harm, but highlights the role of emotion, sympathy and physical vulnerability that is 
often absent in moral universalism. While I am sympathetic to this account, it 
becomes increasingly problematic when we consider the full extent of Linklater’s 
cosmopolitanism, as he explicitly builds from an account of universal concern to an 
account of cosmopolitan duty instantiated in a global political order. 
 
     There are two problems with this appeal to common humanity. First, Linklater 
treats the categories of the “outsider” or the “stranger” as if they have the same 
meaning as “humanity”, and while he is clear that ‘the decision to help a stranger 
from another social group need not rest on a doctrine of the equality of all persons – 
or rather it need only recognize their equality to a limited extent,’32 this still supposes 
that the relevant appeal was one to a common humanness, as opposed to duties owed 
to difference as such. Further, what goes unaddressed is that “humanity” is treated as 
the more primordial or basic category, which is a questionable assumption and begs 
the question of how this concept acquires meaning. To the degree that this appeal to 
the experience of common humanity – both in sympathy and vulnerability – is meant 
to substantiate a robust and prescriptive form of moral universalism and political 
cosmopolitanism, it fails to provide the grounds for its own significance. Linklater 
seems to assume that the failure to be morally motivated by such experiences is 
explained by the construction of exclusive and particular identities, neglecting the 
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way in which a human identity is itself constructed and can be used to justify a great 
many harms and exclusions as easily as care and inclusion. Colonial subjects were 
recognised as humans of an inferior variety, and Europeans in some cases thought of 
themselves as having a variety of duties of “automatic rescue” that included saving 
their Christian souls or removing them from conditions of barbarism.33 Certainly, 
Linklater would oppose such constructions of humanity – my point is to emphasise 
that the meaning of human identity, whatever its phenomenological immediacy, is not 
given nor necessary singular and coherent.  
 
     The second related point is that the prevention of harm is not a simple or obviously 
basic value either. To begin with Linklater tells a story of individuals suffering from 
harm – the challenge for them is exert control over these harms in a way that gives 
each person a say in this process and regards every individual as equal. Importantly, 
these qualifications (participation and equal regard) are not built into a concern with 
preventing harm as such. This is the often repeated point that the individualistic 
autonomous agent is not a given but a social construction, and one which importantly 
is defined though an opposition to certain types of harm, mainly threats to autonomy 
defined through exercising rational choice, being secure in body and property, 
maintaining clear legal distinctions between individuals and between the public and 
private in social life. While Linklater may want to begin with “basic” physical harms 
– which remains contentious in its own way – he also wants to give an account of 
increasing freedom and inclusion, which requires a more substantive account of harm 
that will not do the foundational work he intends. Further, not only are basic harms 
difficult to establish, the prevention or control of one type of harm may result in 
additional harms or the loss of valuable goods, making this appeal to harms even 
more ambiguous and complicated. Living in a world in which eliminating threats of 
bodily harm is prioritised may result in less personal control over one’s own body or 
fewer chances for desired risk taking. In the end I do not want to deny the importance 
of vulnerability and harm, or humanity and sympathy, to our ethical thought, but 
rather to point to the fact that they do not necessarily support the grander edifice that 
Linklater seeks to build upon them. They provide no shelter from the plurality and 
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uncertainty that make ethical commitment and judgment an always contingent and 
political activity. 
 
     Linklater recognises that ‘the need for compassion for non-nationals, personal 
responsibility for the environment and action to create more cosmopolitan forms of 
political association’ does not necessarily challenge the nation-state or the inter-state 
system, as these institutions could be reformed, but he also clearly thinks that 
upholding our duty and expressing the appropriate care for humanity should lead to 
new forms of political order.34 Returning to his original tension between man and 
citizen, we can trace an argument based both on the practical necessity of more 
inclusive forms of international political order and the moral basis for cosmopolitan 
rights. Linklater reads the history of political community as a story of increasing 
inclusion brought about by both social forces and moral learning – this leads to an 
increasingly interrelated social world defined by global economic relations, shared 
environmental threats, societies based on the rule of law rather than custom, the 
modern state’s monopoly of legitimate violence and the regulation of international 
politics by the sovereign inter-state system. There is a crucial linkage made between 
this history and cosmopolitan moral duties, which leads Linklater to envision the 
solution to the problem “man and citizen” as the expansion of the legitimate 
representational elements of the state to a global level.  
 
     In part the development of citizenship rights is a history of practical social 
evolution, as increasingly powerful and institutionalised states required new forms of 
legitimacy, which were secured by guarantees of security and then political 
participation and welfare. But this adaptation of social life to conditions also enables 
and is guided by powerful moral duties. Whether he looks to the Stoic or natural law 
tradition, Linklater identifies a similar tension between the duties we have to 
humanity and those we have towards co-nationals. Many have argued for the 
acceptability of this split, claiming that our duties to humanity are imperfect and 
indeterminate, but Linklater supports a conception of universal human rights that 
expands the rights and protections afforded to citizens to all human beings. While he 
acknowledges that the contemporary human rights regime is importantly partial, what 
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he refers to as a ‘liberal as opposed to a republican conception of citizenship beyond 
the state,’35 he argues that it has a distinct significance in ‘challenging the traditional 
assumption that states are the sole or main subjects of international law.’36 
 
     The contemporary human rights regime institutionalises an individual legal 
personality that is not tied to national citizenship but rather reflects the rights of 
human beings as such. This form of right follows the same logic of the expansion of 
citizenship rights to all those within the political community, but challenges the 
exclusion based on nationality. While the universal rights current most broadly 
accepted lack the guarantees of participation and self-determination, which are central 
to the full conception of modern citizenship, they still preserve an important realm of 
cosmopolitan right in which rights violations anywhere are a concern for all, and 
those whose rights are violated can make their case outside of the nation-state – 
though the legal and political institutions through which this is done remains 
practically limited and problematically exclusive, it is still a significant step.37  
 
     Linklater’s argument goes further than claiming that human rights provide minimal 
principles of legitimacy that inhibit the unjust actions of states against their citizens – 
though he acknowledge this important function. First, establishing international legal 
personality for individuals undermines the state as the sole legitimate authority in 
world politics, as the state is not only often the primary violator of these rights, but it 
is increasingly incapable of protecting individuals. Second, the need to respect 
individuals’ rights to self-determination and participation suggests the need for new 
forms of political organisation, as the inter-state system and the nation-state prove 
unable to ensure the full scope of individual rights and effectively regulate the harms 
individuals suffer. 
 
     Linklater acknowledges that human rights as they exist in the contemporary world 
are only a partial institutionalisation of cosmopolitan duty, but they are part of a 
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process by which a cosmopolitan global order may emerge.38 Also, cosmopolitan 
right – as the extension of citizenship rights beyond the nation-state – suggests that 
the idea of good international citizenship has a role to play in improving the inter-state 
system and potentially transforming it. Linklater suggests that good international 
citizens are states that ‘have a special responsibility for working out the international 
implications of the more enlightened concepts of national citizenship.’39 Further, he 
suggests that this responsibility falls to liberal-social democratic states, as they have 
most fully worked out the universal moral implications of citizenship rights in their 
domestic polities. This compliments the idea of human rights as limits on state’s 
rights, suggesting that a commitment to human rights should lead to action to uphold 
those rights within the international system by upholding international human rights 
treaties, adhering to international criminal law and giving consideration to the needs 
and interests of non-citizens.  
 
     Many cosmopolitan thinkers draw out the immanent universalism in contemporary 
international politics to motivate a further cosmopolitan transformation,40 but what 
distinguishes Linklater’s position is the consideration he gives to both the persistent 
and important role of the nation-state and the inter-state system. The development of a 
cosmopolitan democracy – as opposed to unrepresentative institutions of global 
governance or more limited forms cosmopolitan right – is a possibility to be pursued 
but one that will likely require much time and effort. Rather than emphasising a 
unique break in our current moment, such that a cosmopolitan orientation is a sudden 
requirement, he traces out the historic presence of cosmopolitan harm conventions in 
international politics, suggesting that the value of universal concern and its role in 
constraining political power is inherent in our moral sentiments and current 
institutions of international politics. 
  
The function of a sociology of cosmopolitan harm conventions is to 
investigate how far different state systems drew on the idea of a 
universal community of humankind to create agreements that 
individuals should be protected from the suffering such phenomena 
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cause. It is to ask how far the great state-systems developed moral 
conventions which reveal that human sympathies need not be confined 
to co-nationals or fellow citizens but can be expanded to embrace all 
members of the human race.41 
 
This compliments the idea of good international citizenship, as Linklater demonstrates 
that there are norms of behaviour in the classical conception of sovereignty that insist 
that states have responsibility for both order and justice in international society, 
placing limits on the use of violence by sovereign states and upholding the duty states 
owe to their subjects.42 Yet, despite these aspects, which are more fully expressed in 
the current inter-state system, the move to cosmopolitan democracy remains the 
necessary next step in the pursuit of justice. This is because we have reached the 
limits of state-centric social order’s ability to respond to the demands of justice and 
adequately control the social world. His work on the NATO intervention in Kosovo 
both highlights the role for good international citizenship and points to the moral and 
structural limitations of the current order, as the response to events in Kosovo was 
famously characterised as legitimate but illegal and states, burdened with their 
particular interest, were imperfect agents of justice.43 Further, the issues of global 
poverty and environmental destruction provide additional evidence that the existing 
institutions of international society are inadequate. 
 
     The exact shape this cosmopolitan democracy takes is not clear, and one could be 
forgiven in thinking he is idealising the European Union (EU),44 but Linklater is 
hardly alone in this failing – what is distinctive is his insistence that what must be 
expanded are citizenship rights that add a more participatory democratic compliment 
to existing human rights protections. The most important change would be to fully 
dissolve the link between nationality or ethnicity and political inclusion, so that all 
individuals would have a say in those actions that affect them. Linklater suggests this 
will involve authorities both smaller and larger than the nation-state (speaking both 
geographically and in terms of numbers), but that proliferation of democratic polities 
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in a cosmopolitan order does not mean the elimination of the state as such. Rather, the 
state persists in a truly post-Westphalian form, in which its absolute sovereignty is not 
even a lingering myth and a global order of democratic participation and law 
constrains the actions of state authority. Not only are vital exclusions eliminated, as a 
global democratic order would include everyone, the exclusions that remain in 
political life would be legitimated by inclusive processes of justifiable differentiation 
or face appeal to higher political and legal orders by individuals treated unjustly.  
 
     This vision of cosmopolitan order bears similarities to that suggested by Benhabib, 
who speaks of democratic iterations at multiple social levels.45 Comparing their work 
again reveals two problems faced by a critical cosmopolitanism, which her work 
responds more fully to. First, universal human rights require the imposition of a 
political structure and an account of the universal individual upon existing 
communities and individuals with potentially very different subjectivities. Benhabib is 
keenly aware of this problem. She argues that legitimate human rights norms are 
worked out through democratic iterations in which culturally specific human rights 
are re-made as ‘elements in the public culture of democratic peoples through their 
own process of interpretation articulation, and iteration.’46 While human rights entail 
protections for individuals that trump the de facto authority of the nation-sate and, 
further, that communal authority requires guarantees of democratic participation, 
Benhabib suggests that the form that actual human rights standards will take depends 
upon the context in which they are worked out. On this account the universal 
individual finds expression through an actual person, therefore the space for 
particularity must be preserved.  
 
     The second problem Benhabib’s account of rights highlights is that it undermines 
the priority given to the territorial state in favour of a more expansive democratic 
order, but, seemingly, without any guide to how the boundaries of legitimate 
community are to be established. If everyone has a right to participate in decisions 
that affect them, then potentially everyone has a right to participation everywhere. 
Benhabib address this issue by accepting the necessity of a democratic sovereignty 
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that extends beyond the nation-state to a form of global constitutionalism, but without 
seeking to eliminate or completely transcend the state. Instead the state must find its 
legitimacy in a cosmopolitan field with multiple levels of governance and 
participation, institutionalising not a singular human community, but a community of 
humanity that enables and is legitimated by universal rights that protect individuals 
not only from state violence, but also social and economic harms endemic to global 
capitalism, and guarantee the sanctity of forms of community in which individual 
identity, ethical values and communal autonomy are also protected from unjust 
intervention.47 The community of humanity, then, is a diverse community of 
communities, the members of which preserve their distinctiveness even as morality 
requires they abide by universal principles of legitimacy.  
 
     There are many virtues in Benhabib’s justification of human rights. She does allow 
for an important degree of contestation in the articulation of human rights through her 
ideas of democratic iteration and jurisgenerative politics.48 First, the appeal to 
democratic iterations highlights the necessity of contextualisation, as human rights 
norms are not simply accepted as they are institutionalised in international politics, 
but re-made and applied in context through the democratic process. Second, the 
jurisgenerative nature of law, which she emphasises, denies the capacity of powerful 
institutions and actors to authoritatively determine the social norms expressed through 
the law. This is done by appealing to the wider political contestation that shapes the 
law and allows human rights law to remain critical and subversive of established 
power, even when they are rhetorically taken up by hegemonic states to justify self-
interested policies. However, the degree of contestation and difference that is allowed 
is still constrained, as it is only when universal moral principles are upheld that it can 
be said that there ‘is legitimate “unity and diversity” in human rights among well-
ordered polities.’49 So, even as democratic iterations lead to diversity, they also lead 
to convergence, because the moral principles that provide the foundation of rights 
cannot be contradictory or ambiguous.  
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     Bonnie Honig suggests, the ‘assumption in Habermas and Benhabib of linear time 
secures’ what she calls ‘a chrono-logic in relation to which they assess new rights: 
new rights-claims are judged in terms of the rights’ amenability to being subsumed 
under existing constitutional or universal categories.’50 As she goes on to argue, 
Benhabib cannot ‘see how new rights-claims do not necessarily demand mere 
inclusion in a previously stabilized order. They may. But they may also demand a new 
world. They may unsettle previously existing categories of right.’51 This approach to 
rights is a result of the role that the quest for certainty plays in how we understand 
moral principles, treating them as if they must limit contestation and impose order 
upon ethical and political life, which means that justifications of human rights that are 
expressed in this mode will always depend upon a singular conception of humanity 
and legitimate community, even if one is as sensitive to difference as Benhabib is, 
there is a need to presuppose the universal moral subject and her place in the political 
community in order to generate objective principles.  
 
     To conclude, I want to point to two problems with Linklater’s conception of both 
morality and politics. First, it is not clear that the progress of human freedom is a 
process that can be rationalised, in the sense that there is clear progress towards 
greater and more perfect freedom. Human freedom is the source of conflict as much 
as harmony; within societies the free creativity of humanity can lead to social 
breakdown as quickly as social harmony and this problem is only made worse at the 
international level. If we do not assume that freedom is rationally constrained to take 
certain prescribed forms, there is no reason to assume it can be developed without 
continuously leading to conflict that does not admit of any rationally necessary 
resolution.52 Related to this is the observation that much of humanity over much of its 
history has not privileged freedom above other values. This is not an attack on 
freedom as valuable, but an acknowledgment that what we value does not reduce to 
freedom and a consistent prioritisation of freedom can force us to sacrifice other 
values.  
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     The second concern I want to raise is that despite Linklater’s best efforts, his 
thinking retains problematically absolutist notions of both progress and moral 
principle. Even though he makes accommodation for postmodern critiques of 
modernist narratives of human progress indebted to Enlightenment rationalism, I 
contend that Linklater retains a broadly progressive notion of the evolution of human 
society that is supportive of a cosmopolitan political order and universal moral 
principle.53 It is unclear how this narrative is compelling if one truly rejects the idea 
that some social, historical or rational force determines the course of human social 
evolution. This critique is directly related to Linklater’s contention that an 
increasingly universal ethics, underpinned by the universal moral principles embodied 
in discourse ethics, is both the needed solution to the tensions between the universal 
and particular, and a realisation of a desirable Kantian ideal of moral regard as respect 
for equal, autonomous and rational subjects. If one takes a more agnostic approach to 
the necessity or probability of historical progress it seems more likely that much of 
our development is contingent and uncertain.54 It is this understanding of history that 
provides a different perspective on questions of moral and political progress. It is a 
position of greater scepticism and pluralism, which sees both moral principle and 
social change as an interaction between material conditions, established practice, 
human moral imagination and rational problem solving.  
 
     The problem with abandoning both a comprehensive notion of rational freedom 
and of a purposeful history that guarantees social progress is that the relationship 
between morality and politics is called into question.55 Linklater ties political 
legitimacy to inclusion, both as equal concern and political participation, but the 
priority they are given is unsustainable within the terms that he sets out. This aporia 
does not go unrecognised, but in the end Linklater’s secondary appeal to human 
vulnerability and the historical reality of cosmopolitan sentiments fails as an 
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independent justification, as these moral ideals only lead to the grander cosmopolitan 
project if they are already read as justifying and supporting Linklater’s account of 
cosmopolitan right. Returning to the role of human rights, we see again the use of 
moral principle – removed from contestation and expressing a necessarily moral 
power – to justify a coercive political order and to limit contestation. Human rights 
specify not only the legitimate claims of political subjects and authorities, but also the 
relationships, ends and practices that constitute social life, making the invocation of 
human rights an always potentially assimilative act of imposition. This is an 
imposition not only on those who are socially marginalised or who object to the 
human rights claim in question, but also an imposition of the ideal upon lived 
experience. The value of Linklater’s cosmopolitan orientation is not only in the 
sensitivity and sophistication of the argument, but also in the tension it exhibits – the 
reality of international politics challenges and upsets his cosmopolitan vision, 
pointing to the limits not of a possible ethic of global concern but a particular way of 
understanding the role of human rights, and moral principles generally, in legitimating 
the forms political authority he envisions. 
 
     In Linklater’s work, human rights and citizenship rights have a common source in 
the demands of equal moral regard and a right to participation, and in both cases these 
universal rights directly structure political life. Political authority is legitimate so far 
as it can successfully uphold these rights, and so far as the inter-state system fails to 
protect these rights effectively or limits their scope then new forms of political order 
become necessary. Further, this transformed order must be more universal, even as 
the order need not be based upon a singular world state. The rights of individuals, 
including rights to maintain communities of permissibly exclusive identity,56 call for 
new political authorities both smaller and larger than the nation-state. What is most 
remarkable about this political ideal is the degree of harmony it presumes, and which 
would be necessary to its success. Not only is there a harmony or rights – rights to 
security, political participation, welfare and community are presumed to form a single 
emancipatory ideal – but the multiple levels of political authority, if they are to be a 
real advance on the nation-state, must work with astounding coordination and 
goodwill. While a multi-level order of democratic iterations may offer further levels 
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of appeal to individuals abused by political authority, it also serves to expose 
individuals to proliferating obligations, which they may not be able to meet, as well as 
creating more sites of vulnerability to institutional abuse, corruption and inefficiency. 
This remark is not intended merely to point to the practical difficulties of 
cosmopolitan politics (an important but obvious critique), but rather to point out a 
weakness in Linklater’s conception of politics – and specifically democracy – which 
is perhaps too focused on procedures and laws, missing much of what is political in 
both the exercise of power but also the reality of contestation that cannot be contained 
in the dialogic ideal.57  
 
III. Walzer’s Democratic Nationalism 
 
In considering the work of Michael Walzer I want to follow important strands of my 
argument as they apply to his conception of ethics and understanding of the role of 
human rights in world politics. In the end, I argue that distinctions between universal 
and particular, or cosmopolitan and communitarian, orientations miss the common 
assumptions regarding ethics and politics that not only generate core controversies 
around human rights, and in international political theory broadly, but also render 
them irresolvable and limiting. Walzer’s work is defined by his focus on the 
contextual and social nature of meaning, which goes deeper than simply insisting on 
the recognition of the social sources of identity. This leads me to focus on the nature 
of community and ethical values in my critique, but my concern remains tracing out 
the way these ideas relate to political authority - and the place of universal principles, 
such as human rights, in world politics. 
 
     Walzer’s thought is not structured around a central problem, such as Linklater’s 
distinction between man and citizen, and his work covers many aspects of political 
theory. He has, however, been centrally concerned with international politics, from 
his seminal work on just war to his reflections on democracy, justice and tolerance. If 
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Walzer’s thinking on world politics can be characterised by a unifying concern it 
would be the connection between community and meaning. It is the importance he 
grants to embedded understanding that shapes his views on ethics and politics, and 
which forms the backdrop for his views on human rights and legitimate political 
authority.58 
 
     The socially embedded nature of ethics, for Walzer, comes from the nature of truth 
and meaning. Traditional accounts of morality depend upon the image of the 
philosopher as lawgiver, such that it is the philosopher’s separation from the social 
world than enables the articulation of justified principles.59 Walzer acknowledges that 
this process takes many forms – prophetic revelation and rational deduction being two 
rather out of fashion ways of generating the moral law – and suggests that in 
contemporary political theory the image of the judge dominates.60 In democratic 
society the law itself is generated through the democratic process, ideally representing 
the will of the people, but the judge (and by extension the philosopher) is charged 
with ensuring the agreement of enacted law with higher principles. This requires the 
philosopher to exist in a removed state from the political community, as their object 
of reflection is the universal ideal of justice or right. It is this separation that Walzer 
opposes. He insists that such external and non-social standpoints are unattainable and 
so far as they are imperfectly put into practice they take a rather authoritarian form.  
 
     This critique of philosophical morality is based on an account of truth and meaning 
that is dependent upon consensus within the community.61 Importantly this is not 
simply a dialogic consensus, but one based in deeper currents of history, established 
practices and common experience. For this reason Walzer finds appeals to original 
positions or ideal speech situations unconvincing, and instead focuses on the 
importance of both established social meanings and the processes by which those 
meanings are established, contested and changed, stating that  
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conversation is only one among many features of the complex social 
process that produces consensus and shared understandings. That 
process includes political struggle (settled, at best, by the force of 
numbers, not arguments), negotiation and compromise, law making and 
law enforcement, socialization in families and schools, economic 
transformations, cultural creativity of all sorts. The understandings that 
come to be shared will never have been rationally defended by a single 
speaker who managed to see them whole.62  
 
The implications of this starting point can be seen in Walzer’s defence of the self-
determination of peoples,63 his argument for a plurality of distributive principles when 
addressing the demands of social justice as complex equality,64 and the attention he 
gives to the challenge of tolerating difference within the community.65 The process of 
generating and revising social meanings is a concrete process, and while there is 
certainly a place for abstract reflection, that abstraction cannot take the place of actual 
struggles and contestations that generate the sort of situated and historical consensus 
that community depends upon.66 This is particularly evident in Walzer’s account of 
democracy, where he offers a vivid picture of democracy as a comprehensive political 
practice that involves knocking on doors, raising money, holding protests, debating 
policy and actually casting ballots and abiding by the results, at least until the next 
round of voting – and it is the immediacy and even physicality of these democratic 
customs that generate the social identity and relations that enable critique.67 
 
     Given Walzer’s general view it might seem unlikely he would have much to say 
about world politics, but in fact his account of political community does have 
implications for international order. In his article “Nation and Universe,” Walzer 
makes clear that his understanding of social meaning does not preclude a form of 
universalism, what he terms reiterative universalism.68 The implication of this 
reiterative universalism is that while there is not a single standard of legitimacy for all 
communities, there is a common need for and right to self-determination. Because 
social meanings, and by extension ethical values and the terms of legitimate political 
                                                 
62
 Walzer, “A Critique of Philosophical Conversation,” Thinking Politically, 32. 
63
 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, 
NY: Basic Books, 1977). 
64
 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 1983. 
65
 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (London: Yale University Press, 1997). 
66
 Walzer, “Objectivity and Social Meaning,” Thinking Politically, 50. 
67
 Walzer, “Deliberation and What Else?” Thinking Politically, 134-145. 
68
 Walzer, “Nation and Universe,” Thinking Politically, 186. 
  88 
authority, must be worked out in community, something like a universal right to self-
determination should structure relations between communities in order to preserve the 
needed social space.69  
 
     Walzer argues in Just and Unjust Wars that the society of states is structured by 
states’ rights to territorial integrity and self-determination.70 It is a point of contention 
how these rights are grounded, as in that text he suggests that states’ rights are derived 
from individual rights to life and liberty – a concession to individualism that has led 
critics to allege that protection and priority he gives to states is unjustified.71 This 
criticism, as it is generally stated, misses the point of Walzer’s argument, as critics all 
too quickly move from this use of individual rights as a justification for the state to a 
liberal case for the priority of individual human rights over states’ rights.72 First, the 
individual rights to life and liberty that Walzer defends are essentially concerned with 
preserving the individual as a member of a self-determining community, and not with 
articulating prescriptive and determinate universal rights that individuals can exercise 
apart from any particular community, stating that ‘morally creative men and women 
produce many different moralities, none of them the one perfect morality that would 
render their creativity superfluous.’73 Further, Walzer is clear that he takes these basic 
rights to be justified by a general consensus that reaches beyond the liberal context in 
which they were articulated and which are vaguely articulated and conventionally 
accepted rather than grounded in a universal human nature.74 This is evidenced by the 
way in which the nation-state has been taken up as a political structure internationally 
– particularly in the post-WWII period the protection of state sovereignty was seen as 
vital for newly liberated peoples, but that liberation takes many forms.75 Finally, the 
modern nation-state system is an historical context of its own, so while the rights 
framework that defines the nation-state system is not a timeless moral principle it 
does reflect the understanding of an age. While Walzer does not make this direct 
argument, traces of it can be seen when he points to the way in which “Western” 
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values have changed across historical epochs – a point well illustrated by the 
increasing priority given to bodily over spiritual health.76 Also, in his account of 
tolerance in different ages defined by imperial order, nationalist politics and 
immigrant states, Walzer suggests that we can intelligently speak of the spirit of an 
age, so far as this involves the most widespread social understandings and values.77 It 
is worth noting that we may only now be entering a period in which globally inclusive 
social meaning is even a possibility – as it is a relatively recent phenomenon that all 
peoples are incorporated into a comprehensive international system and some form of 
human equality is widely embraced. 
 
     The protection of the individual’s right to self-determination within a community 
of shared understanding is the central moral principle that structures Walzer’s account 
of international society. Both in discussing the justice of war and the permissibility of 
humanitarian intervention, he is clear that the walls erected between peoples by the 
norm of sovereignty are vital to protecting the distinctive and creative features of any 
community. He is, however, adamant that the nation-state is an imperfect form of 
political order and its presumptive authority is open to question – this is most clearly 
the case when the government of a state turns on its people.78 Yet, judging when the 
bond between the institutions of government and the community has broken is a 
difficult thing to do, in large part because of the specific social meanings that define 
this relationship, but also because the presumptions of sovereignty are such that 
outsiders experience the state as a combination of government and people. Not only is 
the outsider unable to fully appreciate the social meanings that define political 
authority, the external critic also gets only a partial view of the political life of the 
nation-state. Sovereignty and the state-system clearly have a moral value for Walzer, 
but it is not absolute.79 
 
     There are times when a state’s lack of legitimacy is evident and a grievous moral 
wrong is obviously being committed, and it is in these instances that Walzer sees a 
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place for the actions of outsiders. In discussing when humanitarian intervention is 
legitimate and reflecting on the politics of rescue, Walzer emphasizes the provisional 
and contingent nature of such actions.80 We must rely on our judgment in deciding 
when the crimes of a given state cross the line from unfortunate to unconscionable – 
though he does suggest that there are some crimes we (used in the most inclusive 
sense) find absolutely wrong, including genocide, mass murder, famine, systematic 
torture and the expulsion of large numbers of people from their homes. It is in 
response to these crimes that we can perhaps begin talking about human rights that go 
beyond the rather vague account of rights to life and liberty. While Walzer is sceptical 
of the probability of robust human rights protections in our current world, he does not 
reject the idea in principle. The primary concern Walzer has is the distance that exists 
between universal moral aspiration and real world action and social structures. The 
rights embodied in the sovereign state-system provide a minimal degree of security to 
individuals and communities, and there are practices of intervention that have begun 
to buttress individual’s rights with concrete protections, but aspiration for a more just 
international political order is dependent upon assigning correlating responsibilities to 
the wider-set of emerging rights, as well as building the political institutions that can 
ensure these rights. In essence, Walzer insists on making clear what is required to 
make a wider set of human rights effective, while focusing on the primacy of the 
rights to membership and the right to have rights – underlining the limited value of 
rights without enforcement.81 
 
     While I do want to highlight Walzer’s limited endorsement of rights, it should not 
lead to the conclusion that he sees institutionalisation as the only obstacle to a more 
robust system of universal human rights. The primary value of autonomous political 
communities is the space it gives individuals to make their collective lives relatively 
free from imposition, and this is not merely a consequence of the value of diversity as 
such, but reflects the nature of communal life. The world we live in, from the physical 
objects we use to the moral ideals that direct our activity, is a socially constructed 
world and to invade the space in which this activity takes place or to impose values, 
institutions and practices on others is, for Walzer, a very real kind of violence. 
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Beginning from this situated position the appeal to (reiterative) universal values or 
rights involves a logic that is very different from traditional accounts of moral 
universalism, as particular structures are not built up from basic and universal 
premises – the conventional account of political and moral philosophy. What 
universal values we do recognize are the result of adapting particular values to the 
task of understanding others, as thin universal values are derived from thick particular 
ones.82 This makes the prospects of a universal morality rather precarious as the act of 
identifying with or endorsing the moral experience of those we do not know risks both 
misunderstanding and imposing our own values upon them. Thus, what universalism 
we do find is limited and general – rights to life and self-determination, and 
injunctions against the most severe forms of political violence – giving us a rather 
crude set of ethical tools for inter-communal action, which Walzer thinks gives us 
good reason for caution and humility. 
 
     The two most common criticism of Walzer’s position are that his views are overly 
statist and that his understanding of community fails to account for the diversity that 
exists within any actual society. While these critiques certainly point to important 
tensions in Walzer’s work, I find it difficult to see them as refutations of his position 
and, more importantly, they do not point to the most interesting limitations of his 
work. Walzer has said much to contextualise the rather conditional priority he grants 
to the state as such, making the disagreements that liberal and cosmopolitan thinkers 
have with his views a field of diminishing intellectual yields.83 My concern is not to 
point out the ways the state violates individual rights or to argue that the state is no 
longer the most relevant unit in the political order, but to argue that Walzer represents 
one-side of the tension inherent in the current inter-state system, such that he and his 
critics share a great deal of ground – and that it is this shared terrain that is most in 
need of criticism. The weaknesses of Walzer’s notion of community present a more 
fruitful line of critique, but I want to consider the limitations of his thought within the 
context of his understanding of social meaning and the concrete processes by which 
ethics and politics are actually carried out.  
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     Walzer’s ideal of international society mirrors Linklater’s universalist vision, 
which claims that we can have a plurality of political authorities ordered by a singular 
conception of cosmopolitan citizenship that ensures the same moral rights to 
everyone. For Walzer, there can be a plurality of meanings to citizenship and the 
rights that individuals have are dependent upon their social context, but the social 
context to which individuals belong is importantly singular. The nation-state may only 
be a modern version of the creative moral community, but the ideal of communal 
identity is vital to ordering the diversity of the world. To allow for plurality without 
the authority of the community risks a descent into meaninglessness.84 The 
importance of this unspoken threat can be seen in Walzer views on social criticism – 
contestation and struggle over social meaning is vital but it must take place within the 
terms of the community.85 In the case that outsiders want to offer criticism, it must be 
translated in order to be effective and non-invasive. This is a consequence of the 
authoritative relationship of morality to politics, which in Walzer’s thought means the 
moral community determines legitimate political structures,86 but the legislative logic 
at work is the same one we see in Linklater’s cosmopolitan vision. 
 
     As his ideal of legitimate political authority and its instantiation in the modern 
state is a revealing limitation, so to is Walzer’s ideal of community. Critics have 
highlighted the way in which his account of community at best glosses over the 
diversity within community, and at worst renders the process of contestation and 
change difficult and obscure by strengthening rather than destabilising structures of 
social marginalisation.87 The implication of this critique can only be appreciated by 
taking Walzer’s responses to them seriously. First, Walzer has insisted that 
communities are defined as much by the processes of contestation and criticism as 
they are by agreement and stability. Second, he advocates for a conception of 
community that acknowledges duties to outsiders and can make space for tolerance of 
difference within the community. And finally, much of his seeming conservatism is a 
function of his realism regarding the process of political change within communities 
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that are defined by social meanings built upon history, established practice and 
common experience.88 I do not think these responses redeem Walzer’s vision of moral 
community, but again I want to suggest they point to widely held concepts that limit 
our understanding and approach to human rights, and the relations between morality 
and politics more broadly. 
 
     I have already argued that Walzer’s understanding of social criticism presupposes 
a realm of shared social meaning, such that the role of the critic reinforces the 
importance of a shared conception of community. I want to pursue the implications of 
this relationship further, as it is because Walzer understands the social construction of 
meaning in an exclusive way that he must limit who can be a critic and what the critic 
can say. Accepting that meaning is deeply social implies that meaning is necessarily 
constrained by the current forms that association takes, but it is only by presuming 
some primordial significance for a certain type of communal identity that priority is 
given to the institutional borders of community rather than the plurality of 
associations that define the social world.89 Walzer’s view of social meaning is 
uncritically conservative so far as it begs the question of how the community itself 
comes into being and is sustained, as well as how social meaning is established and 
changed. The key point for my argument is that the appeal to a collective identity that 
grounds the moral value of community elides the exclusions and silences that 
prioritising one common identity creates – the consequence of this is not only that 
certain identities are marginalized or ejected from the moral community, but that 
these exclusions and silences are internal even to those who embrace the communal 
identity. This denial of the more radical implications of pluralism,90 both external and 
internal, manifests in founding mythologies of the nation and sustains the exclusive 
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identity of the moral community.91 Yet, how social meanings are actually established 
and how they evolve reveals a productive tension in Walzer’s work. In his defence of 
democracy Walzer highlights the contestation and compromise involved in 
establishing social meanings, and it is the openness of this contextual, rather than 
rational, view that provides the possibility for embedded criticism. Walzer, however, 
does not focus on the sources of opposing meanings and identities – despite their 
importance to preserving his critical orientation. This is not surprising, however, 
because focusing on the ambiguity central to social meaning, both its expression and 
suppression, blurs the vision of the moral community and threatens the political 
structures based on national self-determination. 
 
     This is also related to an ambiguity in Walzer’s understanding of universalism. 
While his arguments about the directionality of universalism –from particular to 
universal – is a useful corrective to traditional philosophical understanding, it leaves 
unaddressed the question of how shared meanings are possible and why they exert 
motivational force upon us. Like Linklater, Walzer points to our capacities for 
sympathy and our vulnerability to pain, as well as to the importance of our capacity 
for language that takes shape in associated experience, and while the implications he 
draws from these gestures toward commonality are more limited than Linklater’s, the 
potential they have to unsettle his own view of social meaning are not addressed.  
 
Walzer’s insight that moral culture, even viewed from a particularist 
perspective, need not be considered fixed is an extremely valuable point 
for an embedded cosmopolitan position to adopt. His concomitant 
assumption that this culture is defined and interpreted within boundaries 
that are fixed is, however, problematic and in need of correction.92  
 
A similar tension can be found in the account of universal rights to self-determination 
and the duties that communities have to outsiders. Duties to outsiders include giving 
refuge to those who have been expelled from their homes and providing pathways to 
membership for outsiders within the community – while this later duty may be 
specific to democratic societies with inclusive self-understandings, Walzer makes the 
case that a duty to tolerate outsiders within the political community has long been 
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acknowledged. The appeal to universal values and duties seems to acknowledge that 
the communal world of social meanings exceeds convention and that the elements of 
political life that exist at the margins of community are made meaningful despite their 
exclusion from the world of social meaning. 
 
    This leads me to Walzer’s final response: his acknowledgment of the difficulty of 
changing social meaning without engaging in the concrete activities of community. It 
is in his account of the detailed and concrete reality of social practices that Walzer 
shares common ground with Alasdair MacIntyre, as both thinkers claim that social 
life is defined by shared ideas and practices that directly impact how we think and 
act.93 If this is true, then no exercise in rational critique or appeal to abstract ideals 
will do the heavy lifting involved in making political or social change happen. Walzer 
and MacIntyre accept the social construction of reality, which means that they must 
seek political and social change within the terms internal to the political community, 
leaving only marginal spaces for effective universal appeals. Again we find a 
mirrored contrast in Linklater’s work, as he would seek to overcome convention by 
appealing to universal values and the emancipation of individuals from limiting and 
coercive social forces. What is missing from both accounts of the comprehensive 
social order, as a reality to be accepted or transcended, is an account of how social 
order and meaning interact and how actual individuals experience it. The experience 
of individuals in the social world never perfectly conforms to institutionalised social 
meanings – it is a world filled with remainders, litter and incoherency.94 Further, the 
individuals jointly making the community do not confront their experience in a 
uniform way, either appealing to universal emancipatory ideas or suffering in passive 
conformity, but respond in creative and often unpredictable ways, generating political 
activity easily missed by political programs guided by moral visions endowed with 
certainty. Walzer seems to appreciate the value of individual experience, the humane 
tenor of his philosophy is only the most obvious expression of this concern, but this 
concern is not the starting point of his investigation into social life but a point of 
tension that resists resolution with his vision of the national moral community. 
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     Rather than taking a stand on either side of the dichotomies that separate the work 
of Linklater and Walzer, or reaching for a more perfect synthesis, I have tried to 
illustrate the common limitations in their work. In the end, I would like to characterise 
Linklater and Walzer as particularly compelling examples of common approaches to 
thinking about human rights. Along the way, I hope the case has been made that the 
idea of human rights is (1) tied up with questions of legitimate political authority, (2) 
the scope and nature of political community and the (3) relationship of morality to 
politics. What I have argued is that the way these questions are answered – whether in 
favour of universal moral principles that define legitimate authority for all political 
communities, or with the emphasis on the preservation of spaces where particular 
accounts of political authority and comprehensive moral principles can be generated 
for members of a national moral community, the answers reflect a strain of absolutism 
that places antecedent moral ideals in a position of authority over our understanding 
of the social world and judgment of political structures, and an ontological dualism in 
which the contingent, changing, unfinished and excessive is devalued and is at best 
accommodated, or at worst denied and repressed.  
 
IV. Reconstructing the Relationship between Ethics and Politics 
 
In the final section of this chapter I offer an initial plan for how an alternative view of 
ethics could lead to a reconstructed account of human rights, with important 
implications for the meaning of legitimate authority, political community and the 
relationship between ethics and politics. Whether the ideal is individual freedom or 
communal self-determination, the ideal becomes pathological when we insist upon its 
absolute character to ensure its meaning. When we frame the debate as one between 
universal and particular, or cosmopolitan and communitarian, the ideal in question 
becomes absolute in order to avoid political struggles over value. Our contemporary 
wariness of explicit foundationalism has done little to change the logic of the question 
and instead it has lead to a series of less convincing accounts of moral authority.95 
Because this view of morality and politics retains a notion that the world is a whole 
not defined by remainders, by the litter of an open universe, the suggestion that our 
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ideals are contingent, plural and open to constant contest and reconstruction is 
unsettling. Certainly, Linklater and Walzer both appreciate the space between moral 
ideals and actual experience (it is what makes them complex and rewarding thinkers), 
but in appealing to dialogic universalism or the coherence of social meaning within 
the national community the best one can hope for is to find terms of coexistence with 
an undeniable realm of change, uncertainty and contest. It would seem William 
Connolly’s contention that the modern age is characterized by our inability to accept 
or change our condition applies to both Walzer and Linklater96 – and I would suggest 
to the perennial debates that define human rights more fully than any specific 
argument or articulation of rights. 
 
     My primary purpose has not been to reveal the problematic foundational 
assumptions or to diagnosis the assimilative tendencies in the different visions of 
human rights presented – not only has this work been done well elsewhere,97 but also 
it can only take us so far.  Hutchings points out that the tensions that define the 
debates over human rights, and myriad other aspects of international political theory, 
suffer from a common affliction. ‘Whichever idea is in question, it provides a 
standard against which the actual world is always found wanting. The noise of the 
battle obscures the extent to which all of these perspective are making very similar 
arguments and running into similar problems.’98 Within the limits set by how we think 
about political authority and moral community it seems there is little hope of 
resolving the tension between universal and particular values in the idea of universal 
human rights. The project I want to pursue is to think about these basic ideas in a 
different way by focusing on the relationship between morality and politics, as well as 
the way ideal social orders respond to uncertainty. I will do this in two steps: the first 
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articulating what I see as the limiting conditions for rethinking human rights, and the 
second is to suggest a positive account of one potential way of understanding human 
rights. 
 
     In accusing both Linklater and Walzer of a form of absolutism I am not accusing 
them of fanaticism – clearly they appreciate the complexity of ethical life. Yet, 
despite this recognition their ideal political order is oriented around a central value 
that not only provides order but which is also presumed not to conflict with other 
values. Further, the role that these ideals play is intentionally pre-political; they do not 
allow room for contestation. To acknowledge that our most central values may not 
only be multiple but also might be incompatible suggests that ethics is a more 
contingent and uncertain endeavour than we are usually willing to admit. The 
perspective I have argued for thus far does not imply that our ethical commitments are 
unjustifiable; instead, what it suggests is that they are always political in the sense that 
they involve compromise, loss, commitment and imposition. In the political realm 
pluralism calls our attention to remainders: the losers in political contests, the socially 
excluded and the marginalised; and in shifting our focus it forces us to acknowledge 
the contingency of our commitments, the role of power in establishing primary social 
values, and the interrelation of the ethical and the political.  
 
     While I do not want to obscure the difference between ethics and politics, I am 
suggesting that they are both elements of a common activity. Crudely, the ethical is 
distinguished by a concern for reflective evaluation – distinctly ethical questions 
regard the good, or more precisely if some specific action, event or thing is good. The 
processes of evaluation is importantly self-referential in that our self-understanding is 
implicated in this process, this is true both for individuals and social groups. In its 
reflective nature the ethical provides motivation and guidance for action, but the 
mistake all too often made is to think that this guiding function is certain, absolute or 
complete. The results of acting on our ideals, or of attempting to find compromises or 
resolutions between conflicting ideals, should enter back into our ethical judgment 
and our values - this process of reflection and action should be ongoing.99  
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     The political is generally taken to be more active and less reflective social sphere. 
Contestation, compromise and coercion are just a few of the activities of politics, 
defined primarily by the exertion of power and force. Traditionally moral values are 
seen to legitimate the activity of politics, such that accepting the coercive power of 
the state or the results of democratic processes is justified by some ideal. If that ideal 
is moral and absolute, then the negative consequences of legitimate political action 
are hidden from view, as they are either morally justified or an inescapable necessity. 
This understanding closes off the political from the ethical, obscuring the results of 
political activity from ongoing evaluation and limiting political experience’s influence 
on moral ideals – this should be challenged. What I am suggesting is that there is an 
ongoing interrelationship between the ethical and political, and that the ethical is 
active and imposing in its own way, while the political is a potential space for 
reflection and evaluation.  
 
     The appeal of the quest for certainty we find Linklater and Walzer struggling with 
is only partly explained by the link that has historically been made between reason, 
understood as certain and orderly, and the good – as this explanation begs the 
question of why we have prioritised certainty in ethics. In part it is the role of ethics in 
political life – pre-political values or principles provide the foundation for political 
authority in a way that is analogous to role of a founding figure that gives the just law 
to the political community, while remaining importantly separate from that 
community.100 Additionally, the privileging of certainty is the result of the political 
function of morality – as moral norms are appealed to by those with power, the 
unchanging and certain nature of those moral norms play an important role in 
institutionalising and preserving social order.101 The dual role of ethical values in 
social life highlights the limitations of how ethical ideals are generally understood in 
debates about human rights.  
 
     In Linklater’s work the ideal of the nation-state is rejected, but in its place he puts 
a form of cosmopolitan order, which is legitimated by an appeal to undeniable social 
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forces that are increasing interconnection, a substantive human identity that makes 
wider social orders possible and an historical trend towards inclusive and moral forms 
of social life that reach their fulfilment in a form of cosmopolitan democracy. The 
certainty of this vision is striking – not only are social forces leading to greater 
interconnection, human nature is such that this interconnection can be shaped into 
inclusive forms of global order that instantiate the moral ideals of democracy and a 
cosmopolitan political order that humanity has been progressively working towards. 
While in Walzer’s work we see a less grandiose vision; the bounded political 
community is a fixed form of social order. The ideal of the discrete community is not 
unreasonable, certainly the sharing of social space, economic interaction, shared 
cultural traditions and history, and common political institutions give this form of 
social order a thickness that is undeniable. Yet, it remains a fixed ideal that is not 
open to change, at least not without radically altering our self-understanding, and as 
an ideal, the actual work of constructing discrete and bounded forms of political 
community is made invisible. 
 
     If we remain committed to this way of thinking about both ethical ideals, then 
moving beyond merely conventional moral community forces us to accept a universal 
or a particular founding – do all people follow one just law or is the justice of the law 
specific to each people. If we do not accept the logic of idealism that this choice 
suggests, then answering the question of whether the universal or the particular ideal 
is primary is a fruitless activity, and one that importantly obscures the exclusions and 
power at play in ideals of justice and law, however they rendered legitimate. Insisting 
that there is a primary ethical value, or that our values can be finally and coherently 
ordered, and that there is an ideal form of social order that provides us with stability 
and certainty, is a conceptual dead-end. Yet, this way of framing ethics and politics is 
appealing precisely because it is a way of both preserving established forms of 
authority and identity, and justifying radical change, as it is the certainty about moral 
and social ideals that justifies the exertion of force that maintains or radically alters 
the social world. If one, however, begins with an assumption that ethical values are 
multiple and open to conflict, and that social order itself is subject to indeterminate 
change, the certainty of either conservatism or radicalism is undermined, and we need 
a different understanding of political and social change, one more modest and 
piecemeal.  
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     Both Linklater and Walzer are democrats and in many ways their ideas and visions 
of political life are miles away from the sort of coercive and violent regimes that most 
readily display the vices I am highlighting. Certainty and idealism are more terrifying 
when they motivate a totalitarian or fascist regime, without question, but recent 
political experience does suggest that democracy alone is insufficient to avoid the 
destructive consequences that can follow political action motivated by moral and 
intellectual certainty.102 In what follows I do not reject this democratic starting point, 
but I do want to move away from both the republican and liberal universalist 
understandings of democracy found in Walzer and Linklater. The implication of the 
pluralist and pragmatic position I am suggesting is that our democratic ideal itself 
needs to be more democratic – more open-ended, less procedural, more thoroughly 
embedded in social life and imbued with an inclusive ethic. 
 
     If we begin with the assumption that ideals are constantly subject to change and 
revision in light of experience, then the project of justifying political authority is 
always an ongoing process – the rights and duties of individuals, the nature of 
political community, offices of authority and the institutional structure of political life 
are constantly being remade. This perspective asks us to accept a great deal of 
uncertainty in social life, an uncertainty only increased by the resistance to 
prescriptive accounts of the social world that is implied. Appeals to a progressive 
history of inclusion, moral learning or civilising processes, whatever the supposed 
empirical verification suggests, reflect ideal understandings of the social world – 
imparting purposes and meanings to forces that are claimed to provide justification 
but which remain at their core mysterious. Much as insisting on the coherency of our 
ethical values obscures much of experience, particularly the experience of those 
without power and privilege, the appeal to directional and determinant social forces 
relies upon the absence of experience of those forces as personal, intentional and 
historically contingent – the spread of liberal market economies, for example, is 
carried out through the intentional actions of actual people, forcibly altering their lives 
and those of others with no indisputable assurance that the ideals pursued will be 
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realised. The element of faith in these sorts of commitments should be recognized and 
subject to critical scrutiny along with the ethical values we seek to privilege. 
 
     The implications for human rights as an ideal are significant. First, the idea that 
human rights can be justified by some single and universal ethical value should be 
abandoned. This includes not only reductionist views that attempt to limit human 
rights to those necessary to preserve human autonomy or meet basic needs, for 
example, but also those that see human rights as ensuring a minimally just form of 
political order – whether that is necessarily democratic or more permissive. Also, the 
idea that human rights embody necessary progressive guarantees of individual 
freedom or universal political participation, or that they represent a civilising process 
that guarantees a certain level of human dignity is unsustainable. While these myriad 
ways of justifying and understanding human rights no doubt exemplify some of 
humanities most laudable ideals, without rethinking the logic and function of these 
ideals they will remain partial, limiting and potentially assimilative of, and violent 
towards, difference. Second, we must rethink the function of human rights, as their 
historical function in providing a universal order is compromised. Whether voiced in 
the quasi-religious tone of natural right or the legalistic tenor of international criminal 
law the song remains the same, and human rights are taken to provide the moral 
principles that structure and justify the international political order. 
 
     I want to suggest that human rights can be reconstructed as part of a democratic 
ethos, as their distinctive claim, or prophetic promise, is that every human being has 
moral value and that this value should be recognised in political life. This starting 
point is plural and situated – suggesting not a universal duty to respect human moral 
agency or a universal claim to communal self-determination, but rather that human 
rights can be, and have been, a way of claiming moral recognition in terms of shared 
humanity in order to make political claims upon social life. Human rights are 
described as an ethos rather than offered as a set of principles, because the intention is 
to establish an orientation to thinking about the questions of legitimate authority and 
political community. In the following chapters I will argue that human rights can be 
understood as an ideal that is self-consciously open to reinterpretation of what we 
understand to be most importantly and distinctly human, though this is an always 
delicate and risky process that may simply become assimilative. Also, because human 
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rights are claimed in the name of “humanity”, as an empty universal they can serve 
the political contestation of those who are excluded and marginalized in any current 
social and political order. 
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Chapter 3  
Deep pluralism: reconstructing universalism 
 
‘Pluralism is the philosophy of a messy universe.’ 
-William E. Connolly, Pluralism 
 
I. Reorienting Human Rights: The Affirmation of Deep Pluralism  
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that the goal of justifying universal human right 
is hindered by the very understanding of the nature of moral principles and the 
relationship between morality and politics it presumes. The problem goes beyond the 
persistent failure to rationally ground moral principles in a convincing metaphysics, as 
even the contemporary move to seek a political or communicative account of rational 
moral principles fails to overcome dissensus – constantly leaving open the question of 
whether universalism does violence to difference, renders the rational merely coercive 
and reveals the moral as simply conventional. Yet the imperative to achieve universal 
justification presents itself to any thinker who wants a morality that will constrain 
political life, which will bring certainty to the realm of ideals even if the realm of 
practical activity remains unpredictable and precarious. This chapter begins the task 
of developing a political ethics that seeks to avoid this unitarian moral impulse. 
Eliminating this gap, identified by Hutchings, between the “first best” world of ethics 
(morality) as against the “second best” world of politics,’1 requires reconstructing 
political ethics in a radical way if the objections raised against universal human rights 
are to be addressed in a manner that provides the opening needed, letting in new light 
for evaluating human rights with fresh eyes. This chapter suggests how we might 
begin to do this by arguing for the need to place an account of deep pluralism at the 
centre of ethics and to respect the situated and contingent character of ethical action. 
 
     The first task of my reconstruction of human rights is to argue for deep pluralism 
as a starting point. This idea of deep pluralism serves as an orientation to political 
ethics that does not demand absolute or certain moral principles, but rather accepts the 
plurality of human experience and ethical values as a necessary starting point, a 
condition to be embraced rather than overcome. To begin this work I turn to the 
thought of Isaiah Berlin, in doing so I argue that his value pluralism should be read as 
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a form of deep pluralism and that he provided a promising starting point for 
developing a critical political ethics. To some this choice of starting points might be 
surprising, as Berlin is often taken to have been a conventional figure defending an 
uncritical brand of liberalism. At the very least, looking to Berlin runs the risk of 
becoming trapped in the ongoing debate over the suitability of liberal morality and 
politics as an accommodation of plurality. Both of these points have merit and starting 
with Berlin requires some qualification. 
 
     My account of Berlin’s pluralism and my argument that it can form the basis of a 
critical political ethics in large part ignores the ongoing debate over the relationship 
between his liberal commitments and his value pluralism. Much of the recent 
commentary on his work seems to presuppose both that his central task, and the most 
important consequence of his work, was to articulate the compatibility of liberalism 
and pluralism, and in the process preserve ‘nothing less than the liberal tradition as a 
whole.’2 While I think this misconstrues the nature of his work, I also take no stand on 
these debates here. Rather, I focus on Berlin’s value pluralism as an ethical theory and 
argue that it was a form of what William Connolly has called deep pluralism, which 
goes beyond the liberal account of pluralism as unresolved disagreement or 
scepticism about values, and affirms the persistent reality of plural faiths (spiritual, 
intellectual and moral) held in an unfinished and contingent universe.3 This distinction 
is vital as these different forms of pluralism lead to very different understandings of 
ethics. Liberal pluralism essentially follows Rawls’ line, which responds to plurality 
by seeking synthetic forms of certain moral principle, while deep pluralism begins 
from that fundamental uncertainty and tries to determine how to live ethically in such 
conditions. I substantiate these claims through an analysis of Berlin’s theory of 
values, looking to his account of their sources and the nature of the claims they make 
upon us. In the process, I read Berlin in the context of thinkers that highlight his 
pluralist rather liberal sensibility, notably John Gray, who suggests that Berlin 
defended an agonistic pluralism.  
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     The importance of Berlin’s pluralism for my project is in the way it alters the 
question of human rights. In previous chapters, I have analysed the difficulty 
presented to moral theory by the persistence of disagreement over fundamental 
principles, which seems to render the task of fully and finally justifying human rights 
hopeless. While most contemporary thinkers accept the reality of pluralism, as 
disagreement over moral foundations or diversity in moral belief, it remains a 
condition to be overcome. Moral principles are needed precisely to constrain political 
life in the face of dissensus and contingency, but deep pluralism, which affirms rather 
than tries to overcome the persistence of divergent and competing commitments, leads 
to a different initial premise. First, it implies that pluralism in ethical and political life 
is an undeniable reality, and that the sources of moral value are contingent and plural. 
Second, this means that the task of moral theory is not to provide final principles but 
to improve our ability to exercise judgment in the face of uncertainty, as ethical life 
requires choices, commitments and action without final assurances that we are doing 
so rightly. Finally, the most challenging consequence of deep pluralism is that it 
undercuts the aspiration of a universal ethics based in a singular concept of human 
dignity and a universal political order, which is a fundamental presupposition of the 
international human right regime, which raises the question of whether a deeply 
pluralist human rights is possible. 
 
     This further question of whether pluralism undermines the possibility of universal 
principles is addressed in what follows by reconstructing the meaning of universalism 
in moral thought, focusing on the issue of universal concern and communicability as 
opposed to absolute and universal standards. Berlin defends a qualified account of 
universal values, in part based on a potentially refutable claim that historically certain 
values have been held in common by the majority humanity, but also based on a 
revised notion of universality as communicability. In this case, there are certain 
presuppositions we hold that define humanity, which imply a limited set of universal 
values, the loss of which would make understanding across difference impossible. 
This account of universality is not, however, a way to limit or discipline difference, 
but rather an articulation of the basis for understanding, which is precondition for the 
exercise of moral judgment that pluralism demands. In a world of deep pluralism we 
face moral choices without certain guidance, we must exercise judgment and bear our 
share of the responsibility for the world that our actions create – through this dynamic 
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pluralism reconfigures the relationship between ethics and politics, as we have no 
absolute guarantee of the rightness of our choices, therefore the political content of 
our ethics is brought to the fore.  
 
II. The Plurality of Values 
 
Pluralism is a concept with many different meanings. Here I will speak about value 
pluralism as an ethical theory distinct from other pluralisms, which include pluralist 
theories of knowledge, as well political and international theories.4 Value pluralism is 
credited to Berlin, although it is not his term, and while he was among the first to 
argue for a pluralist theory of values others have developed the idea.5 My aim here is 
present what is most distinctive in Berlin’s conception of pluralism, including an 
argument that his pluralism is best categorised as a deep pluralism. The basic 
propositions of his pluralism are: that values are multiple and, in addition, at least 
some values are objective; further, these distinct values are irreducible, meaning there 
is no higher order value that encompasses all other values, or to which all others are 
subordinate; these ultimate and distinct values can and do conflict, and are at times 
un-combinable; and finally, the choices that are made between values are at times 
incommensurable, meaning no rational measure provides for the “correct” choice.6 
 
    Berlin was opposed to a central orientation in the history of philosophy, which he 
termed monism. Monism identifies the ideal that the truth is singular. The search for a 
unified theory in contemporary physics, Kant’s categorical imperative, and Marx’s 
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historical materialism are intellectual manifestations of this drive toward singularity. 
What pluralism entails is that the truth may in fact be multiple and that there are a 
number of true things, whatever those true things may be: laws of physics, moral 
values, or social forces. Further, value pluralism asserts that the diversity we find in 
moral life is not a mistake or a failure, either of our faculties or our methods, but 
rather a reflection of the way we experience the world. This is in part a 
phenomenological argument, but one that does not reduce to subjectivism or 
relativism, as it requires better and worse understanding of moral experience.7 The 
plurality of values was “real” for Berlin, and a failure to acknowledge this – to revert 
to a form of monism – is to get this aspect of moral experience wrong. Berlin’s 
understanding of what this means, however, does not map neatly on to the distinction 
between cognitive or non-cognitive understandings of morality.8 Moral values are true 
in the sense that they refer to things we have reason to value, and which in some cases 
we may all have reason to value, but they are not undeniable rational propositions. 
Not only are there many things that we value, which cannot be authoritatively 
compared and ranked, but our values are also contingent human creations not certain 
moral laws.  
 
     Berlin was centrally concerned with how values – our goals, ideals, and ends, at 
both a personal and social level – influence our actions and relationships. The values 
that we hold reflect our considered answers to the question of how best to live, they 
represent our reflective judgments on the worth of the ends we pursue. Therefore, 
understanding both the nature and content of values is vital for social and political 
thought, whether we want to understand events or are required to make moral 
judgments. Berlin’s concern with plurality, not only of values but also with the value 
systems of individuals and societies, makes his theory one of political and social 
pluralism.9 As we can see, coming to grips with Berlin’s pluralism requires 
understanding his philosophical thinking on the nature of knowledge and morality, as 
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well as his view of history and society. While Berlin famously distinguished 
intellectual types between systematic and totalising hedgehogs and more nimble and 
patchwork foxes, with whom he self-identified, appreciating the distinctiveness of his 
position requires looking at the whole of his thought.10 His thought was not systematic 
in a traditionally philosophical way, but the disparate threads do hold together to form 
a recognisable cloth, though not in a conventional liberal or universal pattern.  
 
    Values reflect human interests but they are more than a simple listing of things that 
are good for human beings; values are reflective attitudes of approval toward objects, 
states, or relationships in the world. Ethical values are particularly concerned with our 
interpersonal relationships and the pursuit of the good life because they refer directly 
to how we judge others and ourselves. It should be noted that Berlin took values to be 
naturalistic in the sense that value does not come from a non-natural entity like 
“goodness,” for example.11 He did not make any metaphysical claims regarding value 
and he did not hold that there is a source of value outside of human experience. Most 
basically, values are those things that humans commit themselves to; they are our 
‘eulogies and condemnations to acts and characters of men.’12 Because Berlin viewed 
values in this way he often used terms like goods and ends interchangeably with 
values, and at times he even talked about principles or laws in a similar tenor. While 
this could be sloppy thinking or rhetorical excess, I believe that charge is not wholly 
fair. For his purposes it made sense to see all these categories – goods, ends, moral 
principles and laws – as a reflection of basic human commitments, of our considered 
values.  
 
     We can begin to see the distinctiveness of Berlin’s account here: values are not 
given by an essential human nature nor by the commands of reason, but are the 
products of a shared historical process of creating and developing values. Berlin 
makes use of a notion of human nature, but it is an historical and constructed 
understanding that embraces a ‘minimal account of what man is in order not to 
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foreclose the possible (and even likely) emergence of entirely novel and unforeseen 
forms of life and self-fulfilment, in individuals and groups, whereby our conception of 
human nature will be enlarged.’13 This common human nature is necessary so far as a 
common understanding remains possible and desirable in light of a human self-
understanding that is ‘a branching out in new directions, essentially untidy, hesitant, 
sometimes violent, unpredictable in advance, and guaranteed neither to stand still nor 
to proceed in any assignable direction.’14 The understanding we share as human 
beings, however, is not a priori – not given by the dictates of reason – but is the result 
of shared history, common experience and the construction of the idea of humanity as 
an identity we share and affirm. 
 
     Beyond offering an historical account of the source of ethical values, Berlin 
claimed that our values are diverse; this statement alone is not critical of conventional 
modes of ethical thinking. Clearly people do have different values; what is more 
interesting is the implication of pluralism for how we understand the basis of, and 
how we deal with, the diversity of values. As was argued in previous chapters, 
traditionally, moral theories have dealt with pluralism in two ways: one is by 
separating out self-interested values from our true moral values, in a sense separating 
tastes or desires from what is morally right. In other theories, the diversity of values is 
acknowledged, but an overriding value is thought to provide a way to order that 
diversity. Alternatively, sceptical theories of relativism or subjectivism hold that the 
diversity of values reflects the fact that values are either completely dependent on 
social understandings or are individual expressions of approval, completely 
undermining the objectivity of values. What makes pluralism distinctive is that ethical 
values are multiple and at the same time objective. So the obvious question is: how do 
we know that values are objective and plural? 
 
     For Berlin, there was something like a continuum of values, ranging in importance 
from common ethical values, which are part of all human lives, to customs and 
conventions, reflecting particular social values, and at the far end manners, etiquette, 
and tastes, which are more specifically cultural and personal.15 This continuum of 
                                                 
13
 Hausheer, xlix. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Berlin, “European Unity and its Vicissitudes,” The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 205. 
  111 
values takes the measure of two things: the degree of objectivity and the degree of 
plurality, which increases as the degree of objectivity decreases. What Berlin calls 
common human values are those values that are shared by all people in light of their 
humanity.16 There is still a plurality of values at this level; for example, Berlin argues 
that individual freedom and communal identity are both common human values that 
cannot be reduced to a further more fundamental value. But how much plurality is 
there at this level of common values? Berlin does not give a clear answer; the number 
is finite but not specified.17 One way of understanding this limit is as what Berlin calls 
a common core of values, shared by all people regardless of their specific histories 
and social location. This commonality, however, does not provide for a single human 
essence.18 Instead, Berlin argues that the common core of values is too anaemic to 
form a recognisably, much less full, human life. They are the historically necessary 
values of any life we recognise as human – similar to mental and physical capacities 
that all humans share – but as social evolution occurs, it may be that the common core 
shrinks or grows with the passage of time.  
 
     As we consider values further along the continuum, they become less objective and 
increasingly plural. These values, what Berlin called customs or conventions reflect 
values that originate in specific social and historical settings, and while there may be a 
link to a more objective common value, these customs or conventions are part of a 
particular shared history and social framework. It is because of this contingent basis in 
history and society that customs and conventions exhibit greater plurality, as human 
inventiveness leads to greater diversity. Finally, at the far end of the continuum are 
manners, tastes, or rules of etiquette. These sorts of values exhibit the greatest 
diversity and the least objectivity. Though it is worth noting that even the most deeply 
idiosyncratic values can potentially be understood – though perhaps only with great 
difficulty. With this framework in mind we can now turn to Berlin’s more detailed 
argument for the objectivity and plurality of values. 
  
    To begin it is important to note how Berlin understood the objectivity of values. He 
was not seeking a foundation outside of human experience, a view from nowhere 
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providing clear principles with which to pass judgment. Rather, he was referring to 
the objectivity of values as the degree to which we share common assumptions 
sufficient for communication with people very distant from ourselves, as the capacity 
for understanding and being understood.19 ‘This common ground is what is called 
objective – that which enables us to identify other men and other civilisations as 
human and civilised at all.’20 Berlin’s first argument for the objectivity of values was 
that the majority of people over the majority of time have shared certain central 
values. He said this claim was quasi-empirical and dependent upon the work of 
historians, anthropologists and philosophers of culture to know and test the facts in 
question.21 I will examine this empirical claim below, but first it is important to make 
a general comment about Berlin’s overall approach.  
 
     Berlin’s work drew on two distinct traditions that be brought together in a unique 
way in his thought: on one hand he was impressed by English empiricism and its 
emphasis on giving experience its due; while on the other hand, he was deeply 
concerned with the importance of ideas, emphasising their role in framing experience. 
This dual concern reflected both the waning legacy of British idealism and the rising 
influence of logical positivism that dominated Berlin’s intellectual world at Oxford in 
the early part of the 20th century.22 Added to this is an interest in the historical 
development of ideas divorced from deterministic notions he found in both Hegel and 
Marx. Together, these influences lead to his historical account of the dynamic 
interrelationship between experience and ideas.  
 
     The simple empirical claim about common values is that the majority of people for 
the majority of history held some basic values in common. The methodological 
difficulties of conducting such a study would be staggering, and obviously will not be 
pursued here. However, this claim about the potential commonality and plurality of 
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values across time and space presupposes that there is some basis for these 
similarities. Berlin pointed first to the physical capacities that human beings share: ‘a 
certain physical, physiological, and nervous structure, certain organs, certain physical 
senses and psychological properties, capacities for thinking, willing, feeling,’ and then 
to a set of common human values, for example freedom, safety, well-being, and 
family relationships.23 Given that Berlin thought values were developed out of human 
experience these common features can, at least plausibly, lead to the sort of common 
values he described. He also claimed that these common values were distinct, which 
is to say that most human societies across most of time not only valued things like 
physical well-being and family life, but they also acknowledged that these values are 
distinct. Berlin most clearly expressed what these common moral values entail in the 
negative, noting that ‘[f]ew today would wish to defend slavery or ritual murder or 
Nazi gas chambers or the torture of human beings for the sake of pleasure or profit or 
even political good – or the duty of children to denounce their parents, which the 
French and Russian revolutions demanded, or mindless killing.’24 While these 
historically shared valued tend to find expression in the negative (what John Gray 
calls universal evils) the positive side of these shared values is as important, even if it 
is less clearly articulated.25 The values held in common – Berlin was hesitant to 
strongly assert they were universal moral values established without question – form 
the basis of a human conception of ethics, which is a requirement for the 
communication and understanding across difference that Berlin sees as constitutive of 
objectivity.26  
 
   There are a number of objections that can be raised against this empirical aspect of 
the argument. The first is that societies and individuals do at times value things in 
opposition to what history and physiology tells us is the norm. Pain for example can 
be a part of religious or sexual experiences, or a solitary life may be held in higher 
regard than a life lived in a tight network of family relationships. These plausible 
“deviations” help to clarify Berlin’s idea. Certainly individuals, or whole social 
traditions, can place a greater value on particular values rather than others. In the case 
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of the self-flagellating believer, religious insight is more valuable than physical 
comfort, but the pain inflicted is instrumental to another value. Assuming that there 
are not people who we would consider healthy, in either mind or body, that seek out 
physical pain or loneliness for its own sake, we can acknowledge that people will 
privilege some values at the cost of others without concluding that such compromises 
are incomprehensible.27 We should not assume that this notion of common human 
values results in a coherent and wholly desirable set of values, also it should not lead 
us to assume that deviation from them is necessarily immoral. The tradition of critical 
genealogy provides an important counterweight to the assimilative tendencies 
inherent in the idea of common humanity. Thinkers like Michel Foucault and 
Friedrich Nietzsche illuminate the role of power in shaping the “normal” or 
“acceptable” as conceptual and moral categories and render the very notion of 
“human nature” an object of constant contestation – I think we must read Berlin’s 
work with these insights in mind.28 Berlin’s own writings acknowledged this 
contestation, as he was keenly aware that even the values he most celebrated – liberty 
and self-creation – had not only found their privilege relatively recently, they required 
sacrifices that many are unwilling to make. While Berlin was not part of the critical 
genealogical tradition, his understanding of values provides an opening that most 
liberal thinkers do not. The empirical claim about common values, however, is not a 
normative one, suggesting that history can tell us the right way to be human. The 
substantive point Berlin drew from his argument was not a definition of “normal” 
humanity or a justification for legislative moral principles, but rather the grounds for 
objective understanding that are necessary for an ethics with global scope.  
 
     The empirical claim that there are common human values also seems to be limited 
by group belongings, because most value systems do specify those that are inside 
versus outside the realm of concern. So, that murder is wrong may be a universal, but 
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that value is only applied to those recognised within the moral structure.29 It is this 
structure that allowed colonisers to kill “savages” without feeling they had done 
something wrong.30 This point is more damaging to Berlin’s position if we understand 
the idea of a common value as equivalent to “the murder of any human being is 
always wrong, and always has been.” On one hand, the obvious falseness of this as a 
universally accepted and adhered to value highlights what is lost in abandoning 
conventional notions of moral principle as separated and above the world of what 
people actually do – history is as likely to show us common capacities for valuing and 
enjoying violence, exclusion and cruelty. Berlin acknowledged this darker side of 
“human nature,” as his examination of the appeal of anti-rational fascist thinking and 
violent nationalism revealed common values of belonging and submission to 
authority, which, despite their destructive consequences in the 20th century, provide 
important insight into understanding “human nature.”31 
 
     On the other hand, Berlin’s way of arguing gives us good reason to see the 
limitation of concern as an ethical failure. He saw human nature, in all its socialised 
and historic forms, as allowing for communication and understanding across barriers, 
and we can reasonably assume that most developed value system will acknowledge, if 
not the moral equality of all people, at least the value of human recognition. This 
could potentially be false, but Berlin thought experience told a different story. Not 
only is universal concern a very old idea, but also most historical cases of violent 
particularity have seen brave acts of human solidarity.32 It may be that in his own 
writing Berlin was too optimistic about the degree of commonality, both historically 
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and today, but even if this is the case his way of understanding values retains much of 
its power. 
 
     Finally, the fact that over time humans, and societies, have valued diverse goods is 
an empirical observation open to the claim that this diversity is a mistake and reflects 
a long-standing and wide spread failure of moral knowledge.33 Berlin was aware of 
the limits of what could be pulled out of his empirical claim that there is, and has 
been, a great deal of commonality regarding “universal” human values. This is why 
he said his argument was only quasi-empirical. While George Crowder argues that 
this use of quasi-empirical argument reflects a lack of clarity in what Berlin meant by 
universal, this criticism is misdirected and reflects an inadequate understanding of 
Berlin’s broader argument.34 The part of the argument that is not empirical has to do 
with the nature of ethical thought itself. Berlin, in several places, suggested that there 
is a structure to ethical thought, and that we make use of concepts and categories 
shared by all such systems.35 To clarify Berlin’s point it is necessary to make a slight 
detour, and consider Berlin’s views on epistemology.  
 
     In the essay, “The Purpose of Philosophy” Berlin outlined three different types of 
questions, each of which produces its specific answers and types of knowledge.36 
First, he outlined a distinction between empirical and formal questions; these are 
questions answerable either by observation and induction, or analytical deduction. 
Then he identified a third type of question, one that we cannot easily answer by 
looking at the world or performing a formal analysis. These questions are properly 
philosophical and involve how we view the world. ‘Its [philosophy’s] subject-matter 
is to a large degree not the items of experience, but the ways in which they are 
viewed, the permanent or semi-permanent categories in terms of which experience is 
conceived and classified.’37 In ethical and political experience Berlin thought there 
were both commonalities and differences among individuals. There will a be a great 
deal of diversity in what categories of ethical thought are privileged depending on 
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one’s outlook, 38 consider, for example, the most morally significant categories from a 
utilitarian versus a Muslim perspective, where one would be focused on satisfying 
desires and the other with obedience to divinity. There is, however, some amount of 
commonality in the categories and concepts we use in moral thought, that stem from 
our shared humanity.  
 
The basic categories (with their corresponding concepts) in terms of 
which we define men – such notions as society, freedom, sense of time 
and change, suffering, happiness, productivity, good and bad, right and 
wrong, choice, effort, truth, illusion (to take them wholly at random) – 
are not matters of induction and hypothesis. To think of someone as a 
human being is ipso facto to bring all these notions into play: so that to 
say of someone that he is a man, but that choice, or the notion of truth, 
means nothing to him, would be eccentric: it would clash with what we 
mean by ‘man’ not as a matter of verbal definition (which is alterable 
at will), but as intrinsic to the way in which we think, and (as a matter 
of ‘brute’ fact) evidently cannot but think.39 
 
Berlin believed that our ethical thinking was structured by these concepts and 
categories, which while liable to variation and change, are much firmer than moral 
sceptics or relativists would be willing to concede.40 These common elements of our 
ethical thinking provide the basis for common human values.  
 
     This commonality does two things; it provides an understanding of certain actions 
that are anathema to any ethical system (the universal wrongs mentioned above) and a 
basis for understanding and communication between diverse ethical views, which 
instantiate and interpret the abstract values we may find to be common to all ethical 
systems. ‘Otherwise the concept of man would become too indeterminate, and men or 
societies, divided by unbridgeable normative differences, would be wholly unable to 
communicate across great distances in space and time and culture.’41 When Crowder 
criticises Berlin’s ideas of a ‘common core’ and the ‘horizon of humanity’ as 
contradictory, he is missing the meaning of what Berlin has said.42 The common core 
is a set of values that reflect what all people share, it is expressed most clearly as 
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prohibited actions because the positive expression of justice, for example, will vary in 
a way that the experience of gross injustice will not. The idea of a human horizon is 
different, it refers to the reach of human understanding that our shared core provides; 
it is the limit of what we can recognise as human and provides the basis for both 
criticism and praise of values that are different from our own.43 This idea is similar to 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s notion of a horizon of understanding, though Gadamer 
suggested that the merging of distinct horizons is based upon a common capacity for 
language, while Berlin is speaking to a psychological, and even physiological, basis 
for such understanding across both time and cultures.44 
 
     Berlin compared this idea of basic ethical concepts and categories to the Kantian 
notion that perception is possible only by way of universal categories, common to all 
sentient being. The changes he made are: first, to remove the a priori character of 
these categories, arguing that their seeming permanence need not presuppose an 
external source, they are simply what he terms brute facts about the world; and 
second, that it is possible that our mode of perception could be different, but if that 
were the case, our conceptual apparatus and experience would be very different.45 Our 
basic ethical notions, such as a sense of truth, are of a kind with the fact that we 
perceive our world in three dimensions, or time as only moving forward. The 
difference is the degree of alterability. It is less likely that we could understand, or 
much less operate in, a world with non-linear time, than we could understand a world 
where truth telling or personal expression held no value, but either world would upset 
our conceptual apparatus in a radical way.46 This argument, however, should not be 
taken as an assault on moral diversity, but rather as a way of ensuring it remains 
meaningful. 
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We are urged to look upon life as affording a plurality of values, 
equally genuine, equally ultimate, above all equally objective; 
incapable, therefore, of being ordered in a timeless hierarchy, or judged 
in terms of some one absolute standard. There is a finite variety of 
values and attitudes, some of which one society, some another, have 
made their own, attitudes and values which members of other societies 
may admire or condemn (in the light of their own value-system) but 
can always, if they are sufficiently imaginative and try hard enough, 
contrive to understand – that is, see to be intelligible ends of life for 
human beings situated as these men were.47  
 
Berlin thought these categories provided a basis for understanding ethical concepts, 
but they do not constitute a developed framework and human lives are only realised 
through particular institutions, practices and choices, at both the individual and social 
levels. The difference between this idea and contemporary defences of moral 
universalism based on a notion of minimal consensus or basic needs is clear – our 
ethical world, our practices of judging and valuing, is a shared but constantly 
reconfigured space. Not only did Berlin suggest that the Kantian idea of basic 
categories of thought need to be naturalised and historicised, but that both “nature” 
and “history” need to rethought – Berlin argued against the idea of historical 
determinism and essentialism.48 Both ideas betray our experience of reality and 
impose a singularity upon human lives that limits and deforms creativity and 
difference. Read in this way Berlin’s pluralism bears many similarities to that 
developed by William Connolly, especially in the insistence that values are human 
creations open to change, but also deeply based both in our historical and corporeal 
experience – and that pluralism actually opens ground for understanding and 
solidarity in way that is actually closed off by monism.49  
 
     What has been said thus far extends Berlin’s argument for the objectivity of value, 
but there is more to be said for the truth of the plurality of values. The idea of a 
common set of diverse ethical concepts will go some of the way toward making this 
case, but Berlin’s complete view will only become apparent when we address a 
second argument he makes. As John Gray states, 
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Berlin’s most original claim about this common framework is that its 
structure is such as to generate dilemmas that are unavoidable and at 
the same time un-decidable by reason. He claims that the categories of 
thought that undergird the common judgement of mankind generate 
conflicts that are objective and of which it is true that they have no 
right solution.50  
 
Certain moral values logically occlude others – justice and mercy is a favourite 
example of Berlin’s that illustrates the point nicely. Here it is more difficult for a 
normative argument to say the fact of pluralism is simply an error of knowledge. If 
justice demands retribution, making forgiveness impossible, while mercy requires that 
we forgo the equal treatment demanded by justice, what does that say for the 
possibility of a normative absolute? At this stage one cannot simply say that the 
monist demand for an overriding value is incorrect. A monist ethical theory could tell 
us that while justice and mercy are both basic concepts, mercy must give way to 
justice, or vice versa, or further still that there is some other overriding value, or that 
we can rank values by importance. Ronald Dworkin makes this point and suggests 
that Berlin too quickly assumed that our values conflict, and in the process 
underestimated the role reason can play in mediating such conflicts.51 While Berlin 
would not have denied the important role of reason in softening and avoiding tragic 
conflicts of value, the idea that reason can provide a definitive solution to value 
conflicts is incompatible with how he understood values Even our most basic and 
shared concepts and categories conflict because they are the result of a messy and 
unruly historical process, and any choice to privilege one over the other is just that, a 
choice, which has consequences that must be acknowledged.52 This point is a key 
insight of Berlin’s pluralism: tragedy is not only a real possibility but our ethical 
choices are importantly political, they impose upon others and even upon our selves. 
 
     Berlin presented a comprehensive case for the plurality of values. He argued that 
the source of what we value – our shared ethical framework and the resulting common 
values combined with our particular social and historical experiences – comes from 
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the physical and psychological facts, individual experience, and social history of 
human existence, which results in a plural ethical world. Ethical concepts both frame 
experience and are revised in light of experience. History, passed on through ideas 
and cultural attachments, shapes not only groups but also individuals, but neither 
groups nor individuals are powerless in the stream of history – they are in fact the 
constant makers of it. As untidy an idea as his theory of values is, it is certainly less 
obscure than the notion of finding some metaphysical or transcendental justification 
for the priority of an overriding value. Further, Berlin’s value-pluralism does not 
require us to deny the truth of different value systems, which privilege different basic 
values, something monist theories imply. The Kantian and the Utilitarian both say that 
a value system that privileges nobility, for example, is wrong and immoral in a 
fundamental way. For Berlin, so long as a value system is based on common values it 
is intelligible to us, and not right or wrong in a clear manner. Though it may be that 
some value system so violates our current sense of common values that, while it can 
be understood, it can in not be accepted or tolerated. Examples of this would be those 
engaging in slavery in the contemporary world or the racist ideology of Nazi 
Germany, a controversial example from Berlin’s own work.53 It must be admitted that 
this will not convince a committed moral monist, and in addition it raises the question 
of what, if any, kind of ethical system does pluralism prescribe, and how can we 
evaluate an ethical framework, if not by its truth or falsity. 
 
     To address the first point, there is no “philosophical” argument that pluralism can 
offer to the committed monist.54 What pluralism can do is bring the facts of history 
and our ethical concepts to bear on the monist’s steadfast rejection of plurality, and 
ask the question: if moral truth is single and it exists in a way that is universal and 
objective, what is that truth?55 Further, why is there so little agreement concerning it? 
This illustrates the gulf that is opened up between liberal pluralism and deep pluralism 
– Berlin was not sceptical about our ability to know which values to privilege, he did 
not think any value had anything more than the contingent priority we grant it through 
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our actions, through our commitments, as individuals and communities. Rawls, for 
example, might have been willing to concede that it is practically impossible to know 
with final certainty the best way for humans to live, but he thought theoretical inquiry 
could lead us to be more right that others – deep pluralist reject this framing and this 
is why they are more attentive to the agonistic dimension of ethics, why they are more 
concerned with remainders 
 
     The final argument that Berlin made for the plurality of values relies on individual 
perception, or experience, of the values we hold. Our ethical values, at the individual 
and social levels, place conflicting demands on us for a number of reasons. They may 
be practical, there simply is not time or resources to do all the things humans can do, 
or it can be a matter of incompatibility as in the case of justice and mercy. This 
experience of conflict is a strong argument against moral monism and Berlin thought 
it was necessary to respect this plurality of values because it is a truth we experience 
in our lives – Berlin’s expression a “sense of reality” sums up this idea that there is 
immediacy to phenomenological experience that should be respected.56 There is an 
objective sense of reality that is a sort of balance between experience and our ideas, 
which can be known to a greater or lesser degree.57 It takes account of historical 
developments, such as the differences between the ancient and modern worlds, or the 
effects of the industrial revolution, while at the same time expressing our ideal self-
understanding. Berlin argued that we feel as though we are presented with choices, 
that we are able, or forced, to choose between values that are equally ultimate. 
Perhaps this sense of the reality of choice did not exist in earlier eras, but he thought 
to deny it now is to suffer under a very real delusion.58 Berlin wanted to emphasise 
that denying the plurality of values will deform our experience. 
 
     This experience of plural common values, as well as their potential conflict, is the 
basis for understanding particular values across borders that may seem impossible to 
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transcend. We can apply our imagination; we can attempt to see how other human 
beings could find value in disparate ways of life by recognising their values as 
responding to human needs and being structured by common ethical concepts and 
categories. Our experience suggests this form of understanding is possible because we 
understand our own values as at times conflicting and diverse. There is a sense in 
which recognising the plurality of our own values is the recognition of the foreign 
within our selves. The nature of the values in question may make this process of 
imaginative understanding more or less difficult. It may be very hard for me to 
understand the importance of the etiquette of feudal Japan, because these highly 
specific values are steeped in a particular history and way of life. On the other hand, 
values that are more clearly objective, say a Native American’s anger at the near 
extermination of her people, would be more readily meaningful. Again, for the 
question of objectivity, our experience of values is more suggestive than definitive, 
but in conjunction with Berlin’s other arguments the case for his pluralist objectivity 
is clear, if not finally persuasive. This imaginative experience can be the starting point 
of both commending and criticising practices that are foreign to our own. While at the 
same time, it is not a conventional sort of universalism.59 Berlin’s thought points us in 
the direction of the increasing importance of global ethics, but as a realm of 
understanding and recognition, rather than an endeavour to derive universal moral 
principles, which is the conventional task liberal universalism sets for itself. Pluralism 
requires sensitivity to the context in which value systems have been developed, and 
further recognises that diversity is not a symptom of error in our ethical thinking, but 
a reflection of different ethical histories and communities that we can try, to the best 
of our ability, to understand and appreciate, before passing judgment.  
 
     Finally, pluralism is not a prescriptive moral theory in the sense that it can provide 
a decision rule for moral questions or inherent rights and duties; a large portion of 
what it does is descriptive and illuminative. Berlin did not think that moral theory 
could tell us what is right or wrong to do. What pluralism offers us is insight into what 
we mean, and have historically meant, by right or good; further, it helps us to 
understand and negotiate the conflicts we experience in our moral lives. ‘The goal of 
philosophy is always the same, to assist men to understand themselves and thus 
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operate in the open, and not wildly, in the dark.’60 Ethical life is specific and active, 
which means that we face particular situations and we have to judge and act in the 
concrete world, and pluralism suggests that our ideas about how best to act are 
complex and at times conflicting. We can think of pluralism as offering insight on the 
rules, virtues and goods that guide us, which are defined in part by individual 
experience and in part by our social and historical contexts. 
 
     Regarding the question of how we evaluate value systems if it is not in light of 
their truth or falsity, Berlin said most simply that we must look to the coherence of 
any given value system.61 Our values, both common and contextual, are historical and 
social artefacts that reflect a history of testing against our experiences. This is the 
final arbiter of a value system, even of our most fundamental ethical framework. Does 
it cohere and reflect our experiences of individual and social life? If it does not, it will 
be replaced and become an artefact, of curiosity to some, but without true relevance to 
our lives.62 Berlin thought that these sorts of breaks are uncommon, but not unheard 
of, in our ethical thinking. This is due partly to the commonality of human lives; even 
value systems far removed from us can speak to our experience and offer challenges 
and insights to our own.63 Our ethical knowledge relates to how we see ourselves, 
how we conceive of society, what we should aspire to – which is a very different type 
of knowledge, not subject to progressive accumulation.64 Aside from this notion of 
coherence, there is an underlying aesthetic idea in Berlin’s work, in which some 
values, or value systems, will be unattractive – too violent, cruel or competitive for 
endorsement. Further, he was committed to a humanistic concern for the lives and 
well-being of people – in a sense his first priority was the protection of ‘some 
irreducible core of free, creative, spontaneous human nature, of some elementary 
sense of identity, dignity and worth, against all that patronises and diminishes men, 
and threatens to rob them of themselves.’65 
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     An important point of ambiguity can be brought to light by considering the 
development of ethical values over time. Though much of history the subjugation of 
women was widely accepted – does this imply this is a universal value or that the 
most people throughout history have been wrong?66 To make sense of a pluralist 
response to this question it is necessary to consider its historical character. The claim 
that a value is common or universal can be read in two ways. First, at an abstract 
level, common values provide categories of understanding, such that the value of 
gendered distinctions has been and is expressed in ways that we may find 
objectionable – but importantly the value remains understandable. Second, common 
values have an historical character, so that today we can speak of common values that 
guarantee respect for women given actual social and political changes. Finally, 
Berlin’s approach exposes the political nature of ethical life – because our values can 
be competing and often contradictory, embracing and advancing particular values will 
at times mean opposing others, such that valuing equality may require opposing most 
forms of chauvinism. The subjugation of women involves not only a common human 
value in making distinctions based on gender, but also counterpoised values of 
equality and respect, which have conflicted historically and continue to do so – this 
approach to understanding values does not suggest a single authoritative moral 
principle, but rather a basis for understanding and judgment. To answer the above 
question: human beings have throughout their history at times found the subjugation 
of women acceptable and justified, and we may find that unacceptable and 
unjustifiable – neither response has the irresistible force of “truth” on its side, they 
both represent understandable values. What emerges in this example is the troubling 
consequence of pluralism: perhaps the equality of women is not a universally 
embraced value, and the same is potentially true of any value. Objectivity as 
understanding only means that values we find unacceptable are not mysterious or 
irrational. The values we pursue are political in the sense that they displace other 
values and are contingent upon human action; Berlin famously framed the work of 
Machiavelli in such a light. He suggested that one of Machiavelli’s most profound 
insights was to see the incompatibility of two different sets of value – on one hand 
Christian values of humility and forgiveness, and the other Roman virtues of pride 
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and strength – without suggesting that “rationality” privileged one over the other.67 
Berlin’s ethical vision picks out the potential for conflict and tragedy, to which many 
contemporary liberal and cosmopolitan outlooks are blind.68 
 
III. Understanding Ourselves: Facing Uncertainty and Pluralism 
 
The account of Berlin’s pluralism presented above describes pluralism in ethical and 
political life as a feature of experience to be faced, while also claiming that the source 
of moral value itself is contingent and plural. In the following section I want to 
distinguish Berlin as a deep pluralist by showing how he understood moral theory, not 
as a way to provide final principles, but as part of an effort to improve our judgment 
in the face of uncertainty. Berlin’s pluralism is based in an understanding of ethical 
life in which choices, commitments and action without final assurances are the most 
we can hope to attain. Moving from an account of pluralism as a condition to be 
overcome or treated, to a pluralist ethic that accepts and embraces this feature of 
experience is the vital first step in reconstructing human rights.  
 
     It is possible to accept the plurality of values yet still argue that some values are 
overriding for instrumental reasons, or because of the necessity of creating an ordinal 
ranking of values in order to preserve a coherent view of the good life. Berlin was 
unconvinced by such arguments because they rest upon the idea that some values can 
be subsumed under higher ones, which denies the reality of loss when we compromise 
one value for the sake of another.69 Yet, the un-combinability of values is not 
exclusively a commitment of deep pluralism. Rationalists could easily accept this, but 
only by claiming that we should privilege true moral values or those that are most 
essential. Deep pluralism, however, is committed to value incommensurability, the 
claim that there is no distinctly rational or singularly appropriate way to compare 
intrinsic values. This is what Gray calls a break down of transitivity,70 because these 
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values are intrinsic and there is no overarching criterion of judgement, making 
anything other than contextual and contingent comparisons impossible.71  
 
     Berlin recognised that, while values are indeed plural and we have no a priori or 
distinctly rational method for prioritising our values, it is necessary to make choices 
that involve privileging some values over others in specific situations, over the course 
of a life, and at a societal level. As he says, ‘[p]riorities, never final and absolute must 
be established.’72 The choices we make between plural values are “irrational” in the 
sense that reason does not give us a decisive ordering, but he does not believe that our 
choices are unreasonable in the sense that nothing can be said for why we have 
chosen as we have.73 For Berlin the ‘concrete situation [was] nearly everything.’74 His 
program for coping with the conflicts we encounter in life, which pluralism allows no 
escape from, was to seek compromise where possible, to soften the collisions of 
values, and to realise that we can intelligently examine our values to determine if 
conflicts are as stark as they seem.75 While some commentators see Berlin as a 
conventional sort of liberal, his pluralism presents a more challenging ethics that 
undermines moralised political commitments, such as those common in contemporary 
liberal theory. In what follows, I want to follow two interpretations of the relationship 
between Berlin’s pluralism and liberalism, but not in order to make a judgment upon 
that question, but to develop the argument affirming the depth of his pluralism. Berlin 
was clear that he thought liberalism and pluralism were compatible, but he also denied 
any necessary connection between the two ideas.76 Instead, he emphasised the 
historical nature of liberalism as an outgrowth of a particular social and political 
experience, which is valuable, but not distinctly rational over other value-systems.77 
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This is an affirmation that there are a number of ways of being good, for individuals 
and communities, and that difference is understandable and deserving of recognition.  
 
     George Crowder argues most strongly for the liberal implications of Berlin’s 
pluralism.78 While acknowledging that Berlin himself did not draw a necessary 
connection, Crowder does so by challenging one particular aspect of Berlin’s theory. 
He does not think that value-systems differ in the manner that Berlin suggests, such 
that different values can be legitimately privileged over individual liberty. Rather, he 
argues that all societies are required to privilege a substantial degree of personal 
liberty in order to protect the plurality of values.79 The idea is that liberty is an ordinal 
value, which makes the pursuit of other values possible; plurality is thus dependent on 
liberty. This moves Crowder away from Berlin’s deep pluralism, where he was 
explicit that liberty is an intrinsic value but without necessary primacy,80 and Crowder 
in fact moves closer to liberal theories struggling to deal with diversity, rather than 
pluralism as such. Crowder takes pluralism to entail a more straight-forward 
normative thesis, believing that the fact of pluralism among individuals implies that 
autonomy is the primary good and that liberalism is the best political system for 
supporting this good.81 Liberalism protects reasonable pluralism, and restrains radical 
pluralism. Because Crowder thinks that the rational necessity of autonomy, as a 
cardinal value, will guide us in making choices between conflicting values, choice is 
less radical and the reality of tragic choice is obscured.82  
 
     Part of what is at issue here is a conflation between diversity and pluralism. The 
thesis of pluralism is not simply that individuals will value many different things and 
the world of diversity that results is an inevitable feature of the second best world of 
political life – if that were the case it would indeed be a quintessentially liberal 
perspective.83 Contrasting Berlin’s pluralism with the reasonable pluralism developed 
in Rawls’ later work, we see that for Rawls the central issue was the impossibility of 
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agreement among individuals and that the proliferation of values cannot be contained 
by reason.84 The failure of reason to substantiate a single value-system in Rawls’ 
understanding was primarily attributable to human limitations, and he was not willing 
to accept the reality of deep pluralism in the way that Berlin did.85 This is in part 
because Berlin’s offered an historical rather than an ideal theoretical understanding of 
ethics, but also because Berlin did not aspire to provide a replacement for our loss of 
faith in the power of reason to provide an authoritative theory of the good. Berlin was 
too much the realist to pursue such a chimera; he also associated such attempts with 
an assimilative monistic logic that he saw as a threat to people’s ability to pursue and 
even create their own values, individually and collectively – a temptation he attributed 
to well-meaning liberal pluralists, as well as more radically utopian and monistic 
value-orientations.86 
 
     In contrast to Crowder, John Gray offers a more radical reading of Berlin. 
Pluralism implies that all orderings are contingent, including liberalism, and for this 
reason he terms Berlin’s own commitment to liberalism, agonistic – implying that his 
commitments must be seen as an ungrounded affirmation of liberalism, a “choice” 
unsecured by a necessary account of rightness. This means there is no special warrant 
granted to liberalism by reason or the facts of pluralism.87 Mark Lilla makes this 
claim clear, ‘Berlin believed that liberalism is not just a matter of principle and 
theory; it is an existential matter, a certain way of carrying oneself in the world and in 
the company of others.’88 The need for this existential commitment comes from the 
fact that values are in part acts of will, as Berlin said, ‘morality is moulded by the will 
and that ends are created, not discovered.’89 Our conceptions of the good life, our 
choices, our ways of life, reflect contingent prioritisations, which though they may be 
understandable to most human beings, do not necessarily motivate others in the same 
way. Gray’s emphasis on the existential and voluntarist elements of Berlin’s thinking 
is contested, but he accurately reflects Berlin’s interest in exploring the limitations of 
Enlightenment ethics and his sympathy for elements of the Romantic counter-
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enlightenment.90 Agonistic liberalism, in Gray’s account, focuses on the fact that our 
values lack absolute foundations and can only be ironic commitments - in the 
language or Richard Rorty.91 Yet, Gray’s account of Berlin’s agonistic liberalism is 
partial because it fails to emphasise that liberalism is not simply an individual 
existential choice, as our “choices” take place within historical and cultural contexts 
that set psychological barriers to the completely free existential play of Rorty’s 
metaphoric redescriptions.92 This aspect of Berlin’s agonism is underplayed in Gray’s 
account and adds an embedded context to Gray’s strong existential account of 
pluralism. While there are voluntarist elements in Berlin’s pluralism it is not an 
existential ethical theory that celebrates the complete freedom of the will. The will is 
reined-in by our placement in a social and historical world, and by the account of 
common values detailed above.93  
 
     One difficulty of living and thinking within a particular system of values is that it 
is seemingly difficult to imagine a good way of life that is drastically different from 
one’s own. This is why imaginative insight is so important to Berlin’s pluralism. He 
believed that if we tried to understand the reasons people have for valuing as they do, 
we could begin to understand other ways of life as different and good. This is a 
fundamental challenge of deep pluralism to liberal political theory. Liberalism is not 
uniquely appropriate to the truth of pluralism; other views of the good life could 
easily be as successful.94 If European culture broadly embraces liberalism today it is 
because of a shared history, rather than some unique insight into the nature of 
goodness or being at the forefront of the progressive flow of history.95  Pluralism 
requires us to rethink what toleration means, as it is not a matter of allowing people 
the space to be acceptably non-liberal in their values. For Gray, the best we can hope 
for is a pragmatic modus vivendi, where we try to find terms of common life, rather 
than tolerating the failings of others or aspire to some more prefect consensus.96 Yet 
this highlight another limitation of Gray’s development of pluralism, the discussion of 
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modus vivendi, especially applied to liberal and non-liberal cultures, largely defines 
pluralism in terms that are too strongly collectivist.97  
 
     By focusing on the reality of pluralism within social and historical communities, as 
well as within the individual, Berlin was more attuned to the loss and fragility that is 
central a feature of ethical and political life. Berlin developed an ethic of engaged-
coexistence in which key virtues are receptivity to difference and a care for plural 
expression of human values, without succumbing to the indifference of relativism. 
Because deep pluralism defend a final authoritative value or understand plurality as a 
condition to be overcome, the experience of real and tragic choice opens up a greater 
generosity and develops a more finely attuned ear for voices that are excluded, 
marginalised and all too often silenced completely. 
 
And if we understand how conflicts between ends equally ultimate and 
sacred, but irreconcilable within the breast of even a single human 
being, or between different men or groups, can lead to tragic and 
unavoidable collisions, we shall not distort the moral facts by 
artificially ordering them in terms of some one absolute criterion; 
recognising that (pace the moralists of the eighteenth century) not all 
good things are necessarily compatible with one another; and shall seek 
to comprehend the changing ideas of cultures, peoples, classes and 
individual human beings without asking which are right, which wrong, 
at any rate not in terms of some simple home-made dogma.98 
 
Finally, while Gray is right that Berlin clearly rejected the faith that there is a special 
rational warrant for how we decide: ‘the romantics have dealt a fatal blow to the 
proposition that, all appearances to the contrary, a definite solution to the jigsaw 
puzzle is, at least in principle, possible, that power in the service of reason can 
achieve it, that rational organisation can bring about the perfect union of … values.’99 
What is, however, clear in Berlin’s thinking, is that we can give reasons for our 
commitments, that our choices are not wholly subjective or ironic, but conditioned by 
historical and social circumstances as well as by the limits of our sense of human 
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morality, making choices understandable and providing firmer grounds for the 
generous sympathy that makes deep pluralism an active political ethic of engagement, 
rather than a passive form of liberal tolerance. 
 
     In the end, Berlin’s deep pluralism regarding values does not lead necessarily to 
either a conventional liberal pluralism or even ironic liberalism. He affirmed his own 
liberal faith, he committed himself to a politics (what Bernard Williams calls the 
Liberalism of Fear)100 that sought to avoid cruelty and preserve difference in the face 
of state and social power – including moralised power. Yet this commitment was 
contingent, as all such commitments must be in a pluralist world. This contingent 
commitment, however, is not the same as ironic anti-foundationalism; the tone is 
different and the ethic more generous – which is why Gray’s comparison to Rorty 
does not hold. Deep pluralism does not start from scepticism, by doubting that we 
have deep and substantial reasons for being moral, instead its first insight is that the 
good in human life is multiple and exceeds the dominion of any individual or value 
system. This is the difference that makes a difference.  
 
      Berlin’s tragic sensibility anticipates Honig’s analysis of virtue and virtú politics, 
in which the latter acknowledges that every moral ideal, each ideal political order, has 
remainders101 – values that are lost, experiences that it devalues and voices that are 
silenced. Deep pluralism preserves remainders as sources of insight and value, not 
mistakes to be disciplined or eccentricities to be tolerated. Honig (as well as Williams 
in his later writings)102 politicises this insight by focusing on an agonistic (virtú) 
politics that insists that fundamental principles of political order are open to contest, 
and engaging in this contest is a central political virtue.103 This goes beyond Berlin’s 
acknowledgment of this political openness to an explicit agonistic democratic ethos, 
which is important for dusting off the stolid air that hangs over Berlin’s political 
thought – understandable as his own hesitance to emphasise contest in political life 
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was, given his very personal involvement with the violent extremes of 20th century 
politics.104 
 
     Further, his emphasis on the psychological experience of pluralism, his insistence 
that reason will not authoritatively silence our own ambiguous value-commitments, 
creates space for a pluralism that is critical of the construction of normalised identities 
– either of the autonomous individual or the member of the cohesive ethical 
community. It is telling that Berlin’s ambiguous endorsement of nationalism is read as 
incoherence. David Miller suggests that Berlin was unable to articulate a clear 
position either in support or opposition to nationalism105 – yet, read from a pluralist 
perspective, his thought revealed a nascent genealogical sensibility that clearly saw 
the threat of violence that resides in affirming either the atomistic rational individual 
and the member of the moral community as ideal figures grounding political life. 
Even his famous distinction between positive and negative freedom takes on a 
different hue when read as a deep pluralist analysis106 – the distinction is not a final 
normative judgment nor necessary truthful account. Instead it traces distinct 
understandings of liberty and the ways in which they fold back in upon themselves – 
such that individual liberty risks becoming the external imperative of rational 
freedom, or the protection of a space free of social interference becomes an open field 
in which the wolves prey upon the lambs. The critical edge of deep pluralism comes 
from the denial of privilege to any attempt to absolutely justify a particular value or 
order – whether through the contortions of public reason, appeals to authoritative 
communal meanings or even shared capacities for suffering and enjoyment. 
 
     Berlin saw pluralism emerging out of the disorder of things. In “Historical 
Inevitability” Berlin argued that our ability to hold ourselves and others responsible is 
incompatible with historical determinism, but in that piece he only sought to highlight 
what is lost if we believe history is a closed system rather than arguing against 
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directly for a different understanding of history and the world. In “The Hedgehog and 
the Fox,” which examines Leo Tolstoy’s views on history, Berlin was more confident 
in affirming an experience of history and social life as radically undetermined. He 
began by contrasting Tolstoy’s theoretical commitment to a determinate but 
unknowable (to human beings) order with his well developed “sense of reality”; 
‘Tolstoy perceived reality in its multiplicity, as a collection of separate entities round 
and into which he saw with a clarity and penetration scarcely ever equalled, but he 
believed only in one vast, unitary whole.’107 The essay focuses on the contrast 
between theoretical certainty and the experience of indeterminacy, as well as the 
power of literature to reflect the complex and textured nature of human experience, 
but Berlin’s own pluralist sense of reality emerges as well: ‘no theories can possibly 
fit the immense variety of possible human behaviour, the vast multiplicity of minute, 
undiscoverable causes and effects which form the interplay of men and nature which 
history purports to record.’108 What distinguishes Berlin’s deep pluralism is that he 
does not wrestle with the imperative that the universe must be a determinate whole, as 
Tolstoy does; instead, he affirms the reality ‘a messy universe.’109 
 
     The final distinctive aspect of Berlin’s pluralism is the contrast it allows us to draw 
between pluralism and diversity. Liberal pluralists and ironic liberals generally use 
these terms interchangeably, but for deep pluralists they have distinct meanings. 
Pluralism of values, final ethical faiths and political commitments is a reality of 
human life, which pluralists encourage us to engage – to be aware of our own 
ambiguities in our commitments and identities, to seek compromises with those who 
affirm different goods, to engage generously in understanding why others believe as 
they do and where possible to engage coalitions of political allies affirming different 
ultimate sources of value. Diversity, for the deep pluralist, is a challenge of 
understanding. The challenge of understanding difference is threatening for those who 
cannot tolerate or value diversity, and difference is always at risk of turning into 
incomprehensible otherness, into the distinction between privileged self and 
unknowable other, subject to discipline, discrimination and much worse. Deep 
pluralism is then a feature of the world and our experience that influences how we 
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engage with diversity; it is in part the faith that understanding difference is possible, 
and a commitment to respecting and valuing diversity without demanding otherness 
conform to our own values. Pluralism suggests that being human is an ambiguous 
condition expressing rich diversity, and that we can generously engage difference 
though responsive and respectful pluralism. 
 
IV. Pluralist Human Rights: Openings and Challenges 
 
In conclusion, there is a final challenge to the deep pluralism defended here that needs 
to be addressed. Particularly, if my reconstruction of human rights is going to begin 
with pluralist moral theory it is necessary to respond to the claim that pluralism 
undermines the possibility of a universal ethics based in a shared concept of human 
dignity and a common political program. Without these presuppositions it is not clear 
that a moral defence of an alternative international human right regime is even 
possible. Affirming a deep pluralist ethic seems to make it impossible to appeal to 
human dignity or any other central value that could not only ground but also orient 
human rights as a political project. Further, pluralist agnosticism about the ideal 
political order and its acknowledgment of ongoing contestation goes against the grain 
of cosmopolitan human rights institutions by suggesting that neither the moral 
individual nor embedded citizen is the highest ideal of political life. Important as 
these objections are they do not make a human rights based in a deep pluralism 
impossible. They do, however, require that we attend more closely to the relationship 
between ethics and politics, as well as the place of universal claims in a pluralist 
ethics.  
 
     Established objections to human rights are that they are based on a problematic 
essentialism that privileges individualism, liberal governance, capitalist economics 
and the Western model of the nation-state.110 The idea of human rights is seen as an 
ideology that assimilates and distorts the experience of others, particularly non-
western and female experience.111 From this perspective the universalism of human 
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rights is a false universalism that devalues and often ignores the reality of many 
people’s experience.112 The problematic political result of this epistemological elision 
are a blindness to certain types of violence and cruelty, as well as an inability to give 
value to alternative understandings of social and political ethics. These criticisms 
resonate with the critique of the previous two chapters, which claim that the universal 
presumptions central to human rights conceal their political nature, and that the appeal 
to universal principles of political legitimacy is an attempt to establish standards that 
are outside the realm of politics, and in fact outside the complex ambiguities of the 
actual social world. Whether the process of determining these principles takes, a 
particular vision of the good life, of legitimate social order and the moral individual is 
imposed upon real individuals. 
 
     A pluralist reconstruction of human rights must begin from the assumption that 
any attempt to adopt an absolute universal ideal is a political act that will privilege 
certain values and experiences, and displace alternative visions and generate real 
losses. This requires both the ethic of engagement introduced in embryonic form here 
and developed in what follows, as well as a commitment to an open-ended politics of 
human rights. The politics of human rights, for deep pluralists, must be a politics that 
attends to justified resistance to human rights and emergent human rights claims. This 
will have implications for how we understand the role of human rights in world 
politics – including reconsidering their function in legitimising sovereignty and 
calling for more comprehensive global organisations, while turning our attention to 
sites of contest over the meaning of human rights and social movements engaged in 
claiming human rights, including those that oppose the sovereign state as such and 
oppose an increasingly hierarchical global order.113 
 
     Beyond inspiring us to rethink the politics of human rights, a deep pluralist ethics 
leads us to reconstruct the purpose and nature of universal ethical claims. Berlin 
defended universal values, but his notion of common understanding is not prescriptive 
in the way conventional understandings of universal principles are; universal values 
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do not give us imperatives, norms and laws that should be applied to everyone and all 
situations. The difference is greater than that still, as the loss of the universal and 
absolute imperative is not to be grieved over, so far as pluralism emancipates us from 
the will to singularity it opens ethical and political life up to more ideals and 
institutional orders, while at the same time placing greater responsibility on our 
capacity for practical and situated judgment. The universalism Berlin defended 
provides a basis for confronting the ethical issues of world politics as unique conflicts 
requiring context sensitive solutions. Further, the idea of human rights that we have, 
from the perspective of Berlin’s pluralism, is an historical artefact and the result of an 
actual political process. Not only does this provide us with a better understanding of 
the idea of human rights than appeals to abstract principle, but it also changes the 
critical interrogation of that human rights regime. The question is no longer how to 
ensure that a particular right, or rights regime, is universally warranted – whether by 
reason or consensus. Instead, we will ask do the values affirmed have universal 
scope? Are these values a useful aid to our exercise of practical ethical judgment? As 
a political artefact, whom do these values exclude? And what scope is there for their 
contestation and reconstruction? Universalism as a faith in the possibility of human 
understanding, in a shared and plural humanity, allows us to ask ethical and political 
questions at the level of maximal inclusion, it holds open the possibility of universal 
regard. Yet, this universalism must remain critical, as humanity as an identity is 
ambiguous and the temptation of normalising that identity to exclude others is ever 
present. 
 
     As promising as I think a pluralist ethics is for reconstruction human rights there 
are a number of issue to be addressed and further developed. In the next chapter I turn 
to the ethical theory of John Dewey to address two key weaknesses of Berlin’s work. 
The first regards Berlin’s underdeveloped conception of judgment under conditions of 
pluralism. The question of how we judge, and what this means in relationship to 
action is not fully addressed. Berlin suggests that accommodation, tolerance and 
mutual respect should guide us, and that ethical judgment is importantly tied to a 
sense of coherence with experience and the aesthetic appeal of certain values and 
ways of life. This is evocative, but in the end it needs further clarification and 
development. In the next chapter I examine the work of John Dewey in order to 
develop a fuller account of situated practical reason, of the process of ethical 
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judgment under conditions of pluralism. The second lingering concern is Berlin’s 
ambiguous appeal to a shared human nature. His rejection of essentialism seems to 
make his appeal to human nature contradictory. While I think his historical 
exploration of human self-understanding is an improvement on either simple 
universalism or relativism, there is a danger that Berlin was too assimilative in his 
assumptions about our common human nature. Dewey’s thought, examined below, 
responds to these limitations in part, but in chapter 5 the pluralist and pragmatic ethic 
developed thus far is furthered through a direct engagement with the agonistic and 
pluralist democratic theory of William Connolly, who directly addresses the question 
of whether universalism will inevitably become assimilative and violent. 
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Chapter 4 
Situationist ethics: reconstructing practical reason  
 
‘American pragmatism is a diverse and heterogeneous tradition. But its common 
denominator consists of a future-oriented instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought 
as a weapon to enable more effective action. Its basic impulse is a plebeian radicalism 
that fuels an antipatrician rebelliousness for the moral aim of enriching individuals 
and expanding democracy.’ 
-Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy 
 
I. Ethics as Critical Intelligence 
 
In the previous chapter I have argued that embracing deep pluralism entails 
fundamentally rethinking what ethical inquiry should provide us with. Pluralism, as I 
have tried to make clear, suggests that answers to questions of value do not come in 
the form of a singular imperative, but are instead many and contestable. The pluralism 
that I have argued is essential to reconstructing human rights is a deep pluralism, it is 
not only that people with different cultural backgrounds or philosophical 
commitments may disagree, but rather that we may disagree with ourselves, with our 
families, compatriots and with strangers in equal measure as a consequence of the 
variety of human values and the complexity of our lives. This does not mean that 
values are merely relative, nor does it mean that theoretical reflection on questions of 
value is fruitless, but it does imply that the search for simple moral principles or 
comprehensive ethical systems is at best ineffectual and at worst a will to impose a 
coercive order and singularity upon our experience. Here I turn to the work of John 
Dewey to further develop the ethical basis for a reconstructed human rights, in 
particular drawing on his situationist ethics, which provides an account of ethical 
intelligence (in contrast to practical or communicative reason) and a distinctive 
understanding of universalism, which I argue are key expansions upon Berlin’s deep 
pluralism. 
 
     Dewey’s philosophy is fundamentally a call to abandon the search for immutable 
and absolute truths. At first glance this is consonant with contemporary work in 
ethical and political theory: not only are there a variety of postmodern approaches that 
would insist that such a search is both impossible and pernicious, but more 
conventional voices no longer speak with strong metaphysical accents or declare such 
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ambition to finality. Yet, the problem that universal moral theories address themselves 
to is the very problem Dewey identified in The Quest for Certainty. In that text he 
traced the changes in modern thought that created both the sense that moral values 
were under threat while diagnosing the futility of attempts to defend the certainty of 
moral values from contingency, as each new foundation intended to preserve ultimate 
value crumbles.  
 
When men began to reflect philosophically it seemed to them 
altogether too risky to leave the place of values at the mercy of acts the 
results of which are never sure. This precariousness might hold as far 
as empirical existence, existence in the sensible and phenomenal 
world, is concerned; but this very uncertainty seemed to render it the 
more needful that ideal goods should be shown to have, by means of 
knowledge of the most assured type, an indefeasible and inexpugnable 
position in the realm of the ultimately real.1 
 
From Dewey’s perspective it is not that we tragically lack power to know final and 
absolute truths about human values, it is that such a search is misguided. Dewey 
argued that the failure to find absolute and final answers is not a cause for 
disillusionment but a liberation of human intelligence. The more common response to 
a world that seems so unwilling to accommodate finality or certainty is, especially in 
ethical and political theory, to find some synthetic grounds for what has been lost. 
Dewey enjoined us to stop looking for truth, value or the good external to experience 
and to get on with the work of making, and remaking, these vital materials. 
 
     Like Berlin, Dewey was often accused of undercutting the very possibility of 
objective value,2 and for similar reasons, as he denied both the final authority of 
tradition and the rationalist dream of discovering absolute values through the conceit 
of reason. The source of this reaction is the seeming impossibility of conventional 
moralists to reconsider the nature of values as uncertain and contingent. Dewey’s 
ethics reject the need for imperatives. He said, the ‘imperative, like everything 
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absolute, is sterile. Till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they 
will not know where to look to find it.’3 In place of the search for a general formula, 
he sought to understand the logical, psychological and social elements of ethical 
thought in order to improve ethical intelligence as part of our experience, to develop 
our ability (as co-authors of moral value) to make judgments and improve social life 
in light of our best ideals in specific situations.  
 
     Building upon the deep pluralism taken from Berlin in the last chapter, Dewey’s 
situationist ethics provide a better account of how our values are developed and a 
fuller understanding of how practical judgment works if we accept the plurality and 
contingency of values. These aspects of Dewey’s thought are developed in sections 
two and three, while paying attention to the important contribution to Dewey’s ethical 
thought made by emphasising the elements of pluralism in his pragmatism. In the 
final section, I confront the issue of how the appeal to universal humanity functions in 
the reconstructed political ethic developed here. This final development requires 
focusing on the persistence of political contest in ethical thought, which is 
inadequately addressed in Dewey’s work – this failing sets the stage for chapter five, 
where the always political contest at the heart of ethics is examined in detail. 
 
II. Situationist Ethics and Practical Action 
 
To understand Dewey’s ethical thought it is necessary to place it in the context of his 
wider philosophy. In particular, the distinctive meaning he gave to experience is 
central to his rejection of traditional moral theory and his account of ethical 
intelligence. Where moral theory is divided between transcendent appeals to moral 
authority (whether religious or rational) and claims that moral authority is evident in 
the nature of things (whether in the human nature or communal traditions), Dewey 
rejected the possibility that our experience will give us ground for such final 
authority. Transcendent and transcendental theories depend upon an escape from 
everyday practical experience in order to access higher levels of experience that 
justify our knowledge, particularly authoritative moral knowledge.4 While empirical 
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theories claim that truth is written upon the world such that we can access that truth 
through perception, even as it may require special methods, which affirms the 
authority of moral knowledge that comes from experience of custom or self-evident 
human nature.5 Dewey denied that either rational or empirical experience provides 
knowledge, moral or otherwise; instead, experience is active and knowledge is 
generated through interaction with our physical and social environment. From this 
idea of active experience Dewey developed a situationist and experimental ethics that 
makes use of empirical reality and rational reflection in the reconstruction of 
experience, but which changes the fundamental goal of ethical thinking from 
determining final and authoritative rules to developing better ways of acting ethically 
in light of constantly shifting experience.6 
 
     For Dewey ethical reflection started with problematic experience, with those 
situations that disrupt our everyday experience of acting in the world. Our experience 
most of the time is mediated by habit and custom, which makes our interactions in the 
world relatively seamless, this importantly includes ethics.7 Most of the time we judge 
right and wrong, good and bad, with unreflective ease, but there are disruptions of 
experience, when for various reasons habit and custom fall short. It is in these 
problematic situations, Dewey argued, that ethical thinking really happens, where 
ethical theory has important work to do in reconstructing experience. This implies that 
ethical problems are situational, first and foremost, and that absolute imperatives are 
hollow, whatever purported source of authority they claim.8 This is because our 
experience is contingent, plural, ungrounded and subject to change and further 
development, meaning that the successful responses we find to specific problems are 
the most firmly true ethical claims we can make – leaving grander claims of moral 
principle open to continued testing against experience. Dewey inverted the hierarchy 
of universal over particular principles, of universal and rational over situational and 
practical experience. 
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     Our fullest knowledge of truth, according to Dewey, is achieved in consumatory 
moments in which problematic situations are overcome and a unity is established 
between reflective thought and empirical experience through practical activity.9 These 
moments of successful reconstruction are more meaningful than our common state of 
effective habitual action, as experience has been self-consciously reconstructed to 
overcome the problematic situation created by the failure of habitual activity.10 Yet 
this quintessentially idealist moment of merger between the actual and ideal is the 
fleeting result of practical activity that expresses a feature of improved experience, 
rather than a metaphysical and singular absolute.11 Dewey’s was a plural universe in 
which change and adaption are ongoing, developments multiple and leading to further 
improvements in our ability to cope with and make meaning in such a world.12 
Therefore, the central goal of Dewey’s ethical theory is to improve our ability to 
transform problematic experiences into consumatory ones. 
 
     Dewey’s ethics are not simply instrumental, as a crude reading could suggest, as 
the transformation of experience it aims at places the critical interrogation of our 
existing moral values at the centre of ethical inquiry. In distinction from inquiry in the 
physical sciences, ethical inquiry requires that we consider the implications of any 
particular action for the values we affirm for ourselves and our communities; because 
inquiry into human relations leads to conclusions that affect our self-understandings, 
Dewey thought that all social inquiry has an ethical element. ‘Judgments are “moral” 
in logical type so far as the presence of activity in affecting the content of judgment is 
seen consciously to affect itself – or whenever the reciprocal determination of activity 
and content becomes itself an object of judgment whose determination is a 
prerequisite for further successful judgments.’13 The self-reflection that is constitutive 
of ethical inquiry makes plain that the question of “what sort of people should we be” 
is always in need of an answer through our practical action, rather than our declared 
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imperatives. So, while it is correct to see Dewey’s idea of inquiry as the application of 
critical intelligence to improve experience that improvement is not merely found in 
exerting greater control over external consequences – in ethical inquiry it is 
importantly about making plain the values we affirm, evaluating them and reorienting 
both our action and values in light of experienced consequences, which may require 
changing ourselves as much as our social environment.14 
 
     The situationist ethics Dewey developed prescribes a method of practical action, of 
ethical intelligence, that reconstructs conventional accounts of practical reason 
intended to assist us in determining the right thing to do. Once we find ourselves in an 
ethically problematic situation, the first requirement is to determine the nature of the 
problem that is impeding our action: is it a practical difficulty or a psychological 
doubt leading us to question our own values?15 Once it has been made clear what the 
problematic ends are in a given situation, then we can work towards imagining a new 
“end in view” that reconstructs the problematic situation into a consumatory one.16 
This new end in view, however, is tentative and hypothetical – it must be tested out in 
both imagination and practical action to establish its value.17 And even when a new 
end proves successful, Dewey enjoined us to remain self-reflective in considering the 
nature of the new experience engendered by our actions – to keep the existential 
question at the forefront our minds: has this new end and the actions to make it 
effective in the world lead us to be the sort of people we should be? More needs to be 
said about the functioning of ends in particular ethical situations as well as the place 
of values in ethical thought more broadly. 
 
     Dewey’s ethical thinking is built around his analysis of how values function in 
social life, most importantly in providing ends and means that guide our action. In any 
particular situation we will be guided by ends that we take for granted, pursued in 
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ways that we rarely stop to reflect upon. Nonetheless, the ends we pursue and the 
manner in which we pursue them reflect our valuations of them as goods, even if 
these valuations are often tacit or second-hand, but the things we value are more than 
simple satisfactions.18 To begin with, a moral good is one that is valued for more than 
the satisfaction it brings – even the hedonist must first moralise enjoyment before 
pleasure becomes a moral end, must affirm that it is the sort of thing we should 
dedicate ourselves to in though and conduct.19 Beyond this reflective evaluation, our 
moral values are social and therefore the process of acquiring, evaluating and 
changing our values takes place in common with others. Therefore, we confront an 
already existing world of plural values, an ethical world of many goods expressed in 
diverse ends and pursued through diverse means. This is a major source of tension in 
our ethical lives leading us to confront problematic situations and seek reconstructions 
of value; added to this are changes in our material conditions and changing patterns of 
social interaction that bring the experiences of new individuals and groups together. 
Keeping the depth of this value pluralism in mind, Dewey’s remarks have a distinct 
contemporary relevance when he says:  
 
All the serious perplexities of life come back to the genuine difficulty 
of forming a judgment as to the values of the situation; they come back 
to a conflict of goods... And to suppose that we can make a 
hierarchical table of values at large once for all, a kind of catalogue in 
which they are arranged in an order of ascending or descending worth, 
is to indulge in a gloss on our inability to frame intelligent judgments 
in the concrete.20 
 
It is easy to imagine that Dewey would not be surprised that the challenge of acting 
ethically and thinking critically in our complex contemporary situation, especially 
when dealing with issues of international and global scope, has lead moralists to 
expend so much energy defining universal moral principles that bear upon all 
situations as a matter of definition. 
 
     Responding to problematic situations then requires us to suggest revised ends in 
view to restore continuity to ethical experience. The content of these ends, however, 
cannot be given by a prior theory. We can draw upon the larger context of the 
                                                 
18
 Dewey, Lectures on Ethics, 184-198. 
19
 Ibid., 23-28.   
20
 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 253. 
  146 
situation, such that other values may guide our reconstruction; the demands of the 
situation may call upon us to reconsider what is most important to us in a given 
situation; or the situation may call for effecting social and political changes in order to 
enable the original end pursued. Aside from calling for this sort of detailed and 
empirically grounded analysis, Dewey’s ethics also demand action. He discussed two 
types of action. First, he suggested that we should employ imaginative rehearsals, in 
which we think through the consequences of pursuing a new end as carefully and 
thoroughly as possible.21 Even this strategy, however, has its limits and action is 
required to confirm the value of our new ends.22 Yet, this action is only a stage in the 
ongoing cycle of ethical inquiry and provides ground for further reflection. 
 
     This ongoing process of action and reflection was, for Dewey, the only plausible 
and effective response to the uncertainty we face in practical action – a commitment 
to the intelligent pursuit of moral actions.  
 
To abandon the search for absolute and immutable reality and value 
may seem like a sacrifice. But this renunciation is the condition for 
entering upon a vocation of greater vitality. The search for values to be 
secured and shared by all, because buttressed in the foundations of 
social life, is a quest in which philosophy would have no rivals, but 
coadjutors in men of good will.23 
 
Key to this process of reflection is the distinction he made between something having 
value for us, and the reflective process of valuation. That something is enjoyed and 
therefore has immediate value can be a call for caution as much as it is a confirmation 
of the experience’s moral value – even in reflective action we may find that our new 
end in view leads to an experience we enjoy or prize, but that does not guarantee that 
upon further reflection we find it morally valuable, as the enjoyment of a particular 
end may well be outweighed by negative consequences that result.24 Dewey’s 
articulation of an ethical method does much to clarify the consequences of pluralism 
for practical action and gives substantial content to Berlin’s gesture toward pluralist 
ethics as a guide to making choices in specific consequences without the guidance of 
final principles. More, however, must be said to expand upon this basic account of 
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Dewey’s ethics. Most importantly what has been discussed thus far raises the question 
of what role general moral principles, like those articulated as human rights, play in 
political ethics. Also, what has been said is focused on singular experiences rather 
than the social and political context in which ethical action is required. Both of these 
issues are addressed in the next section. 
 
III. Democratic Reconstructions 
 
The account given thus far is essentially a phenomenological account of moral 
experience, a personalised understanding of the process of moral judgment. This is 
vital for Dewey, as he wanted to shift the focus of ethical theory away from an ideal 
realm of absolute principles to the concrete problems we face. Yet this raises the 
question of what further content is there to his ethical theory. While Cornel West is 
correct to characterise Dewey’s thought as part of a pragmatic tradition that evades 
rather than solves most traditional philosophical questions,25 Dewey clearly saw 
himself as articulating a new philosophy that would assist ethical thought and action 
without according theoretical abstraction a privileged position over practical action. 
This is why his ethical theory is essentially presented as a resource for dealing with 
problematic situations, as a tool we can turn to in order assist us in making better 
ethical judgments both as individuals and members of communities. 
 
A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and 
stick to at all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when 
specified conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence 
are tested by what happens when it is acted upon. Its claim or authority 
rests finally upon the imperativeness of the situation that has to be 
dealt with, not upon its own intrinsic nature – as any tool achieves 
dignity in the measure of the needs served by it.26  
 
In his most explicitly ethical works Dewey pursued three lines of inquiry that he 
thinks will improve our ability to make ethical judgments, these include an 
investigation into the logical structure of ethical concepts, which can clarify our 
thinking and expose concepts in need of reconstruction; an analysis of the 
psychological aspects of ethical judgment including an analysis of habits, desires and 
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the development of moral character; and finally an analysis of the social and political 
structures within which ethical judgments are made.27 In each case he was working, 
quite consciously, at a level of abstraction removed from practical action and 
therefore his ethical theory should be understood as an attempt to clarify the generic 
aspects of ethical experience as a tool for improving practical action, not as presenting 
regulative philosophical ideals. 
 
     The logical concepts of ethics are analysed in order to make clear how ethical 
terms and ideas function in our daily experience, a process that Dewey used to 
articulate his critique of traditional moral theories. A full exposition of the ethical 
concepts he addresses or of his critique of traditional morality is not possible here, so 
I focus on those aspects of this work that are most relevant to the task of 
reconstructing human rights: the good and the right. To begin with, Dewey looked at 
“the good” as the primary feature of ethical thought, as the good is fundamentally that 
which motivates action – those ends and actions identified as good are desired and 
prized.28 As was discussed earlier, a moral good is more than a desired end or state of 
enjoyment, it has been analysed and its consequences affirmed in reflection, and this 
process of reflection upon our ends is central to the ethical method that Dewey 
prescribed.29 As goods become problematic they must be reassessed and reconstructed 
through ethical judgments and therefore always remain central to ethical intelligence, 
yet this centrality is not buttressed through transcendental or empirical theories of 
value. This is the central difference in Dewey’s ethical thought, and the point that has 
lead many to believe he prescribes a positivist ethics without normative content.30 For 
Dewey, a properly experimental ethics must begin with those things that people do 
value as good, but without abandoning the capacity for critical reflection and moral 
progress.  
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Affections, desires, purposes, choices are going to endure as long as 
man is man; therefore as long as man is man, there are going to be 
ideas, judgments, beliefs about values. Nothing could be sillier than to 
attempt to justify their existence at large; they are going to exist 
anyway. What is inevitable needs no proof for its existence. But these 
expressions of our nature need direction, and direction is possible only 
through knowledge. When they are informed by knowledge, they 
themselves constitute, in their directed activity, intelligence in 
operation.31  
 
Moral progress, however, is not guaranteed through reason; instead it occurs within 
human experience through reflection on our ends and means, through an experimental 
and corrigible pursuit of the good. In this context “progress” is made in terms of 
confronting specific problems, not building towards some final and complete 
morality.32 The moral content of the good is our best reflections and our most careful 
action as we work towards creating the best selves and communities we can imagine.  
 
     This highlights the importance of the social nature of the good, as we start our 
pursuit in an existing social context, with many established goods, and we pursue the 
good in community with others. Therefore, the good cannot be judged from a purely 
self-interested perspective, the consequences of our ends upon others matter for 
determining their moral value.33 This also means that the assessments of others 
matter, at least as far as our actions affect them and, most fully, as far as the 
assessments of others determine how we judge ourselves.34 It is in this context that 
goods become regulative ideals, as some goods are given priority in regulating our 
personal conduct and our assessments of others – and while Dewey had much to say, 
as a moralist, about which ideals should regulate our conduct, the more fundamental 
point is that even as our ideals provide guides to action they can fail and must be open 
to reconstruction.35 Further, because ethical judgment is an inherently social act, 
critical ethical intelligence requires an attention to the differential effect of ideals 
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upon individuals in society and an understanding of the social structures and power 
that holds certain ideals in place. Dewey’s analysis, in other words, is not 
conventionalism or arid idealism; it serves to empower our self-conscious acts of 
ethical reconstruction.36 
 
     While more will be said about Dewey’s analysis of the social and political context 
of ethical judgment, I want to highlight his analysis of the concept of “the right” as 
well, which will inform the reconstruction of human rights that I begin in the final 
section of this chapter. The right, according to Dewey, is derivative of the good as it 
represents the codification of particular ideal goods into rules of social action that 
both grant rights and assign duties.37 Unlike formal moral theories  (which would 
include Kantianism and discourse ethics), Dewey did not think the pure concept of 
right can give us determinate moral rules because as the right expresses a rule it also 
expresses established goods, both ends and means.38 Rights, therefore, figure into 
ethical experience differently than the good because rights express the social rules of 
conduct (the privileges and responsibilities) that influence our actions. Specific rights 
are prior to a general conception of right on Dewey’s understanding, which means 
that that our experience of established rights is vital in determining the moral value of 
any particular right. Therefore, rights are still open to reconstruction in problematic 
situations, as the experience of individuals exposes incoherency and exploitation in 
existing concepts of the right; this change of focus is actually quite radical, as it 
undermines the authority, both social and intellectual, that normally preserves rights 
and instead focuses on their practical consequences and empowers the democratic 
reconstruction of established privileges and responsibilities.  
 
     A further change entailed by Dewey’s analysis of rights is that there is no longer a 
universal account of right, as any abstraction from the context in which a right is 
made determinate leaves us with only a generic abstraction. Such abstraction can 
serve as ideals and guides to action – in essence the idea of universal human rights is 
the ideal of a global community in which everyone has privileges and duties to one 
another, but the generic abstraction itself lacks content. The content and value of any 
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right or rights regime must be put to the test in specific situations, in concrete 
practical activity. This makes clear that rights as given in any particular context are 
fundamental to the legitimacy of the existing social order, as they institutionalise the 
account of what each owes to another. Calls to reconstruct the privileges and 
responsibilities that define the social structure are radical in the sense that they call for 
fundamental changes in society.39 While we lose the power of transcendental theories 
of right to make absolute claims upon the social order, what is gained in Dewey’s 
understanding of rights is a clearer picture of how rights function in society and what 
is actually involved in rejecting existing rights and claiming new ones. His ethics also 
points us toward the analysis of actual rather than ideal rights regimes and the actual 
experience that drives us to make ethical judgment and social change. 
 
     Beyond an account of how key ethical concepts function in thought and action, 
Dewey insisted that we must understand the psychology of ethical judgment. Again 
Dewey’s work is so broad that only a partial presentation is possible. The key idea 
that Dewey developed in social psychology is the role of habit and custom in 
determining our behaviour and wider social structures. While he was keen to 
overcome the negative consequences of convention, Dewey did not imagine that 
ethics can or should eliminate habit and custom – the primary task is rather to enable 
better habits and customs that open up possibilities for further ethical advancement 
and growth.40 It is striking that his account of the psychological basis of ethical action 
is represented as opening up human powers to control our environment and improve 
our communities and our selves; the social psychological basis of ethics is not an 
impediment to judgment and it is not a cage of biological determinism or social 
conventionalism.  
 
     Dewey understood habits as the established currents through which experience 
flows, leading us to pursue given ends through accepted means until something 
disrupts the course of activity. Customs are socialised habits, they represent the 
established goods, rights and institutions of society that coordinate social activity in 
relatively stable ways. Importantly, customs provide the backdrop of habit, the source 
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of our habits and the primary means of their reinforcement.41 Given the weight of 
habit and custom as unconscious guides to activity, the work of disrupting and 
changing convention is difficult but vital; which is why the disruption of experience is 
so important to Dewey. Our desires, impulses, frustrations and suffering are all 
potential motives to reconsider established ways of acting as they generate the 
problematic situations that call out for ethical judgment. 
 
Fear and hope, joy and sorrow, aversion and desire, as perturbations, 
are qualities of a divided response. They involve concern, solicitude, 
for what the present situation may become. “Care” signifies two quite 
different things: fret, worry and anxiety, and cherishing attention to 
that in whose potentialities we are interested. These two meaning 
represent different poles of reactive behaviour to a present having a 
future which is ambiguous. Elation and depression, moreover, 
manifest themselves only under conditions wherein not everything 
from start to finish is completely determined and certain. They may 
occur at a final moment of triumph or defeat, but this moment is one of 
victory or frustration in connection with a previous course of affairs 
whose issue was in suspense. Love for a Being so perfect and 
complete that our regard for it can make no difference to it is not so 
much affection as (a fact which the scholastics saw) it is concern for 
the destiny for our own souls. Hate that is sheer antagonism without 
any element of uncertainty is not an emotion, but is an energy devoted 
to ruthless destruction.42  
 
This means that these emotional and visceral responses to experience are central to 
ethics, as they provide the spur to self-reflection and reconstruction, which in turn 
inspires social and political action to reform custom and alter the social order.  
 
     The goal of ethical judgment, however, is not to eradicate habit and custom, as we 
not only need them in order to make our way through the world, it is impossible to 
question all our habits and customs at once, meaning the process of moral 
improvement is always ongoing and necessarily partial. Dewey’s goal was to raise 
individual action to the level of conduct, which requires a moral consciousness that is 
aware of the habitual and customary, while seeking out opportunities for 
reconstruction and improvement of one’s character.43 Moral conduct is contrasted 
with habitual behaviour to clarify the distinction between the merely habitual and 
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accepted, and the moralisation of habit as conduct. The same process is needed, 
Dewey thought, at a social level, which inspires his insistence on the importance of 
democracy as an ethical form of community that makes it possible to constantly 
evaluate and reconstruct social customs, institutions and rights. Ethical intelligence is 
dependent upon making reflective and cooperative social action a part of everyday 
experience, upon the development individual character and democratic community.44  
 
     The final element of Dewey’s ethical theory is the analysis of the political and 
social context in which ethical judgment is exercised. This involves consideration of 
the social structures that constrain ethical judgment, as well as an assessment of the 
ways ethical reconstruction can be enabled by social change. The analysis of political, 
economic and other social institutions, in turn generates a call for political action to 
enable democratic community.  
 
     Dewey was a keen social critic and clearly saw the negative consequences that 
established institutions had upon the development of ethical intelligence. Of special 
importance to him was the effect of the newly industrialised economy upon people’s 
lives. Not only were the majority of people engaged in difficult, repetitive, dangerous 
and oppressive forms of work, the demands of the industrial economy resulted in 
disastrous urban living conditions. Even for those less directly exploited and 
brutalised by industrialisation, the rapid changes in social conditions abetted moral 
indifference, rising inequality and encouraged processes of centralisation that 
removed even the relatively privileged from positions of control over their own 
lives.45 Even Dewey’s critique of consumer culture has serious moral implications, as 
he saw it as undermining the possibility of ethical intelligence as the powerful 
habituating forces of consumption and distraction fulfilled impulses and desires that 
otherwise might inspire social reform.46 This sort of engagement with social 
conditions, with the forces and structures that determine social institutions, laws and 
customs is vital to developing ethical intelligence. Dewey’s more general theoretical 
analysis identifies key spheres of activity that must be considered, including the 
economy, schools, the media, government and technology – all of the institutions of 
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social life bear upon the individual and the nature of community, which means that 
judgment requires engaged analysis.47  
 
     While critics are correct to point to limitations in Dewey’s own social analysis – 
for example his tendency to reduce racism and patriarchy to class exploitation – his 
ethics importantly establishes the need for such detailed analysis and gives the 
experience of exploitation, oppression and violence a privileged place in encouraging 
ethical judgment and motivating social change.48 Additionally, West is right that 
Dewey’s failure to engage with the best elements of the Marxist tradition is a 
weakness of his thought, but even on this count Dewey’s theory has important 
virtues.49 Importantly, Dewey rejected the historical determinism that hindered the 
development of Marxist thought and he analysed social forces in their diversity 
(looking to economic exchange, technology, moral customs, laws, political 
institutions, schools, the arts and the organisation of family life) without assuming 
that any one was necessarily primary – as such a determination required an analysis of 
the concrete conditions.50 Also, he maintained an explicit link between ethical 
judgment and social conditions; appreciating both that existing conditions influenced 
moral custom and that ethical action was vital to motivating and effecting social 
change.  
 
     Dewey’s focus on education provides the primary example of how social 
institutions are important sites for developing ethical intelligence. Given his focus on 
the psychological and social elements of moral action it is unsurprising that he 
focused on education as an institution capable of encouraging improved habits, and 
developing moral character. While his initial faith in the power of reform in education 
to effect wider social change was tempered by greater realism in his later works, the 
centrality of education remains in his ethics. Without going into the details of his 
educational theory, the important insight for my purposes is the role that education 
had in developing a democratic approach to intelligence.51 If schools were to 
encourage cooperative and critical habits of inquiry, rather than obedience and 
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conformity, the possibility of democratic community would be much improved 
through establishing equal respect for others and inculcating ongoing critical 
engagement as a habituated element of moral character. Throughout his career he 
advocated for the democratic organisation of institutions, including classrooms, 
workplaces, government and even cultural institutions, expressing the necessity of 
social reform to ethical improvement.52 His experiments in education reform, 
however, lead to a key insight – changing education alone was inadequate, as 
individuals intellectually empowered but still caught within social institutions hostile 
to critical and democratic intelligence in ethical matters were liable to disappointment 
and social reproach.53 This reality fed into Dewey’s understanding of social reform 
both personally and intellectually. As a political actor he was engaged with a number 
of reform movements, including the labour movement, women’s suffrage and racial 
equality.54 These engagements were more than expression of Dewey’s own personal 
political commitment, as the implication of his account of ethical intelligence was that 
inclusion and participation in social life was key to enabling ethical judgment and 
social change, which meant that efforts to increase democratic inclusion and expand 
democratic control over society were expressions of the ideal and method of his 
theory.  
 
     Democracy plays a central role in Dewey’s social ethics as both a means of reform 
and an end to be pursued because it provides the best way to improve ethical 
judgment. Dewey thought this because democratic community directly involves 
individuals in the cooperative endeavour of improving their conditions of life.55 So 
while social analysis of existing institutions is vital to ethical judgment in exposing 
the types of relationships created by existing customs and practices, the effort to 
reform them is guided by a democratic sensibility that insists that individuals 
experiencing the effects of social institutions are best placed to know how they should 
change, and that individuals must act cooperatively. ‘The idea of democracy is a 
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wider and fuller idea than can be exemplified in the state even at its best. To be 
realized it must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, 
industry, religion.’56 Cooperative ethical action is not only a practical good, though 
Dewey does endorse the Millian notion that the inclusion of more people in 
deliberation may encourage better results, it is also a condition of ethical knowledge 
developed through the application of intelligence. As we can develop knowledge 
through the successful reconstruction of specific situations as an individual 
experiencing a problematic situation, the same is true of cooperative social inquiry, 
but this requires the widest possible participation in the process of ethical judgment 
and action.57 This means that while Dewey’s insistence on the contingency and 
fallibility of all ideals means that a democratic ethos does not have any absolute or 
final privilege, it is more than a simple faith and represents a reasoned response to the 
problems of social ethics. 
 
     The situationist focus of Dewey’s ethics can begin to seem infinitely demanding, 
as if each ethical judgment and action requires an investigation into the good 
necessary to the situation – but this is mistaken. It is clear that the critical element of 
ethical inquiry is not a constant state; it works as a guide to specific moments of 
dilemma, an ideal to inform everyday conduct and an orientation to be instantiated in 
social institutions. Much of our experience will be guided by habit and custom aimed 
toward established ideals – and Dewey’s own democratic ethos functions in this way, 
it is not an imperative. The ethos of democracy is an ideal of cooperative interaction 
based on inclusion and equality in a social order that is differentiated but not 
exploitative; it includes a commitment to encouraging a democratic and experimental 
sensibility through education, to enabling participation throughout the different 
spheres of social activity and seeks to extend democratic political institutions that can 
control the social interactions that affect our lives. Such an ethos, however, does not 
have a necessary privilege disconnected from our experience of democracy’s positive 
consequences as an ethical ideal – so while an ethos is not a knowledge claim that can 
be refuted through a particular piece empirical evidence, or a single rational argument, 
it is still subject to a broader sense of testing, it must continue to prove its worth as 
cooperative social intelligence and an attractive moral ideal.  
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     Dewey’s vision of radical participatory democracy has two virtues that I want to 
highlight, both because they strengthen this vision and because they are virtues that 
are important for the reconstruction of human rights. First, democratic equality 
institutionalises the participation of those who are marginalised and excluded, who 
have an important critical position in the ongoing process of democratic 
improvement.58 The exploited worker is better able to reveal the injustice of 
contemporary economic practices, women to reveal the oppression of patriarchy, and 
racial minorities in revealing prejudices and violent practices of exclusion; these and 
many other experiences are revealed through a thorough going democratic ethos. The 
second virtue is the commitment to ongoing reconstruction that democratic practice 
makes possible – individuals, groups and the community as a whole are enabled as 
makers of their own lives, as agents of social reconstruction who pull down existing 
institutions in order to create new ones. This is what Dewey understands by his idea 
of democracy as an ethic of growth and improvement; it opens the way to more 
meaningful experience through inclusive participation and constant critical praxis.59 
While it is correct to speak of Dewey’ democratic faith, we must appreciate that his 
faith is a reflexive political and ethical commitment, not a dogma – the answer to the 
question of how best to live together is importantly not always already known. 
 
IV. Plural and Pragmatic Human Rights: An Initial Reconstruction 
 
Putting the situationist and pluralist ethical perspective developed here and in the last 
chapter together, I will suggest, provides a promising basis for a critical 
reconstruction of human rights. Where Dewey’s ethics adds a fuller account of what 
values are – they are ends we pursue and the considered means to their fulfilment – 
and how we make value judgments, Berlin’s deep pluralism emphasises that value 
judgments always engender loss and that democratic ideals must appreciate the 
divided and contested allegiances of individuals and communities. Further, in 
bringing these approaches together it is possible to rethink the role of universal ethical 
claims. Berlin opens up the possibility of understanding universal values as common 
and contingent ends that enable human beings to understand each other across their 
differences. This understanding of universal values, however, is limited it its ability to 
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guide action – though it may provide an account of common prohibitions and enable 
the understanding necessary to confront specific dilemma. Building upon this idea, 
Dewey’s understanding of universals as generic abstractions from specific situations 
that serve as tools that enable further critical investigation is an important further 
development. Finally, both thinkers see ethical judgment as an oscillation between the 
need for committed action in the face of pluralism and contingency, and an 
appreciation that our values are never final and secure – accepting and trying to cope 
with the persistent return of disagreement and contestation. 
 
     In contrast to theories of human rights examined in earlier chapters, the account 
that I will develop in the chapters to follow focuses on human rights as a response to 
particular struggles and specific social problems. Even those who share elements of 
this position, such as Jack Donnelly, fail to embrace a situational account of human 
rights. When Donnelly argues that human rights offer universal protections, 
developed in response to the power of the contemporary nation and the dangers of a 
global capitalist economy, he does not acknowledge the particularity and 
contestability of this response.60 This objection, however, implies a further critique 
than the now standard claim that human rights represent the values of Western 
tradition that is particular rather than universal. Human rights were developed as the 
responses of particular groups to concrete problems and any future value those rights 
may have must be proven in the experience of other communities responding to their 
own concrete problems – human rights must prove their worth everyday. Feminist 
critics of human rights have been central to both showing the limitations of existing 
human rights ideals and creatively developing the idea of human rights to address the 
specific problems that women face.61 Further, past success is no protection against the 
partiality of received human rights, especially if one is attentive to those remainders 
sacrificed in committing to any particular judgment where there are plural and 
competing ethical goods. To suggest, as Donnelly implicitly does, that human rights 
serve to humanise the nation-state and embed the market in a vision of national social 
democracy, misses the important counter factual that other forms of resistance were 
possible and may not have lead the contemporary human rights regime, or to a human 
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rights at all. An historical example would be the marginalisation of social and 
economic rights by powerful states and within international institutions, which 
obscures the central place that economic and social issues have had in diverse rights 
movements. This is true of early rights movements in England, where the Levellers 
and the Diggers are often ignored,62 as well as in the early days of developing the 
human rights institutions of the UN – looking at the background intellectual writings 
of the period reveals the influence of social and economic rights as central to the 
understanding of a just society at the time.63 
 
     Attending to the situations and struggles through which human rights were 
developed also reorients our political understanding of rights by focusing our 
attention on individuals and groups opposing existing social orders. It forces us to 
appreciate the disruptive heritage of rights claims that upset existing orders and 
sought to reform political life. A situationist and pluralist perspective also makes 
sense of the discontinuous nature of rights claims. Rather than insisting that human 
rights must be compatible with each other, surely a rationalist conceit, this perspective 
reveals a plural picture of human rights as the human rights tradition collects the 
consequences of a variety of social struggles under a single heading. Human rights are 
in a sense a collection of many dreams of universal political change, a potent tool for 
social action, but one without necessity and opening up a plurality of possibilities for 
future action. This ennobles a more radical political imagination, in which the national 
state and the cosmopolitan extension of state structures of governance are no longer 
the only political ideals that might move us to action in the name of human rights. 
 
     Human rights, from a situationist and pluralist perspective, are importantly open 
rather than determined by the necessity of normative reasons; the future development 
of human rights is uncertain, as the claims upon the social order made in the name of 
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“humanity” are not fixed and can potentially express a multitude of values. This 
democratic aspect of human rights is both an opening and a challenge – while human 
rights are malleable enough for many people to use it as a common language of 
universalism, it also means that human rights can be deployed in cynical and 
problematic ways. Not only is the rhetoric of universal rights a tempting object of 
cooptation by cynical political powers, but the logic of human rights – as claims made 
upon the basic terms of social relations in the name of a common human identity – 
can support substantive conceptions of rights that are regressive, exclusionary and 
violent. This implies that if human rights are to embody worthwhile ends and 
encourage democratic forms of society, locally as well as globally, this requires a 
political action and not just the modest powers of reasoned intellectual justification. 
 
     The contingency and pluralism within human rights, both historically and as 
expressed today in law, theoretical discourse and social movements, means that the 
contest over their meaning is unavoidable, and this will likely always be the case. 
Rather than seeking a consensus on rights, the perspective developed here suggests a 
pluralist sensibility that will link distinct human rights movements in response to a 
variety of struggles, without presuming that a final synthesis is necessary or possible 
at the global level. Where consensus is about the reduction of dissonant voices and the 
pursuit of harmony, a pluralist human rights is concerned to appreciate voices 
sounding in dissonance and to encourage new lines of melody.  
 
These primary concerns therefore mean that at the heart of interrogating 
the field of human rights through the conceptual framework of 'silence' 
lies a critique of the presentation of the human rights project as the 
overcoming of domination per se, and not as a project that acts, at the 
same time, to perpetuate certain forms of domination. It should be noted, 
then, that rather than judging the human rights project as either 
emancipatory or as domination we focus upon its essentially contested 
nature.64  
 
This fundamentally changes the political expression of human rights and their ideal 
form, moving us away from a legal conception of moral principle in which moral 
reason gives the legitimate law to the unruly world of politics. In place of that 
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dynamic, human rights function more as an ethos that assumes that developing 
universal ethical concern may produce positive consequence, essentially widening the 
public concerned with the abuses people suffer, providing means of addressing global 
harms generated by interconnected social processes and providing a common 
language to express solidarity across plural political struggles. There are no 
guarantees that such an ethos will be beneficial or sustained, but it does potentially 
open the way for more democratic forms of action in defence of human rights, placing 
direct engagement and focused social movements ahead of the centralising processes 
of international institutions and the creation of a comprehensive international human 
rights law. The centralisation of human rights as law and rhetoric is inherently 
problematic as it cedes what rhetorical and political power human rights may have to 
established authorities, to heads of state and international institutions. The impotence 
of the UN to stop human rights violations and the willingness of powerful states to 
redefine, stretch and ignore established rights brings home the danger of separating 
human rights from a democratic politics of engagement and action, from their origin 
in revolutionary social movements.65 
 
     Finally, a situationist and pluralist starting point allows us to think more critically 
about the notion of humanity that is used when talking about human rights. Human 
rights are necessarily universal claims, but not all universal claims refer to the idea of 
a common humanity. Universal humanity as an important political identity is neither 
simple nor clearly defined, yet this is how it is often treated – defenders of human 
rights move quickly from the claim that human rights are those rights we have by 
virtue of our humanity and that common humanity is defined by dignity – or some 
other essential human quality. This logic misses the constructed and contested nature 
of humanity, we are not simply humans possessing dignity (or some other privileged 
quality) and human rights; the appeal to the social and political salience of a distinctly 
human identity must be understood as a political project. Yet, if it is a political 
project, more attention needs to be given to the work that human identity does. 
Dewey’s pragmatism opens up this question in a way that Berlin’s pluralism does not 
manage.  
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     The human identity is a formally universal category, a generic abstraction; by 
definition it includes every one as a biological member of the species – though this is 
not without its own exclusions, particularly for those who are socially marginalised as 
not fully or properly human, nonetheless the basic logic of the identity remains. This 
makes it a politically significant category because the ability to give “humanity” 
significant meaning enables us to make rights claims without reference to established 
political identities. This is essentially how the appeal to the rights of man and human 
rights functioned historically; it enabled claims that could not be justified within the 
existing order of things. It made possible an ethical appeal beyond established 
principles, even as it depended upon the ambiguous redeployment of existing 
meanings, but reconstructed to do new work rather than to recreate past orders. 
 
     Where the idea of humanity becomes dangerous is when it is made absolute and 
regulative. In such cases, the appeal to humanity can be used to justify expressions of 
power that transgress existing limitation – such as the invocation of humanity by 
powerful Western states to justify invasion, warfare and interference in the affairs of 
other political communities. This is not to claim that national sovereignty should be 
absolute, but to point to the way in which humanity functions as a blanket justification 
for those that take up the mantle of defending, and implicitly defining, humanity. The 
situated and pluralist ethics I start from, however, denies the absolute meaning and 
privilege of humanity, instead insisting on recognition of the ambiguity of humanity 
as an ethical and political identity. This ambiguity is a feature of humanity not only 
because we affirm a plurality of values and ways of life that cannot be summarised in 
the notion of humanity, but also because humanity as an identity is built upon the 
specific experience of concrete individuals and communities – it is a generic 
abstraction, in Dewey’s terms. ‘What is generic and the same everywhere is at best 
the organic structure of man, his biological make-up. While it is evidently important 
to take this into account, it is also evident that none of the distinctive features of 
human association can be deduced from it.’66 So, while identifying with humanity 
may allow us to open up new ways of experiencing our lives and enable new forms of 
knowledge, such that we form new communities that exceed state boundaries or find 
agreement on prohibitions against particular crimes such as genocide, forced 
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displacement and political murder, the human identity we appeal to remains an 
abstraction that needs to constantly scrutinised. 
 
     In this regard, Rorty’s view of human rights is prescient: human rights (along with 
an appeal to a common humanity) are a feature of our contemporary world.67 Human 
rights are a tool we have developed both for understanding ourselves and for pursuing 
improved conditions of life. Where Rorty is less convincing, however, is his choice to 
describe human rights as an ironic metaphor rather than a tool of critical 
intelligence.68 This is more than a contrast of language, as Rorty’s account of human 
rights gives up the self-reflexive stance that Dewey’s notion of a tool in the service of 
critical inquiry preserves. The tool of human rights, as way of understanding 
experience and working towards better conditions, is contingent and must be 
constantly reassessed. Also, Dewey’s approach leaves space for critiques of human 
rights that open up the ambiguity of conventional human rights politics. While human 
rights have already done much to shift the reference point of political life away from 
state sovereignty and national identity, playing a significant part in the process of 
opening up international and global levels of ethical interaction between individuals, 
the moral ideal of human rights imposes its own static structures, as was shown in 
chapter two. A situationist human right ethic pushes us to consider, more creatively 
and critically, the potential to expand democratic communities in response to 
changing conditions of international life, but without presuming geographically rooted 
and singular loyalties, or the necessity of a common global form of political authority. 
Speaking of the strain put upon democratic community not only in the national state 
but also with the increasing internationalisation of human affairs Dewey said: 
 
But if it be reestablished, it will manifest a fullness, variety and freedom 
of possession and enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown in the 
contiguous associations of the past. For it will be alive and flexible as 
well as stable, responsive to the complex and world-wide scene in which 
it is enmeshed. While local, it will not be isolated. Its larger relationships 
will provide an exhaustible and flowing fund of meanings upon which to 
draw, with assurance that its drafts will be honored. Territorial states and 
political boundaries will persist; but they will not be barriers which 
impoverish experience by cutting man off from his fellows; they will not 
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be hard and fast divisions whereby external separation is converted into 
inner jealousy, fear, suspicion and hostility.69 
 
These nascent international ideas of expanded ethical community through post-
territorial democracy have been developed in recent works by Molly Cochran70 and 
Daniel Bray.71 I explore these ideas further in the next chapter through an engagement 
with William Connolly’s international thought. 
 
     I explore the implications of the ethical theory developed here further in the 
chapters that follow but for now I have tried to give a sense of how the meaning of 
human rights changes if we start with a situationist and pluralist orientation. The final 
point to stress is that humanity, like any other political and moral identity, is 
developed experimentally and, ideally, through democratic inclusion. This means that 
even as it seems that changes in our social world – towards more global interaction 
and integration – push us toward accounting for political and ethical life in more 
universal way, the universal is not an imperative and humanity is not a higher moral 
identity. It is one way we have historically approached such problems and that 
tradition must continue to meet the challenges presented by contemporary experience, 
if its value is to be defended. 
 
     In the next chapter, I continue to develop the ethical theory presented thus far, but 
with a concentration on articulating a democratic political ethos. This requires 
addressing a number of limitations of what has been said thus far. To begin, Dewey’s 
ethics need a clearer and more explicit account of the place of political power and 
social structures as barriers to the sorts of democratic reform movements supported by 
his situationist account, in an effort to do that I turn to the work of William Connolly, 
to provide a more critical perspective on the various forms of exclusion, 
magnetisation and oppression inherent to democratic politics. This focus on the most 
difficult challenges to democracy also reveals resource in both Berlin and Dewey’s 
thinking to enable critical investigations. For example, Berlin’s genealogical 
tendencies in tracing out the historical meaning of values and their political effects 
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points to an historical and critical pluralism, and his psychological focus on the 
agonistic experience of choice is a resource for diagnosing exclusions and 
normalisation within existing identities. Likewise, a more critical Dewey can be 
developed around his practical analysis of customs and institutions as the backdrop 
against we seek moral reform, which marks out the importance of critical histories 
and structural analysis of institutions. While the work here is mostly setting out a 
theoretical perspective, the final chapters engage these tools of situationist and 
pluralist ethics to reconstruct human rights in more explicit terms than has been 
possible thus far. 
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Chapter 5  
Agonistic politics: reconstructing human rights 
 
‘The new possibility shadows every single person and changes the nature of his life; 
for any new possibility that existence acquires, even the least likely, transforms 
everything about existence.’ 
-Milan Kundera, Slowness 
 
I. Critical Engagements: Berlin, Dewey and Connolly 
 
In previous chapters I have developed the pluralism of Isaiah Berlin and the 
situationist ethics of John Dewey as intellectual resources for reconstructing human 
rights in light of fundamental criticisms of conventional theories. As has been 
highlighted in these chapters, my interpretation of these thinkers runs counter to 
established readings, for example, the deployment of Berlin to defend the rational 
necessity of liberalism as a response to value-pluralism,1 or the use of Dewey to 
endorse contemporary forms of liberal democracy as a final existential faith.2  In what 
follows I engage with William Connolly’s work on pluralism and democracy to 
further develop my critical reading of both thinkers, one that focuses on the ethical 
and political implications of deep pluralism and the challenge of developing an 
adequate politic ethics for a plural and uncertain world. In this chapter, I make use of 
two of his principal ideas in offering a reconstructed account of human rights: his 
critique of traditional conceptions of ethical and political community and his 
suggestion for how to develop a public ethos suitable to what he calls a politics of 
becoming. 
 
     Before moving to these specific aspects of Connolly's thought, more needs be said 
about the reasons why these thinkers are being read together and why a further 
engagement with Connolly is necessary. To begin, Connolly develops many of the 
same themes that animate the work of Berlin and Dewey, and while his direct 
engagement with either thinker has been limited, he does draw inspiration from 
common influences and is concerned with similar problems.3   
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     Connolly acknowledges his sympathy for Berlin's 'agonistic liberalism,' but their 
affinities run deeper.4 It is the basic undecidability of questions of value and the 
reality that people hold different, and at times opposing, values, which cannot be 
reconciled in final and distinctively rational way, which links the pluralism of both 
thinkers. Further, they both reject attempts by positivism, in various forms, to 
discount the value of normative theorising.5 In their defence of political theory both 
Berlin and Connolly appeal to the context in which normative language is employed 
and their shared pluralism leads them to important insights into the implications of the 
contextual use of normative language.6 Because neither assumes that questions of 
value can be answered in a final or singular way, they avoid either a universalist or 
conventionalist position. Instead, they both struggle with the question of how best to 
live with other individuals and groups that hold plural ethical values and confess 
different sources of ethical commitment. Connolly's work reveals the way a pluralist 
orientation highlights the danger and violence latent in the conversion of difference 
into otherness, which haunts the pursuit of what he calls single-entry universalism.7 
This focus on the way that consolidating personal and social identity depends upon 
difference and engages resentments to normalise contingent identities and ethical 
faiths adds a needed critical edge to Berlin's acknowledgment that pluralism can 
engender a desire for spaces of common understanding, in which the contingency and 
plurality of our values is lessened. I have argued that this critical edge is not 
completely foreign to Berlin's pluralism, but Connolly’s work more fully develops 
what is a weaker strand of his thought, which needs to be brought forward in 
reconstructing human rights.  
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     In a similar way Connolly's critique of nationalist political community not only 
supports Berlin's ambiguous judgment of nationalism as both necessary and 
dangerous, but also opens up the pluralist imagination to reconsider the boundaries of 
political community. Connolly acknowledges the necessity of belonging to a 
community and the importance of political recognition to nations, but he is also aware 
of the violence and exclusions required to establish and maintain both national and 
individual identities.8 ‘Modern political thought, in its most general drift, celebrates 
the political advantages of boundary over-coding by suppressing the violences 
accompanying these constructions.’9 This insight is developed at greater length below, 
with particular focus on how Connolly's pluralist re-imagining of ethical and political 
community serves a reconstruction of human rights. 
 
     In the last chapter, I argued for the distinctiveness and potential of Dewey's 
situationist ethics, making use of agonistic democratic theory to defend Dewey's 
ethical philosophy against the charge that it is blind to the realities of power and 
control in social relations. Dewey’s critiques often paint him as a naïve democratic 
evangelist, pushing a hopelessly optimistic account of democracy as social panacea10 - 
the implication being that Dewey suggested that social intelligence, defined as 
democratic participation and informed discussion, will solve problems that are not 
actually amenable to reasonable argument. This charge depends upon Dewey's 
typically liberal and inadequate articulation of the reality and exercise of political 
power, or so the argument goes. I have pointed to the ways in which this critique is 
unfounded, given Dewey's insistence that ethical reflection and political action must 
take account of contemporary institutions upheld by custom and habit, which 
penetrate deeply into the structure of society and that conflict was a necessary aspect 
of reform. Dewey's focus on education and his appeal to experience are central to his 
response to the reality of power, because he believed institutions were upheld by 
customs and habits that naturalise contingent, and in fact deeply political, norms. Yet, 
                                                 
8
 William E. Connolly, “The Liberal Image of the Nation,” Political Theory and the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, eds. Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 183-198. 
9
 William E. Connolly, “Tocqueville, Territory and Violence,” Theory, Culture & Society, Volume 11, 
Number 1 (1994), 23. 
10
 Foremost among critics pushing this line of criticism in Dewey’s own day was Reinhold Niebuhr in 
Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York, NY: Scribner, 1934). For 
a fuller account of Dewey’s critical reception see Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1997), especially chapter 1. 
  169 
there are weaknesses in Dewey's political ethics, effectively highlighted by Cornel 
West, who argues that Dewey does not appreciate the depth and multidimensionality 
of the divisions that characterise contemporary society and which may not be 
amenable to resolution through democratic consensus,11 which also leads Dewey to 
focus his own political efforts on economic exploitation, rather than other forms of 
social oppression.12 Turning to Connolly at this point provides a fuller account of how 
power generates and reinforces social divisions that exploit and depend upon the very 
desire for uniform identity that Dewey's ethics risks perpetuating if his call for 
democracy is interpreted as a call for deliberation instead of political action, this risk 
provides further reason to emphasise the pluralist impulses in Dewey's approach. 
Further, Connolly's analysis of assemblages and resonance machines points to the 
need to consider the unexpected and contingent ways in which forces of exploitation 
and oppression can combine in political institutions.13 In both cases, these criticisms 
do not deny the significance of Dewey's thought but provide reasons to develop it in 
new directions.  
 
     It is important to understand Dewey's unique account of experience and its central 
place in his ethics and defence of democracy, despite Rorty’s influential claim that 
Dewey’s account of experience was a case of metaphysical-backsliding.14 
Engagement with Connolly highlights the critical potential in Dewey’s ethics, as the 
problems in need of resolution emanate from the particular experience of situated 
individuals and groups, which forces ethical theory to be more attuned to a politics of 
becoming, to the ongoing contestation of norms and principles. Connolly's emphasis 
on contestation points to the limits of intellectual consensus to resolve all political 
problems and highlights the importance of what he terms the micropolitcs of daily 
life, in addition to macropolitical engagement, both of which focus our reading of 
Dewey's ethics towards his concern with altering habit and conduct as well as the 
institutions and organisation of society at large. Dewey's evolutionary naturalism is in 
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many ways a forerunner to Connolly's own engagement with immanent naturalism, as 
both thinkers appreciate the importance of the biological and habitual in thought and 
action. Dewey's ethics reconstructs the relationship between moral ideal and political 
action, arguing that not only is the ideal pursued in response to a particular situation 
an “end in view” to resolve that specific situation, but that it is merely hypothetical, 
requiring concrete action, which resolves the situation at hand and sets the stage for 
further reflection and reconstruction. Dewey's ethic of democratic growth does not 
aim toward some pre-given standard or to a state of final democratic inclusion, but to 
an ongoing process of greater democratisation. The possibilities of a democratising 
ethos, responsive to a politics of becoming, for reconstructing human rights are 
explored below.15 
 
     In what follows, I make use of Connolly's ideas, and those developed in earlier 
chapters, but do not set out to distil Connolly's position on human rights. Instead, 
what I defend is a reconstructed idea of human rights that alters the problematic 
relationship between ethics and politics in conventional accounts, and by reworking 
that nexus enable a rethinking of the politics of human rights. The final section of this 
chapter offers a democratising ethic of human rights, which, if we reject the necessity 
of the ideal of the national-state or a comprehensive cosmopolitanism, makes it 
possible to more fully appreciate the contingency, multiplicity and ongoing 
contestation of ethically authoritative forms of political community and the content of 
human rights as articulations of political legitimacy. 
 
II. Normalising Identities and Legitimising Communities 
 
A central focus of Connolly's work has been to rethink the relationship between 
democracy and political identity. This project can be divided into two related but 
distinct lines of inquiry, the first, challenging the confluence of national identity and 
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territory as essential to democratic government, and the second, an attempt to rethink 
democracy beyond territoriality without relying on a single-entry cosmopolitanism, 
which he sees as dependent upon problematic notions of universal political identity. 
In the Ethos of Pluralization he claims that  
 
The stronger the drive to the unified nation, the integrated community, 
and/or the normal individual, the more powerful becomes the drive to 
convert differences into modes of otherness. And the more implacable 
the cultural drive to convert difference into otherness the less feasible 
it becomes to build majority assemblages of democratic governance 
that can actually govern a diverse population.16  
 
By focusing on the source of this imperative for a privileged identity in the need to 
legitimise political authority, Connolly reveals the ground that is shared by most 
contemporary political theorists. Liberals, communitarians, cosmopolitans and 
nationalists all posit a moral ideal of political community that justifies coercive 
authority. Rather than continue the ‘ontopolitical’17 debate Connolly’s focus is upon 
the reasons we desire and need such security, and in doing so he avoids retreading old 
ground and provides an important resource for thinking about human rights. Further 
to the project at hand, his re-imagining of democracy and pluralism are important 
additions to the political thought of both Berlin and Dewey, who are critical of the 
modern nation-state as an ideal political community, but struggle to articulate how 
else to think about new and expanded forms of political community, especially given 
that their pluralist ethical theory makes single-entry cosmopolitanism an unattractive 
option.  
 
     Connolly identifies the source of the desire for a privileged and normalised identity 
in the ambiguity inherent to political authority. Reflecting on the nature of 
sovereignty he references the paradox of authority articulated by Rousseau, in which 
the will of the political community justifies political authority, while at the same time 
political authority is necessary to constitute the political community.18 This paradox 
creates the need for an external source of legitimacy for the particular political 
authority exercised over a given territory. Tracing the political process by which the 
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authoritative political community is constituted, he links the idea of territory to terror, 
pointing to the violence and power deployed in creating the nation-state, both in 
disciplining populations and in eliminating those that resist such discipline.19 Unable 
to overcome the paradox Rousseau identifies or to avoid the necessary power and 
violence at the root of political authority, Connolly argues, conventional political 
theory instead obscures these facts. The role of a privileged identity is to give 
authority legitimacy, either through its concurrence with a national community or its 
protection of a sanctified liberal individuality – in this move the moral ideal gives the 
law to the polis while remaining incontestable, beyond the political.20 Political 
authority is thereby rendered legitimate through this privileged and moralised identity, 
which requires that the contingency inherent in diverse democratic societies must be 
disciplined and democracy becomes a form of governance in which those that do not 
fit or refuse to adopt the appropriate identity are subjected to various forms of 
political control and delegitimised as political actors.21 
 
     The identity of the citizen – whether constructed as a rational individual exerting 
control over the political world or an authentic member of the political community 
attuned to a distinctive way of life – is sustained by its exclusions.22 This means that 
the law-abiding citizen, the responsible member of society, the father who knows 
best, the "normal" individual is contrasted with the criminal, the welfare queen, the 
deadbeat dad, all variety of "abnormalities." These twin processes of normalisation 
and exclusion exert a discipline on both the internal plurality of those who embrace, 
or try to emulate, privileged identities (yet struggle to remain responsible, law-
abiding, normal) but it also makes those who fail, or worse refuse, to embrace such 
identities, subjects of public resentment.23 Connolly suggest that the need to affirm 
and consolidate an authoritative political identity converts difference into otherness, 
which is then subject to harsh forms of discipline, punishment and violence, as an 
expression of the resentment by those affirming the privileged identity against those 
who expose its inherent contingency. We see similar political frames emerge 
internationally, most egregiously in the representations of “failed” African polities in 
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which the powerless victim is terrorised by the savage politician, in need of rescue by 
Western saviours.24 This is more than the resentment generated by changing social 
conditions, which increase insecurity, or the loss of social privilege, experienced by 
those affirming authoritative identities as a result of social movements to increase 
inclusion – which Connolly documents effectively in his analysis of the resentment 
and disaffection of white, straight, working-class men in America in the wake of 
movements for women’s liberation, racial equality and gay rights.25 It is a wider and 
more general anxiety generated by the necessity for authoritative identity as such, 
given the vital role it plays in legitimising authority.26 Connolly argues that our 
experience exceeds all attempts to impose a singular or final identity and it is the 
confinement of this rich and overflowing experience of ‘life as a protean set of 
energies and possibilities exceeding the terms of any identity or cultural horizon into 
which it is set’ that generates resentment against the world, a world that refuses to 
accommodate fully, and certainly, the identities we affirm.27 As experience is 
curtailed, as desire is sacrificed to the discipline of authoritative identity without final 
affirmation, people suffer the weight of their ideals without receiving the relief from 
uncertainty that was promised.  
 
     It is with this rich account of experience and a politicised reading of identity in 
mind that Connolly opposes conventional pluralism. He argues against a pluralism 
that 'celebrates diversity within settled contexts of conflict and collective action', in 
which 'diversity is valued because putative grounds of unity (in a deity, a rationality, 
or a nationality) seem too porous and contestable to sustain a cultural consensus.'28 
This conventional pluralism, still very much alive in political theory, continues to 
desire unity, seeing the condition of pluralism as the loss of a pre-modern 
enchantment or attunement with the world.29 The "reality" of a modern experience 
that no longer sustains the ideal of an ordered world, in which humanity finds a secure 
place, pushes the conventional pluralist to resign herself to a condition of acceptable 
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diversity that requires artificial grounds, which cannot accept a world of deep 
pluralism.  
 
     This conventional political pluralism is what Connolly calls arboreal pluralism, it 
'appreciate[s] the diversity as limbs branching out form a common trunk, fed by a 
taproot. The trunks might be Christianity or Kantian morality or the history of a 
unified nation or secular reason.'30 What Connolly opposes in his call for 
pluralisation, rather than pluralism, is the way in which the quest for certainty, for 
authoritative identities and ideals, is replayed in the constant search for more plausible 
foundations rather than facing uncertainty. 'So invocation of overlapping consensus, 
ontological minimalism, nonfoundationalism and the primacy of epistemology' all 
focus on how to re-establish certainty, rather than attend to protean experience, while 
also serving the political function of limiting contestation and privileging existing 
identities and political forms.31 In his analysis of the desire for certainty and the 
political function of authoritative identity, Connolly issues a challenge to rethink 
democratic politics in terms that respect the depth of pluralism in our experience and 
the uncertain forces of change that are restrained by conventional pluralism. This 
change in focus, from pluralism to pluralisation, leads to an embrace of a politics of 
becoming, rather than a defence of a politics of being. 
 
     Connolly focuses on the politics of becoming both to upset the assumption that 
national identity and territoriality are essential to democracy, and to justify a new 
public ethos - which will be addressed in the next section. By focusing on the way in 
which authoritative identity is unsettled by experiences that exceed its limits, and 
calling on us to embrace these differences rather than trying to discipline them, 
Connolly challenges conventional notions of national democracy by suggesting that a 
single underlying consensus is not necessary to democratic politics. In fact, it is the 
plurality of identities, final faiths, values and experiences that provides the substance 
of democratic contestation and affirming pluralisation reorients democracy as a form 
of politics; in doing this Connolly replace the arboreal image with a rhizomatic one 
that supports agonistic democracy and networks of consensus based on plural forms 
of identity. ‘A rhizomatic pluralism would generate such an ethos from multiple 
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sources rather than from a single, exclusionary taproot. In rhizomatic pluralism the 
possibilities of collaboration around a particular issue increase as each constituency 
enhances the experience of contingency and social implications in its own 
formation.’32 This account of pluralism generates a call for agonistic democracy as it 
expands the sites of political collaboration and contestation, while accepting that final 
and authoritative resolutions are impossible. This suggests that plural assemblages – 
networks of different social identities, final faiths and diverse individuals 
collaborating and contesting over a multiplicity of political questions – rather than 
privileged national identities be taken to as adequate to democratic politics. Rather 
than confining the identities and issues included in modern democracy, agonistic 
democracy pushes us to embrace the contestability of the very identities and social 
institutions upon which the modern state depends. For example, as economic, cultural 
and political bonds exceed the territorial nation-state democratic assemblages that 
include citizens and non-citizens will make claims upon existing authorities and seek 
to build new political institutions. 
 
     This alters the terms of sovereign power, no longer residing with the democratic 
nation, instead expressed not only in the consensuses and agreements that form in 
society (politics of being), but also as movements that contest the accepted order and 
express new forms of identity that challenge convention (politics of becoming). 
 
Sovereign is that which decides an exception exists and how to decide it, 
with the that composed of a plurality of forces circulating through and 
under the positional sovereignty of the official arbitrating body. Such a 
result may discourage those who seek a tight explanation of the 
economic and political causes of legal action (the realists), a closed 
model of legal process (the idealists), or a tight model of legal paradox 
(the paradoxicalists). But it illuminates the complexity of sovereignty. It 
has another advantage, too: it points to strategic issues and sites to 
address for those who seek to introduce a robust pluralism into the ethos 
of sovereignty.33  
 
This affirmation of democratic sovereignty, Connolly argues, is especially important 
today as the diversity within societies increases and cross-border flows undermine the 
territorially bounded state - failing to embrace this deeper and wider pluralism tends 
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toward the assertion of fundamental identities and authoritarian politics that seek to 
consolidate political power in the name of privileged identities that are under threat by 
the forces of change.34 This importantly includes secular faiths and identities based on 
rational consensus. Yet, this line of argument does not lead Connolly to 
unambiguously affirm a comprehensive cosmopolitan vision of global order. 
 
     As Connolly's critique of democratic nationalism obviously points toward some 
expanded notion of political community beyond the bounded territorial state, it seems 
that articulating a cosmopolitan vision would be the natural next step. And, in many 
ways, Connolly's appeal to the increasing speed and density of cross-border 
interactions, transnational flows and the distinctly global late-modern experience 
coincides with the analysis of many cosmopolitan thinkers.35 Yet there is a crucial 
difference. Most cosmopolitans display a desire for moral principle to legislate and 
constrain this uncertain and new global world, whereas Connolly sees this ambiguous 
contemporary condition as opening up new possibilities for democratic politics and 
richer forms of identity. ‘The contemporary world, then, where time moves faster and 
multicultural intersections have multiplied, forms a condition of possibility for 
emergence of a more generous pluralism.’36 Because his central project eschews the 
quest for certainty his approach to cosmopolitanism is to expand his project of 
pluralisation and therefore focuses on how best to understand and react to the 
distinctive challenges of the contemporary world. Connolly’s work therefore depends 
not only on a descriptive account of our contemporary condition as generating 
profound uncertainty, but also on an affirmation of such a condition. He embraces 
possibilities our contemporary condition presents us to shake off unitarian impulses of 
certainty and singularity in response to the protean nature of experience. This displays 
deep affinities with both Berlin and Dewey; not only does it reflect a deep pluralism 
that infuses our experience of the world, but it celebrates the liberation of 
contingency, the breaking of the chains of absolute certainty. 
 
     Mirroring the critique of the principal moral theories that support human rights in 
chapter 1, Connolly reacts against the conception of morality as a law that imposes 
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itself upon the world, as this moral law depends, at least in the Kantian tradition, upon 
an unjustifiable apodictic certainty – not only that moral principle should take the 
form of a universal law binding upon everyone, but also that this universal law will 
find expression acceptable to everyone. Essentially, what this Kantian move does is 
appeal to a complex and contestable view of the world, without justification, which 
privileges the identity of the Kantian moral agent. This move is subject to the same 
critiques outlined above, regarding the assertion and defence of an authoritative form 
of political identity, but it also goes further because the terms of the identity are 
universal, not national, and the politics in question are global.  
 
Today the specific terms of that cosmopolitanism have not only 
become even more contestable, they carry with them elements of a 
dogmatic Western imperialism still in need of reconstruction. One key, 
in my judgment, is to relinquish the demand that all reasonable people 
in all cultures must actually or implicitly recognize the logic of 
morality in the same way Kant did. Or even as neo-Kantians do. Once 
this pivot of Kantian morality is treated as a contestable act of faith, it 
becomes possible to engage a late-modern world of speed and dense 
interdependencies in which cosmopolitanism involves the difficult task 
of coming to terms receptively and reciprocally with multiple and 
contending universals.37 
 
As with his rejection of an authoritative identity or community as the lynchpin for a 
domestic politics, Connolly looks for a cosmopolitanism with plural and contestable 
universals, expressed in a more modest way and defined by multiple lines of identity 
and ethical sources.38 So, in contrast to liberal forms of cosmopolitanism, our global 
condition should not (cannot) be ordered on the basis of single authoritative form of 
moral identity.  
 
     In the same article, Connolly goes on to consider cosmopolitan thinkers less 
concerned with articulating a founding moral law. Turning to Martha Nussbaum's 
work, Connolly highlights what cosmopolitans take to be at stake in articulating a 
universal morality. As is often the case, the alternative to a universal morality is 'some 
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form of relativism, subjectivism, provincialism or amoral narcissism.'39 So, even if the 
Kantian moral law is rejected as a foundation for the necessary universal morality 
there remains a need for consensus, a more practical and less ambitious certainty. The 
various iterations of this attempt at consensus have been examined in chapters 1 and 
2, but the key point here is the way Connolly critiques this project. As he considers 
Nussbaum's attempt to offer a vague but thick universal account of moral identity, he 
exposes how she constructs her project around the necessity of moving beyond 
nationalist moralities and avoiding the dangers of moral uncertainty. What Connolly 
objects to is that there is 'too little appreciation in this account of how much each 
formulation of the universal itself is apt be shaped and conditioned by the specific 
metaphysically inflected experiences from which it is crafted.'40 This is a problem 
because, first, her account of universal human capabilities closes down contestation of 
those universals, rather than enabling it, and, second, Nussbaum's insistence upon a 
single-entry universalism that already knows what the regulative universal ideal must 
be (or that there must be one such ideal) as a function of its role in constraining 
pluralism through the imposition of rational order, rather than enabling pluralisation. 
 
     Again, Connolly contrasts a rhizomatic image to a more conventional way of 
imagining political cultures. Nussbaum imagines cosmopolitanism through an image 
of concentric circles linking a singular subject to local and universal spheres. While 
Connolly has sympathy with the insight of this concentric ideal, so far as we do have 
a moral identity that is defined by nearer relationships of family and community, and 
more distant relations to nations and humanity, what he wants to point to is the way 
that each level of identification could also be analyzed through a rhizomatic image 
that sees contestation, plurality and remainders in each identity. Because Nussbaum 
accepts the concentric image of culture, her own universalism must be 'above the 
reach of metaphysical contestation' if it is fulfil its 'regulative function.'41 In 
opposition to this he argues for a double-entry universalism that is based on the 
contestability and multiplicity of universals, which arises as a consequence of the 
pluralism and uncertainty that defines our experience of the world at a deep level. 
Given this critique of both nationalist and cosmopolitan democracy, two central 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 604. 
40
 Ibid., 606. 
41
 Ibid., 608. 
  179 
questions emerge for Connolly and for my own project. First, what forms of political 
community and identity are possible and desirable in our contemporary condition of 
pluralism? And, second, what virtues does a pluralising ethics of contingency 
suggest? It is to these questions that I turn now. 
 
III. Ambiguous Humanity and Democracy as a Pluralising Ethos 
 
Beginning from pluralist premises and a rejection of the quest for certainty changes 
the imperative of political community. To begin with, Connolly suggests that the 
neither a homogeneous identity nor an insular and slow political culture is necessary 
for democracy, whether national or cosmopolitan in focus. 
 
Network pluralism sustains a thick political culture, but this is a 
thickness in which the centre develops into multiple lines of 
connection, across numerous dimensions of difference. Network 
pluralism is irreducible to national pluralism, enclave (fragmented) 
pluralism, or procedural images of secular public culture. It takes the 
shape of multiple lines of connection across difference such as 
ethnicity, religion, language, gender practice and sexuality. These lines 
of flow slice through the centre as diverse constituencies connect to 
one another, pulling it from concentric pluralism toward a network 
pattern of multidimensional connections.42   
 
Connolly is describing both a feature of contemporary interaction and a new ideal of 
deterritorialised community. The same networks of identity that exceed national 
identity cross over territorial borders and provide forms of identification sufficient for 
political action. What this suggests is that we can (must) be content with temporary 
and contingent assemblages that form around particular issues and movements; we 
should accept that this form of political organisation is sufficient. Connolly does not 
suggest that we can do away with the state, at least not in the near term nor by a 
conscious act of will, but that by embracing the plural foundations that motivate 
ethical commitment and respecting the contingency of formations of political 
identification we can reduce the harmful impacts of nationalist political identification 
and begin to develop a cosmopolitan orientation based on multiple universals and 
shifting political assemblages. 
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     A network pluralism, as described by Connolly, would neither contain democratic 
politics to the nation-state nor transpose it to a global cosmopolitanism authoritatively 
governing the world – importantly, it also rejects a progressive vision of 
transformation from one form of order to the other. In place of these political visions, 
Connolly suggests that plural identities cross state borders without generating a single 
universalism; instead they result in a multitude of universalism and transnationalisms. 
Further, the institutionalisation of these identifications is partial, shifting and 
ambiguous – both as a description and an ideal – because the sources of these 
emergent communities are themselves contingent. While the nation-state is 
undermined by the break-up of national identity and the increasing influence of 
external political forces, whether the demands of a global capitalist class or global 
social movements supporting human rights, Connolly’s response is not to re-
institutionalise or re-found authority.43 The growth of institutions of global 
governance extends the points of positional sovereignty, while post-territorial forms 
of political identity alter the terrain of effective sovereignty. This alters the paradox of 
democracy, renders it more complex, plural and contingent, and Connolly’s project is 
to both understand this new condition and to encourage more effective democratic 
politics, ‘It speaks to those who appreciate the ambiguities circulating through state 
sovereignty, discern the global dimension of sovereignty, and seek levers of citizen 
action at each node through which the complexity of sovereignty circulates.’44 His 
sense that democratic and inclusive forces are less attuned to and effective in acting in 
our contemporary context is expressed in his diagnosis of what he calls the negative 
global capitalist antagonism machine, which implies that oligarchic and exclusionary 
forces have been more successful in exploiting our increasingly plural, unstable and 
post-territorial political world through appeals to resentment, fear and conflict.45 The 
pluralist response to this must be different in tone and sensibility, leading Connolly to 
search for a pluralising global resonance machine inspired by care for protean and 
fragile existence.46 
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     The affirmation of pluralism, Connolly argues, can be encouraged by the 
uncertainty of our contemporary condition, as individuals and communities are drawn 
together across borders.  
 
As the historical drive to secure a single regulative idea of global 
engagement is shaken by a world spinning faster than heretofore, a 
small window of opportunity opens to negotiate a positive matrix of 
interacting cosmopolitanisms. The effort depends upon numerous 
parties relinquishing the provincial demand that all others subscribe to 
faith in the transcendental, universal, immanent, deliberative, revealed 
or rational source they themselves confess.47 
 
This is a juncture where Connolly and Dewey can be productively brought together, 
as Connolly's cosmopolitan ideal is essentially situationist. This implies that forms of 
cross-border identification and action will be specific to particular situations and 
problems, and the potential for the creation of more lasting political community is 
generated through the successful resolution of these situations. Speaking of 
reconstructed community beyond the territorial state, Dewey said,  
 
if it be reestablished, it will manifest a fullness, variety and freedom of 
possession and enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown in the 
contiguous associations of the past. For it will be alive and flexible as 
well as stable, responsive to the complex and world-wide scene in which 
it is enmeshed. While local, it will not be isolated. Its larger relationships 
will provide an exhaustible and flowing fund of meanings upon which to 
draw, with assurance that its drafts will be honored. Territorial states and 
political boundaries will persist; but they will not be barriers which 
impoverish experience by cutting man off from his fellows; they will not 
be hard and fast divisions whereby external separation is converted into 
inner jealousy, fear, suspicion and hostility. Competition will continue, 
but it will be less rivalry for acquisition of material goods, and more an 
emulation of local groups to enrich direct experience with appreciatively 
enjoyed intellectual and artistic wealth.48  
 
Connolly adds a more contemporary sense of how this situationist political ethics 
might begin to generate global forms of political community, which Dewey was 
pessimistic about, despite his appeal to work toward such a community. By 
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suggesting that solidarity can be formed across diverse foundations and that these 
networks of identification can build into assemblages that can pursue general ends 
without demanding conformity within identities or ends, Connolly offers a more 
realistic pluralising and resonating assemblage, rather than Dewey’s more parochial 
great community, which retained elements of a bounded conception of democratic 
community.49  
 
     The primary conclusion I want to draw from this engagement with Connolly's 
thought is to rethink the political and moral identification that defines human rights. 
What his work highlights is that the terms of a distinctly human identity are not 
sufficiently interrogated, despite the way in which a common human identity is 
deployed as if it were unproblematic.50 In chapter 2, I argued that the moral ideals we 
hold define the political shape that human rights take, and a key part of these moral 
ideals is the importance of human identity. Many thinkers assert the significance of 
human identity, as if it is simple and unproblematic. And while the logical 
universality of "human" as a descriptive category is relatively unproblematic, the 
humanity that is affirmed in discussion of human rights goes beyond this formal 
question. Should human beings be freed from their provincial contexts and allowed to 
fulfil their moral autonomy? Should the authoritative moral community be protected 
by human rights? These central questions of the human rights debate all employ a 
notion of human identity that is static and essentialist.  
 
     Connolly highlights how identity is generated and maintained by privileging 
particular aspects of experience and naturalising them. This is extremely important for 
human rights as the formal universality of the category means that the experience 
from which a human identity is forged will be contradictory, contingent and changing. 
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Given the desire for certainty expressed in conventional moral theory, it is no surprise 
that defining an authoritative human identity is seen as vital to preserving a universal 
morality; the "reality" of humanity is rife with uncertainty and ambiguity. A 
reconstruction of human rights that begins from an embrace of deep pluralism and 
seeks to support ongoing pluralisation must guard against the powerful assimilative 
drive built into any attempt to define humanity as a determinate identity. This danger, 
however, also contains a possibility, which points to the second contribution that 
Connolly makes to the question of human identity.  
 
     In keeping human identity open and contested a reconstruction of human rights 
committed to pluralism presents unique opportunities for political action. Contesting a 
particular privileged identity requires some alternative, and the ambiguous category of 
humanity is important and attractive because it enables claims based on one's 
humanity, not one's historical and institutionalised community membership, gender 
identity, ethnicity, etc. – the human identity, potentially, preserves a space for new 
claims because of its formal emptiness. The idea of human identity can support the 
sorts of plural networks and diverse assemblages that participate in cross-border 
movements, which Connolly sees as important counters to statist politics, if we 
explicitly conceive of humanity as a pluralising rather than essentialising concept. 
Yet, there is an important blind spot in Connolly's work that raises a challenge to the 
account of human identity offered here.  
 
     Given Connolly's rejection of the desirability and need for a universal consensus to 
enable either cosmopolitan identities or cross-border politics, how is understanding 
between plural universalisms possible? This problem is further highlighted by 
Connolly's explicit rejection of convergence as a regulative ideal. Responding to Fred 
Dallmayr, he says, 
 
as he presents and appreciates it, the 'fusion of horizons' postulated by 
Gadamer does not signify the assimilation of others to 'us', but it does 
signify the growing 'convergence of our and their perspectives through 
a process of reciprocal learning'. Convergence is the key word. From 
my perspective, convergence is only one ideal to pursue among others. 
A political culture of multidimensional diversity will also be one in 
which the quest for convergence gives ground to the pursuit of 
multiple connections of respect across persisting differences, issuing in 
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what might be called a political culture of positive connections through 
relations of agonistic respect.51 
 
But the further question, raised by this appeal to agonistic respect rather than 
convergence, is how that respect is generated - how do we accept differences that we 
disagree with, without turning that difference into otherness? I agree with Connolly 
that the idea of convergence is problematic, but agonistic respect requires some form 
of common understanding, nonetheless.  
 
     Berlin's account of human universals becomes important here. As I have argued, 
his idea for universal concepts and categories that make human experience something 
that can be shared can be read in a way that is not an empirical account of a singular 
natural nature but rather is closer to an historical account of the contingent and plural 
categories of understanding necessary for diverse experience to be made 
communicable. The concepts and categories through which we understand the idea of 
humanity are necessary even for a pluralist conception of human identity, but with 
important qualifications. These categories are empirical in two ways: first, they 
represent the historical ways in which humanity has been defined and understood - 
meaning we can look to cultural history to know what these have been taken to be, 
and second, they are open to change - both expansion and reduction. Connolly, in fact, 
reflects this view in earlier work, stating that ‘without something like our basic ideas 
about persons and responsibility’ our social relationships could find no grounding.52 
Yet, his later moves into deconstruction and genealogical methods seem to undermine 
the idea of such basic concepts.53 What I want to suggest is that to have the plural 
universalisms that Connolly defends and to see human identity in the way I have 
outlined above, we do depend upon projected universal concepts and categories that 
define what is human. This, however, means that we must be aware of how we 
understand these categories, giving even more weight to Connolly's insistence that 
genealogy is a necessary method for thinking through ethical ideals. And, most 
importantly for supporting agonistic respect, we should be aware that the necessity of 
these universals does not exempt them from contestation. So, while understanding the 
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values, faiths and experience that diverse people express and affirm – to understand 
them as valuable forms of difference, not irrational or immoral otherness – requires 
basic concepts that define the meaning of humanity, these concepts are plural and 
contestable themselves.  
 
     A central critique I have pressed against contemporary human rights theorising has 
been that the moral theory employed is inadequate, both generally and within the 
global context of human rights. In the previous two chapters I have developed a 
pluralist and situationist ethical framework, which thus far is substantively undefined. 
This lack of explicit content is a consequence of the change in ethical thinking I have 
argued for – not only are the values employed in political ethics plural, they are also 
dependent upon the situation in which ethical dilemmas occur. This approach does not 
attempt to justify foundational commitment in some moment of apodictic certainty 
and in this it differs from the various moral approaches based on a law-like founding 
principles. In this approach to ethics a good deal of ground is already shared with 
Connolly's work, and in what follows his thought will be used to begin filling out a 
distinct human rights ethos, which suggests virtues and orientations with which to 
approach particular problems rather than imperatives and rules. 
 
     In his critique of contemporary normative political theory Connolly brings to light 
the important but neglected question of the ontological perspective assumed in such 
work.54 He does this in part because it reveals the ground shared by thinkers usually 
seen as diametrically opposed, but also to reveal the way in which deep pluralism 
involves its own ontological perspective, its own sense of the nature of the world. 
What he reveals about contemporary political theory is that they share a modernist 
ontology in which human beings find themselves estranged from a world that does not 
accommodate their desires.55 In response, contemporary thinkers seek to recreate the 
certainty they assume was present for past believers in rational Enlightenment, the 
Christian God or a divine natural order – they attempt this work in various ways, 
trying to synthetically generate the certainty they project into the past. The most 
important thing that this line of analysis leads to, for Connolly, is the will to limit 
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pluralism inherent in these onto-political constructions. While the world today may 
seem plural, contingent and deeply uncertain, these various onto-political 
constructions reclaim certainty through a chastened rationalism, in which human 
beings exert moral control over the uncertain world, or through a modest faith in 
attunement to higher and more certain forms of being.56 According to Connolly, this 
insistence on certainty gives rise to the hostile reaction such thinkers have to 
postmodern traditions of deconstruction and genealogy, which undermine the very 
possibility (and desirability) of this quest for certainty.57 It is this desire for 
redemption of the present that limits what pluralism can mean within this essentially 
monist approach to morality. 
 
     In defending the reality of pluralism Connolly shares considerable ground with 
Berlin, as both thinkers argue that there are undercurrents within the Western 
philosophical tradition that embrace rather than fight against the plurality and 
uncertainty inherent in the world. Drawing upon William James, among others, 
Connolly argues that the world is imperfect, filled with litter and ambiguity, that 
nature is not a Newtonian clock driven by determinate forces, instead its more organic 
and defined by both probabilities and unpredictable change, and that even time is 
plural, defined by various experiences of duration, which form variable flows defined 
by different intensities and speeds.58 This account of deep pluralism has been 
explored in relation to Berlin's pluralism, and the diagnosis of the quest for certainty 
that haunts normative political theory shares obvious resonance with Dewey's work – 
but the most important idea to draw out of Connolly's consideration of onto-politics is 
how it reveals the way one's orientation to the world affects the ethos one affirms. The 
pluralism defended by Connolly and throughout this work can only reflect a particular 
way of experiencing the world – in this respect there is no final argument for the 
reality of a plural and contingent world, it is an orientation, an affirmation, even a 
faith, but Connolly's analysis importantly reveals that this is also true of those 
perspectives that seek certainty, and a virtue of pluralism is that it pushes us to 
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recognise our commitments as a contestable, embodied, reasoned and habituated 
orientation to existence.59   
 
     This last point leads to an important distinction that Connolly makes in Ethos of 
Pluralization between pluralism and pluralisation (which serves as a background to 
his democratic ethos), as he wants to resist an account of pluralism tied too tightly to 
present conditions, pluralism as a politics of being is insufficient, and that is why he 
argues for pluralisation as a politics of becoming.  
 
A pluralizing democracy is the site of tension or ambi-valence between 
politics as general action to sustain the economic and cultural 
conditions of existing plurality and the dissonant politics of 
pluralization. When this constitutive tension is maintained, a 
democratic culture thrives. Better, a democratic ethos is one in which 
this productive tension is always coming into being through the 
energization of that side of the equation that has most recently fallen 
into neglect.60  
 
What this entails is that the plural and diverse identities that define any present 
configuration, even where difference is not converted into otherness, pluralism should 
not be naturalised, nor should further pluralisation be inhibited. Not only does this 
focus work against the latent conservatism Connolly identifies in more limited 
accounts of pluralism, but it also sets the stage for his more expansive public ethos – 
which is a democratic ethos that looks to expand inclusion into democratic processes 
by not only opening up political identity but also by layering democratic virtues and 
practices over and across the nation-state as a privileged political space. 
 
     Democracy can allow for this ongoing contestation to be worked out in a way that 
pluralises political culture, but this requires that even when consensus is reached or 
when one side of a democratic contest prevails that we pay attention to what is lost, to 
the remainders. This language of remainders comes from Honig, but the general point 
is highlighted in Connolly's democratic ethos, which acknowledges that to affirm a 
value, faith or political position, even when negotiated democratically, entails a loss 
that can lead to resentment and violence, especially if the political culture does not 
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acknowledge this loss or tries to prevent future renegotiations of dominant identities 
and political structures. This entails abandoning the prevailing separation between 
ethics and politics, present in much contemporary thinking about human rights, and 
also rethinking the determinate force that ethics is assumed to exert upon politics. Any 
decision reached, even if done in an ethically exemplary way, imposes norms and 
standards upon us that some of us may reject or resent, whether that occurs sub-
consciously or consciously. Connolly says,   
 
The virtues commended here do not take the politics out of ethics, nor 
do they rise above politics. Rather, they lend an ethical dimension to 
the experience of identity, the practice of faith, the promotions of self-
interest, and the engagements of politics. They speak to a world in 
which people draw upon different final sources of ethical sustenance 
and bring those sources with them into politics.61 
 
Connolly's pluralising democratic ethos confronts us with the unavoidability of the 
use of power in ethics, with the political tools of compulsion, authority and force, but 
these take on different characteristics in a pluralist politics.  
 
Agonistic democracy, where each of these terms provides a necessary 
qualification to the other, furnishes the best political medium through 
which to incorporate strife into interdependence and care into strife. 
This virtue provides a powerful argument on behalf of democracy. It 
also provides considerations pertinent to the shape of the ideal of 
democracy assumes in the late-modern age.62  
 
Connolly gives us no refuge from this reality, no utopias of ideal theory, but instead 
responds by seeking to cultivate a democratic sensibility that is fundamentally 
concerned with the shape that our political ethos takes through our enactment of it, at 
both the macro- and micro-political levels. 
 
     Throughout his recent works Connolly has developed two virtues he thinks are 
central to a pluralising democratic ethos, these are agonistic respect and critical 
responsiveness. He defines them as 'civic virtues that require both internal 
constituency cultivation and public negotiation.'63 This description, of civic virtues, 
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highlights the bicameral orientation that Connolly endorses, which calls on us to 
acknowledge and develop our own pluralist orientations, and to recognise this 
dynamic in our social and political interactions. These public virtues apply first and 
foremost to our interactions with others, with difference, and for this reason are not 
commands that go to the core of an authoritative ethical identity, and can be shared by 
those confessing different existential faiths.64 These virtues, however, are also more 
than public virtues, as they require attending to the micro-politics of ethical 
experience, to practice these virtues requires personal reflection, adjustment of one's 
desires and visceral reactions, it requires us to reconstruct our habits and social 
customs.65 Yet, this bicameral orientation does not require that everyone confess the 
same pluralist faith that Connolly expounds, it instead aspires to be a public 
democratic ethos for a time of increasing pluralisation.  
 
     The first virtue, agonistic respect concerns the relationships between what 
Connolly calls 'interdependent partisans,'66 or those that share a political space but 
support different values and orientations. The relationship entailed is importantly 
different from the one implied by liberal toleration, where the parties are defined as 
majority and minority groupings, in which the minority's difference is tolerated by the 
power-holding majority. The terms of agonistic respect require that neither partisan is 
intent on placing her own position beyond contestation. This far more reciprocal 
relationship requires trust and a less formal account of equality than tolerance – 
partisans are not just formally equal, as the 'respect between them is deep precisely to 
the extent that each can respect the other in drawing its respect from a source 
unfamiliar to it,' which requires partisans to acknowledge that those they disagree 
with may be as rational, honest, committed and well-intentioned in their expression as 
they are themselves.67 This orientation, to seek respectful terms of ongoing 
contestation, not only reconfigures the political ethos that informs contemporary 
plural formations, but it also provides a general orientation for how one encounters 
new sources of pluralisation in cultural life. Yet, a question lingers, which Connolly 
puts to himself, asking, 'how could such a connection be forged, without falling into 
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disconnected individualism, devolving into substantive commonality, or dissolving 
entirely into a set of common procedures?’68 
 
     This returns us, once again, to the question of how understanding is possible in a 
plural world. Connolly acknowledges that established understandings of obligation 
and right may go some way to providing the terms through which agonistic respect is 
expressed.69 Yet, it is in those times when common understandings prove insufficient 
in the face of new conditions that agonistic respect is most necessary. Connolly begins 
by suggesting that the doubts and uncertainties felt by all sides can generate a 
generous and reciprocal spirit that makes it possible to sustain agonistic respect. As 
we are able to see the fragility of our own position, the alternative values endorsed by 
others, hopefully, becomes more understandable – the idea is that sharing and 
acknowledging the uncertainty of our own commitments makes it possible to respect 
and negotiate terms of coexistence with people who hold different views. This require 
that we make positive use of the pain that is generated by agonism; rather than 
responding to difference with resentment or violence, we respond with modesty 
regarding our own convictions and generosity in understanding those of others. This 
is convincing to a point, but I do want to further develop the idea of agonistic respect 
on two points. 
 
     Above, I considered how Connolly's account of plural cosmopolitanism requires 
some account of universal terms of understanding, particularly in the case of human 
identity. The difficulty in achieving understanding returns when we consider agonistic 
respect, because it is unclear what, if any, limits there are to achieving understanding 
between partisans that defend incommensurable and, possibly, hostile faiths. This is 
particularly important if agonistic respect requires some form of equality between 
partisans, and seeks to avoid the subsumption of difference under the terms of the 
more powerful party. As was argued above, some account of universal concepts and 
categories is necessary to enable understanding. The problem, however, is deeper, as 
the possibility of understanding does not speak to contestation between parties who 
remain hostile and refuse to pursue understanding – it raises the question of what the 
limits of agonistic respect are. Responding to this obstacle requires bringing out a 
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strand of Connolly's work more fully: he focuses on the situational nature of 
contestation, as the negotiation of agonistic respect occurs in response to specific 
situations and is motivated by specific values and goals, but I want to suggest more 
needs to be made of the situationist perspective as it provides additional support in 
responding to the question of how understanding can be encouraged between 
partisans that may seem irreconcilable.  
 
     Here Dewey's situationist ethic provides a useful addition to the virtue of agonistic 
respect, as the appeal to contingent universals necessary when common 
understandings fail is put into an experimental and reflective context. For example, if 
sustaining agonistic respect depends upon an understanding that cannot be generated 
from a common culture – between secularist and religious groups that hold their 
beliefs deeply and have little or no common experience, for example – then it may be 
necessary to appeal to universal concepts or categories that each group holds. Finding 
a comprehensive understanding or convergence between these opposed views would 
be extremely difficult, as entire world views would seem to be at stake. However, a 
situationist focus would seek convergence in relation to specific issues, in the current 
example, perhaps designing school curriculums that deal with questions of religion 
and science, in which case the chances of convergence and respect are greater despite 
incommensurable universals. For example, the religious person might appeal to the 
evolutionary universality of religious faith, to justify the inclusion of religious studies 
to the secularist, despite the unacceptability of such justifications to his own faith. The 
secularist, in contrast, could appeal to the divine command that we should pursue an 
understanding of God's world, even as she found such logic unpersuasive. In each 
case generating sufficient common ground to support agonistic respect is possible in 
concrete situations, rather than between opposed worldviews as such. Finding 
workable solutions in this way requires deeper engagement than conventional liberal 
toleration. Connolly hints at such a situationist approach, but connecting these 
impulses to Dewey's ethics adds important practical insights into the virtue of 
agonistic respect. There may be times when such understanding is impossible and 
partisan antagonism is generated, but Connolly suggests that in such moments the 
committed pluralist will not only seek out terms for respect, but where that is 
impossible infuse their political actions with a an care for difference that preserves the 
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possibility of future respect and does not compromise the pluralist commitment to the 
fragile plurality of human experience.70 
 
     The second point of development has to do with the experience of doubt and 
uncertainty that is so central to the generosity that motivates agonistic respect. There 
are two weaknesses in Connolly's account; first, he often speaks of partisans as 
though they were identity groups holding opposed world views, this is certainly not a 
necessity generated by his critique, as he focuses insightfully on the plurality that 
exists within social identity, but he repeatedly invokes an image of contesting faith 
groups. Related to this is a second weakness, the sources of doubt and uncertainty are 
presented as if they only occur when one's beliefs are challenged or on a subconscious 
level, both of which are important sources of doubt and uncertainty, but miss the way 
in which the personal experience of pluralism, actively asserting and holding to 
particular values, can lead to a pluralist consciousness that is an important source for 
generating agonistic respect. Berlin's value-pluralism is particularly useful here; by 
highlighting the existential element of choice in affirming our values, which presumes 
that the chooser (or maker) of values is aware, and feels the weight, of other values, 
Berlin revealed a vital source of generosity that can help to sustain the agonistic 
respect Connolly suggests. Further, focusing on the psychological importance of 
choosing, of affirming, as a source of generosity reinforces Connolly’s own insights 
into the plural and ambiguous composition within, and not only between, faith groups. 
 
     The second civic virtue, critical responsiveness, has a different aim than agonistic 
respect and is more focused on enabling a politics of becoming. Connolly defines the 
politics of becoming as emerging  
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out of historically specific suffering, previously untapped energies, and 
emerging lines of possibility eluding the attention of dominant 
constituencies. In successful instances the politics of becoming moves 
from a netherworld below the register of positive acceptance, identity, 
legitimacy, or justice onto one or more of those registers. To cross that 
threshold is to shake up something in the established world. It is to 
propel a fork in political life, throwing a wrench into the established 
code of obligation, goodness, identity, justice, right, or legitimacy.71 
 
Critical responsiveness encourages a particular response to these moments of rupture, 
to the new claims that are made upon the structure of social life. The politics of 
becoming are disturbing because they upset the accepted norms, obligations, rights 
and recognitions of the established order, and indict these very standards as part of the 
problem. What Connolly seeks is a generous and care-full response to these emergent 
claims upon the social order, which he thinks are increasingly common in our 
contemporary time where the lines and tempos of interaction are increasing, leading 
to greater interdependence and deeper pluralism. He describe critical responsiveness 
as 'careful listening and presumptive generosity to constituencies struggling to move 
from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of recognitions, justice, 
obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers.'72 These 
rather vague notions involve the very practical need to check one's own reactions of 
disgust or resentment in response to difference, a recognition of the visceral register 
of micro-politics, and a duty to be aware that responding to these demands for 
recognition or legitimacy generate a need for new or revised standards of judgment – 
this requires an awareness that "our standards", as they are, are not enough and that 
some further work is needed. Further, whether we end up supporting or opposing the 
demands placed upon the social order and our identities, the judgment made should be 
held with modesty, acknowledging the newness of the situation and the potential 
inadequacy of our response.73 
 
     The virtue of critical responsiveness is as vital as that of agonistic respect, even as 
if it initially seems less clear what this virtue actually beyond the somewhat woolly 
injunction to listen to the excluded more carefully and act with more generosity in 
political life. A situationist ethics goes someway to making this virtue clearer and 
                                                 
71
 Connolly, Pluralism, 121-122. 
72
 Ibid., 126. 
73
 Ibid., 168. 
  194 
more practical. What Berlin, Dewey and Connolly all share, in their pluralist 
dispositions, is a suspicion of the adequacy of any existing social order. Because they 
acknowledge the messy imperfection of the world, the loss that shadows each value 
we affirm and celebrate, the physical and psychological violence and humiliation 
done to human beings by universalisms that command, constrain and oppress – even 
when the hand of that universalism is a liberal state, the command to leave your faith 
at home, to hide your sexual and romantic desires, or to accept your everyday 
economic subservience, oppresses all the same – all three thinkers engage the 
experience of the excluded, marginalised and those made "other." Critical 
responsiveness encompasses this orientation, and tying this responsiveness to a 
situationist ethics leads to concrete ethico-political practices. The key question is 
whom do we listen to? A situationist ethics runs the risk of being confused with a 
crudely instrumentalist approach to political ethics if far the problems it address are 
defined by the most powerful individuals and groups, and for this reason a critical 
situationist ethics must begin from a commitment democratic inclusiveness. This 
commitment presumes that each person (or group) should have, at the very least, the 
space to articulate his claims upon the social order. This is not, however, a 
requirement for a morality of equal individual autonomy or a regime of absolute legal 
rights; as Connolly has shown again and again, these projects will always generate 
new exclusions – the key difference of the approach endorsed here is its ongoing 
character. So, in response to this question, we should take special care to make space 
for and take seriously the demands made by the marginalised, excluded, and 
degraded. We should hear the clamour of the politics of becoming not as a plea for 
some final resolution but rather as a call to refine the conduct of political life. 
 
     To further connect Connolly's civic virtues to Dewey's situationist ethic, the virtue 
of critical responsiveness is embodied by being alive to, seeking out and providing 
forums where problematic situations can be brought to public attention. This involves 
an awareness of our own experience, to those instances where we experience a 
breakdown between the customs and habits that support the ends we uncritically 
affirm – where, for example, the mythologies of hard work and responsibility that 
support capitalist economic relations break against the reality of everyday 
humiliation, deprivation, boredom and resentment revealed by the experience of the 
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poor and working class.74 Further, it requires an attention to the experience of others, 
empathy for their problematic experiences. For example, the ability to question our 
own naturalised desires and understanding of intimate relationships, in order to make 
space for and support the claims of those fighting for social protection, equal privilege 
and public recognition of different desires and patterns of intimate relationship – an 
effective example deployed by Connolly.75 Finally, and perhaps the most challenging 
task, is the effort to be alive to the significance of situations of exclusion and 
oppression that are difficult to see, where these exclusions are of violent and 
threatening people, so that critical responsiveness is potentially overwhelmed by fear 
and the desire to punish in a way that makes it difficult to be responsive or generous.  
 
     Connolly illustrates the difficulty of this sort of responsiveness with an outstanding 
examination of the trial of Dontay Carter.76 What Connolly does by examining the 
case is to reveal the way in which Carter's actions, violent and terrifying as they were, 
could be understood and, in their way, provide a powerful expression of a social 
condition that is intolerable in its inequality, violence, deprivation and 
marginalisation. Further, by questioning the desire to punish that motivated the trial 
and public discourse surrounding it, Connolly reveals the way in which the social 
order is implicated in not only the violence done to Carter and poor African-
Americans in urban ghettos, but also in the silencing of their experience.77 Critical 
responsiveness can, and should, aim to reveal exactly these forms of social 
oppression, not in order to emancipate the victims on one's own terms or to replace 
their voice with one's own, but to alter the social order so that such exclusion and 
violence is neither rendered invisible (unspeakable) and justified (natural).78   
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     Connolly’s account of open political identities, whether defining the authoritative 
community or the “normal” individual, along with his democratic ethos provide key 
elements that I pull into the account of human rights I turn to next. Where Berlin and 
Dewey provided the initial reorientation in ethical theory towards pluralism and a 
situationist political ethic, Connolly’s work takes the reconstruction forward by 
providing more substantive direction for an account of human rights as a 
democratising political ethos. The key points I develop below are that (1) human 
rights we should see human rights as an orientation that seeks to increase democratic 
inclusion and enables the ongoing contestation over the basic terms of political life at 
the global level, (2) that this human rights ethos must respect the ambiguity of human 
identity, which entails that there will be plural articulations of human rights and the 
institutions that support them should not necessarily be singular or aim toward 
absolute authority; and (3) that human rights make claims upon the basic structures of 
political legitimacy, by contesting privileged identities and the given boundaries of 
political community. 
 
IV. Prelude: Human Rights as Democratising Ethos  
 
To briefly summarise the reconstruction of human rights initiated here – as this can 
only be an opening. I begin with a pragmatic account of rights that defines them as 
claims made by and upon the individuals that make up the political community, 
defining legitimate social order. They place constraints and qualifications on coercive 
social power and define reciprocal social duties of members of the political 
community. This could be a claim that an individual has a right to some immunity or 
good (a right to free expression or a fair trial, for example), or it could be a claim that 
the legitimacy of coercive power rests on certain conditions obtaining in society (such 
as general access to welfare or employment). The substantive point is that rights 
claims are a basic part of social order. Rights are a defining condition of political 
legitimacy so far as they call for power to be justified in terms beyond the mere 
possession of power. What is not implied is that this basic logic of rights tells us what 
kind of political actor claims a right, nor against which social actors and orders they 
are claimed against, and it tells us little of what goods, immunities, privileges or 
conditions it claims as necessary for the legitimation of coercive social power.  
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     While much of the time rights claims will be made within a settled context, such 
that interpreting a right or asserting a new one does not place much strain upon the 
social order as such, a pluralist approach to human rights rejects the conventional 
project of answering this basic question of political authority and belonging in a 
singular and final way. Instead, it appeals to a democratising ethos that combines a 
concern for human fragility and diversity with an appreciation that all political orders 
are expressions of power that create exclusions. Human rights provide an ambiguous 
identity that we can appeal to in the ongoing struggle over the central political 
questions about the requirements of legitimate authority and forms of political 
community. This struggle, however, is not a progressive realisation of some 
underlying human unity, but instead results in a pluralised and contingent human 
rights politics, in which the demands we can make of political authority are unsettled 
and then reconstructed, while at the same time the confines of political community 
and the levers of sovereign power are contested and reconfigured. Agnostic pluralism 
does not provide a relief from uncertainty, but it does encourage an ethics of care and 
engagement rather than a morality of anxiety and limitation. 
 
     In the following brief section, I offer a summary account of the idea of human 
rights as a democratising ethos. In chapter 6, I look to the drafting of the UDHR as a 
foundational but ambiguous moment in the development of international human 
rights. In examining the ideas that defined that document I substantiate the claim that 
human rights can be understood as a democratising ethos – along with this effort to 
clarify my position, I also suggest that the re-reading the UDHR as a democratising 
ethos encourages a more critical orientation to the human rights project. In chapter 7, I 
consider how my reconstruction of human rights effects how we understand the 
practices and institutions of human rights, suggesting that more focus should be given 
to the political act of claiming rights, particularly through social movements that 
challenge the basic terms of political legitimacy in world politics. 
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Interlude 
Human Rights as a Democratising Global Ethic 
 
‘Everything should be placed on the open table so that we can openly debate 
questions of power and powerlessness, and how to reformulate the human rights 
corpus to address pressing crises. Perhaps we will decide that human rights is not the 
right language for this struggle. Perhaps it is. In any case we will never know until we 
take off the veil. What is clear today is that the movement will lose its relevance 
unless it can address – seriously and as a priority – human powerlessness in all its 
dimensions.’ 
-Makau Mutua, Human Rights and Powerlessness 
 
I. From Imperative to Ethos 
 
     How, then, does a pluralist and situationist ethic, drawing on Connolly's account of 
civic virtue, translate into a theory of human rights. The conventional debate over 
human rights is generally concerned to set out the structure of those claims and their 
substantive content. What I want to suggest is, first, that the structure of rights can be 
articulated in a more basic fashion, which is amenable to the situated and plural 
accounts of political ethics that I have been concerned with thus far. Second, I argue 
that the content of rights is largely dependent upon the identities and meanings 
through which they are claimed, which further suggests that a theory of rights will 
have to acknowledge the contingent and ambiguous nature of these claims. This 
account of rights explicitly contrasts Connolly's account of a politics of becoming to 
the politics of being, to which rights are usually tied, by suggesting that rights claims 
are neither static nor discovered by uncovering some fundamental truth. Therefore, 
the ethical function of rights must be rethought, we must move from a vision of rights 
as moral imperative to one in which the claiming of rights is a political act supported 
by a particular ethos – an orientation towards ethical matters that guides our responses 
to both the existing world of rights and future claims. 
 
     Dewey argued that rights are prescriptive ends pursued in social life that give our 
common life structure – rights and duties define what members of a community can 
claim of others and what can be demanded of them.1 This account of rights, however, 
is importantly read on two levels, the customary and the explicitly ethical. Customary 
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rights serve as the background conditions that we generally do not reflect upon, they 
are the rights we inherit, our experience is sustained by them, but ethical reflections 
on rights and duties comes about when the social relationships held in place by 
custom and habit are disturbed and the prescription of behaviour uncertain. And 
human rights address the social relationships of world politics, and in the process 
serve several functions, including providing a universal moral orientation, a the logic 
and language for existing standards of international/global political legitimacy, an 
increasing institutionalised legal framework and a critical rights activism.2 The 
account of rights developed here essentially addresses itself to rights as an ethical 
orientation (democratising in nature), a political dynamic (activist and transformative) 
and an emergent and plural institutionalisation (a human rights public of diverse 
movements responding to specific problems with support and solidarity but also 
allowing a great deal of diversity). Human rights ‘constitute different constellations of 
diverse subject positions in, and through, agency-in-structure.’3 Hence the need for 
reflection and the articulation of new rights to reconstruct social relations – whether 
this involves the community placing new responsibilities upon or granting new rights 
to minority classes or individuals, or new demands from those within society upon the 
basic terms of the social order. The actual content of human rights is open to diverse 
expression, both in cases of social transformation and in the more prosaic process of 
ongoing political renegotiations of the existing order.  
 
     This way of thinking about rights comes out of an ethical perspective that does not 
find inherent ends revealed through reason or in the nature of humanity (or the world 
at large), but rather finds its ends in experience and our attempts to improve 
experience, to improve our social lives. The substantive ends pursued can only be 
articulated in a provisional and tentative way. First, I have argued in favour of a 
democratising conception of rights that opposes exclusion and powerlessness, and 
which supports the inclusion of people in the political communities that determine 
their conditions of life, which allows them to exert control over the social forces that 
affect their lives. Further, this democratising account of rights calls for a more open 
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politics, in which identities and authoritative communities can be challenged and 
reconstructed; at base it calls for a more radically democratic politics. This is an ethos, 
however, not an imperative. Any fuller account of what sort of rights and duties 
should be institutionalised as human rights must be a response to a specific situation 
in particular contexts. The position developed here cannot provide an ideal list of 
substantive rights, it can offer a point of critique for existing rights regimes and 
suggest specific responses. For example, it could support Makau Mutua’s call for a 
greater focus on economic powerlessness and exploitation when considering the place 
of human rights in African polities, as the legacy of colonialism and the current 
realities of economic imperialism are pressing problems that require substantial social 
transformations.4  The exact nature of the reconstruction, however, would depend 
upon an analysis of the specific question being considered, as well as the orientation 
of inquirer considering it. This highlights an important further point: the analysis of 
the social and ethical function of rights is not necessarily connected to the 
democratising ethos I favour here, because even as I am able to give reasons for 
embracing this ethos, there is no final authoritative warrant for its superiority – only 
its persuasiveness and, importantly, its consequences should it serve as a basis for 
practical action. 
 
     A dominant view of human rights is that they are intended to address a limited set 
of very serious forms of injustice and violence, basically defining the limits of 
legitimate authority: such that, if a social order violates core human rights to life, 
against torture or makes use of other extreme forms of violence, then it cannot be 
legitimate. This account is problematic in two ways. First, it suggests that human 
rights can only be claims to certain protections or goods that can be reliably provided 
by existing political authorities, and second, it does not have an adequate sense of 
how pervasive human rights have become in world politics, the way in which their 
claims have grown and now influence politics in numerous and, at times, 
contradictory ways. The first problem emerges when we want to keep human rights as 
minimal and basic as possible, defining them as a negative account of legitimate 
authority that can prescribe minimal universal norms. What this fails to appreciate is 
that a plurality of universals can be embodied in human rights claims. So, while the 
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argument that human rights claims can be made against a small and widely agreed set 
of injustices is acceptable as far as it goes, I want to defend the use of human rights to 
make both more fundamental and far reaching claims upon the social order. For 
example, where critics reject social and economic rights because providing work or 
welfare is not something every political authority can reliably provide, this misses that 
social and economic human rights can be read as claims made upon the structure of 
society, challenging the very structures of contemporary capitalism that make it so 
difficult for political communities to provide equal access to economic resources. The 
second problem arises because we are too focused on human rights as an issue of state 
legitimacy in relation to citizens. Human rights are not only addressed to state 
authorities nor solely concerned with the relationship between national citizens and 
national sovereigns. Human rights have become standards of legitimate authority for 
an ill-defined international community, importantly dominated by powerful states and 
international institutions, but also including variegated institutions of global 
governance, global civil society groups and multinational corporations, all of whom 
are implicated in contemporary human rights politics. This is why the attention that 
Connolly gives to the limitations of the nationalist political frame and his account of a 
pluralist and rhizomatic cosmopolitanism are important resources in reconstructing 
the political expressions of human rights, which will be taken up in the chapters that 
follow.  
 
II. Contestable Humanity: Rights Claims and Political Community 
 
     Beyond an analysis of the social and ethical function of rights, the account of 
human rights offered here focuses on the way the appeal to humanity functions as a 
political and ethical identity used to justify social transformations. Human rights 
claims can be made on behalf of a variety of political actors against a variety of 
political authorities, for example individuals may claim rights of protection from state 
violence that place duties upon international organisations, rather than their 
government; or indigenous groups may make claims upon corporations demanding a 
contribution towards, or even provision of public services. The articulation of new 
rights claims in this global context serves to redefine the lines of political authority 
and community. And while these claims are not made in a social vacuum – human 
rights are all too often constrained to a state-centric frame of reference – attending to 
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human rights politics as a politics of becoming is vital to the end of encouraging a 
more pluralist and democratic world politics. Connolly highlights the way in which 
rights can be claimed by individuals and classes of people who are excluded, 
marginalised and degraded as they seek to reform and reconstruct the social order, 
pushing us to create space for this understanding of rights at the global level, where 
human rights are all too often defined by hegemonic powers and politicised 
conceptions of humanity, which impose upon difference and support a hierarchical 
world order by denying the contestability of both humanity and the structures of state 
and international authority. Conceiving of human rights as a democratising political 
ethos, which affirms pluralisation and contestation as ends, opens up these questions 
and reframes the politics of human rights. 
 
     Bonnie Honig brings a number of Connolly's insights to an explicit consideration 
of human rights.5 She begins by returning to the paradox of politics and argues that a 
similar dynamic is expressed when a new human right is initially claimed, as each 
claim calls a new social world into being which has yet to be institutionalised as an 
authoritative claim.6 This reveals the exercise of political power at the heart of rights 
claims, analogous to the power Connolly identifies in democratic sovereignty. 
Further, Honig rejects the various attempts to resolve this paradox of politics, either 
confining political authority to a past condition of consensus and unity or projecting it 
upon a future harmony still to come. She develops Connolly's ideas further by 
critiquing the chrono-logic of rights, which is deployed in cosmopolitan accounts of 
rights that rely on a implicit progressivism, in which each expansion or innovation in 
the human rights regime is part of the unfolding of a comprehensive moral order. 
  
Looking backward, we can say with satisfaction that the chrono-logic 
of rights required and therefore delivered the eventual inclusion of 
women, Africans, and native peoples into the schedule of formal 
rights. But what actually did the work? The impulsion of rights, their 
chrono-logic, or the political actors who won the battles they were 
variously motivated to fight and whose contingent victories were later 
credited not to the actors but to the independent trajectory of rights as 
such?7 
                                                 
5
 Bonnie Honig, “The Time of Rights: Emergent Thoughts in an Emergency Setting,” The New 
Pluralism: William Connolly and the Contemporary Global Condition, 85-120. 
6
 Ibid., 104. 
7
 Ibid., 94. 
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In contrast to this account, Honig suggests that rights claims exceed the confines of 
the existing political order, expressing the politics of becoming (or enactment); they 
give a democratic and activist orientation to human right. Rather than pursuing a 
judicial model of human rights, where each successive iteration is interpreted and 
harmonised with established right, Honig highlights the role human rights can have in 
brining about new goods, putting degraded political identities on the register of 
recognition and respect, and encouraging a democratic world politics that remains 
open to pluralism and the unexpected newness that is generated by the interaction of 
difference on multiple registers. 
 
     This implies that human rights exceed the legalised discourses and practices of the 
international human rights regime, reconnecting human rights claims with the 
political contestations and social movements that have lead to the establishment of 
new rights. What this exposes is the expression of power necessary in seeking to 
change the social order, such that the emergence of social and economic rights, or the 
women's human rights movement were not fulfilments of the human rights vision, 
complete from the start, but contests to reconstruct the legitimacy of social orders that 
sustained economic dependence and poverty, or the exclusion and abuse of women. 
For this reason, new (or even reiterated) human rights claims can engender panic 
within the established order, which is why if human rights aspire to something more 
than rhetorical coverage for the claims of the powerful, they need to appeal to some 
further ethical justification. The account suggested here incorporates the civic virtues 
outlined above, in hopes of defending human rights as an inclusive democratising 
ethos. 
 
     This democratising politics of human rights relies upon an appeal to the contested 
and ambiguous concept of humanity, as discussed in the previous chapter. It is the 
formal universality and substantive emptiness that makes humanity such a powerful 
identity, containing potentialities for both emancipation and assimilation. What results 
from this reconstruction of human rights is not an ever more magisterial international 
human rights regime institutionalised through cosmopolitan global governance, nor a 
state-centric order of minimal rights claims, but rather a human rights assemblage or 
human rights public. The end of human rights is not consensus; on this model human 
rights generate a space for contesting existing identities and sites of political 
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authority. Human rights, if imbued with a situated and pluralising ethos and motivated 
by democratising virtues can alter political practice at multiple levels and across 
communities. The coherence and potential of this reconstruction of human rights is 
explored in the chapters that follow, first by looking to the history of human rights 
and the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and then in the final 
chapter a fuller account of how human rights function in world politics is offered and 
their potential value to a democratising political ethos is evaluated. 
 
III. Rights Lost: The Remainders of a Democratising Ethos 
 
     This account of right, especially in the human rights context pursued here, leads to 
two concerns. First, a worry that the normative (rather than simply coercive) power of 
rights is undermined, and, second, that a theory of rights that focuses on the 
contestation of important and well-established rights undermines political stability 
and authority, which are rightly reinforced by the legitimacy of those rights enshrined 
in a stable legal order. These are important objections to the account of rights offered 
here. The response, however, is relatively straightforward. 
 
     Do other accounts of human rights make it easier to assert the moral legitimacy of 
political authority? Do such accounts reinforce the stability of the legal and political 
order? In both cases the answer is yes, of course. The point of articulating a 
democratising account of human rights is that it undermines that certainty, because it 
is a false certainty and the will to secure such certainty is harmful. The articulation of 
a final and complete account of rights is a concealment of the power and contestation 
inherent to the logic of asserting an authoritative order for the world. Further, it stifles 
the act of contestation and impedes social change. So, to acknowledge that rights are 
ambiguous in their normative power and in their role upholding established orders is 
to face the political and ethical questions raised by rights claims directly, particularly 
the expansive claims made by universal human rights, to insist that universal human 
rights prove their value and are not presumptively given absolute or final authority. 
The goal of a democratising account of human rights is to see how far it possible to 
reconstruct rights for a pluralist world of increased interaction, deep pluralism, 
emerging political identities, and ever more complex problems generated by social 
forces that exceed the control of established social orders. There is little else that can 
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be offered to those who mourn the loss of certainty, other than to acknowledge the 
risks inherent in opening up social life to critical examination and reconstruction, and 
to make clear that this democratising impulse is a response to the power of static 
ideals of moral universalism and political authority, and as a situated response it is 
contestable and corrigible in the light of further experience. 
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Chapter 6 
Ambiguous humanity: revisiting the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
 
‘No contemplation of open and diverse human rights futures may remain innocent of 
their many histories. Pre-eminent among these remain the myths of origin that suggest 
that human rights traditions are “gifts of the west to the rest.” The predatory 
hegemonies of the “West” itself compose, recompose, and even revoke, the “gift.”’  
-Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights 
 
I. From Moment of Consensus to Opening the Debate: Rereading the UDHR 
 
Thus far, I have offered an initial reconstruction of human rights, which emphasises 
their role as claims calling for the ethical transformation of the social order. My 
analysis suggests that human rights make use of the category of humanity to make a 
moral claim upon the legitimate political organisation of social life. This opens up a 
contest over the significance of humanity as an identity and places the question of 
legitimate social organisation into a global context, which puts domestic and 
international structures into question. In this chapter I turn to the drafting of the 
UDHR, looking both at the historical records documenting that process and the 
significance it has in how we understand the contemporary human rights regime. My 
intention is to offer evidence, so far as possible, that my reconstruction of human 
rights highlights and reflects important elements of the drafting of the UDHR, which 
are often missed by other historical interpretation; along with that, by reading the 
drafting process through the perspective I have developed, I hope to illuminate the 
significance of this reconstruction. I focus on how (a) human rights function as claims 
upon political structures in the name of the ambiguous category of ‘humanity’, (b) 
how these claims are made in response to specific problems and in the pursuit of 
particular ideals, and finally on (c) the ongoing nature of the political and ethical 
contest over the meaning and significance of human rights. These aspects of human 
rights can be seen in the historical act of declaring such rights and focusing on these 
aspects alters our understanding of the UDHR’s wider significance.  
 
     The conventional debate over the UDHR generally oscillates between two 
positions: on one side it is seen as a moment of founding for the human rights regime, 
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based on an achieved consensus,1 while on the other hand it is seen as a unique 
moment of political imposition by the post-war liberal powers, particularly the United 
State, intent upon remaking the international order.2 Christine Cerna expresses the 
fundamental tension when she says, 
 
Forty-five years ago, on 10 December 1948, the international 
community adopted by consensus, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, still the preeminent document in the growing corpus of 
human rights instruments. Today, a group of nations is seeking to 
redefine the content of the term “human rights” against the will of the 
Western states. This group sees the current definition as part of the 
ideological patrimony of Western civilization. They argue that the 
principles enshrined in the Universal Declaration reflect Western 
values and not their own.3  
 
The UDHR has a special status for both human rights supporters and critics, but here 
my primary task is to upset both historical narratives and the understanding of human 
rights that makes this dichotomous framing possible. Before turning to my own 
reading of the UDHR as an important early moment of ethical contestation and 
political reconstruction, I look at the traditional narrative framing in more detail. 
 
     Many histories of the UDHR have been written, all of them acknowledge the 
political context of the drafting to some degree,4 but the connection between how we 
understand that history and the theory of rights that informs that understanding is 
generally unexamined.5 The standard interpretations generally look for a moment of 
                                                 
1
 Christina M. Cerna, “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of 
Human Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts,” Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 16, Number 4 
(1994), 740-752. 
2
 Makau Mutua, “Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis,” Human Rights 
Quarterly, Volume 29, Number 3(2007), 552-555. 
3
 Cerna, “Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity,” 740. 
4
 Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (New York, NY: Random House, 2001); Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999; Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003). and Susan Waltz, “Reclaiming and Rebuilding the 
History of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Third World Quarterly, Volume 23, Number 3 
(June, 2002), 437-448. 
5
 See Jenna Reinbold, “Political Myth and the Sacred Center of Human Rights: The Universal 
Declaration and the Narrative of ‘Inherent Human Dignity,’” Human Rights Review, Volume 12, 
Number 2 (2011), forthcoming, for an examination of the history of the UDHR that understands the 
core idea of dignity as the founding myth that justifies the political practice of human rights (available 
through online first at http://www.springlink.com/content/y13672p6w3w15653/, last accessed 28 
March 2011). Also, in contrast to Reinbold, Johannes Morsink offers a more conventional philosophy 
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consensus or imposition, depending on whether one sees human rights as justified 
moral principles or an illegitimate political project. For supporters, the UDHR 
represents a break from a terrible era of world politics based on narrow state-interests, 
nationalism, colonialism and racist ideology, and provides the cornerstone for the 
foundation upon which a new order could be built. ‘The human rights instruments and 
covenants, as conceptualised in [the] UDHR and other major UN conventions, exhibit 
common narrative standards based on the widest attainable consensus among nations 
with diverse cultural traditions, religious doctrines, and ideological systems.’6 The 
consensus that the UDHR is presumed to have achieved, reflecting both the content 
and the process, serves as a basis for the development of the international human 
rights regime that followed.  
 
There appears to be consensus within the UN and among states, 
academics, and human rights advocates that the UDHR is the most 
significant embodiment of human rights standards. It has been 
described as “showing signs of having achieved the status of holy writ 
within the human rights movement.” Elsewhere, the UDHR has been 
described generously as the “spiritual parent” of other human rights 
documents.7 
 
Even where care is taken to acknowledge the limits of the original consensus in 1948 
– due to the exclusion of colonised peoples and the objections of Muslim and 
communist states – the lack of consensus is presented as a political failing, not a 
failing of the rights regime as such. 
 
Given that eight countries abstained out of an international body made 
up then of only fifty-six states – most of which were from the West or 
politically “Westernized” – the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was thus not born “universal,” even for those who took direct 
                                                                                                                                            
of human, which is importantly linked to how we understand the history of the UDHR. See, Johannes 
Morsink, “The Philosophy of the Universal Declaration,” Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 6, Number 
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cohesive philosophy to the contemporary human rights movement, whereas I want to employ the 
history of the UDHR to undermine the desirability and necessity of such comprehensive accounts. See 
Johannes Morsink, Inherent Human Rights: Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 
6
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Universal Declarations of Human Rights by the UN and the Islamic Council of Europe,” The 
International Journal of Human Rights, Volume 12, Number 3 (2008), 349. 
7
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part in the process of its elaboration. There is no denying, therefore, 
that those who had not participated in the negotiations and who labeled 
the Declaration as a “Western product” did indeed have a point. 
Having had no voice in the negotiations period from 1946 to 1948 
because they were, largely, Western colonies, Afro-Asian countries 
had a valid reason to question the legitimacy of the Declaration’s 
authority over every cultural or political system. To a lesser extent, the 
same logic applied to the European socialist states, which abstained in 
the vote despite the inclusion in the document of the social and 
economic rights they had firmly defended. Nevertheless, all of them 
quickly lost the grounds for their objections.8  
 
Even where failings are admitted, the intention and content is redeemed by the 
universality the UDHR later attained. 
 
     More sophisticated analyses of the UDHR point to the way in which its radical 
break with traditional attempts to moralise world politics was resisted by both 
“Western” and “non-Western” states – reading it as the founding document for a new 
universal movement that is still in the process of being realised. Within this line of 
thinking overcoming the biases of the state-centric system are key.  
 
Only by reiterating that human rights treaties are constructed outcomes 
of negotiations that demand change in all discriminatory and 
repressive cultures, can we stop the selective adoption of human rights 
and challenge all states that give lip service to human rights but 
continue to violate the rights of their citizens, support repressive 
regimes, or uphold corporate interests over human rights and dignity.9 
 
While the UDHR itself does not represent a perfect or final consensus, it is the corner 
stone for a more fully consensual human rights regime. The theme of consensus is 
carried over to the 1992 UN Vienna Declaration on human rights.10  
 
Drawing representative from the existing major cultures, religions, and 
sociopolitical systems, with delegations from over 170 countries, in a 
world virtually without colonies, the Vienna Conference was the 
largest international gathering ever convened on the theme of human 
rights. Its final document, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
                                                 
8
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Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 2 (2000), 481-482. 
9
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Action – adopted by consensus without a vote or reservations, 
although with some interpretive statements – unambiguously affirms, 
in Article 1 that: “The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is 
beyond question.”11 
 
The Vienna Declaration, then, provides the fuller consensus needed to justify a world 
order based on human rights. Yet, this second moment of consensus essentially 
confirms the universalism of the UDHR and washes away the imperfections of the 
original drafting’s association with illegitimate political interest. 
 
     The contrast to this narrative of consensus and progress is that of imposition and 
political interest. In this narrative the US, and Western states more generally, used 
their political dominance after WWII to impose a new international order upon the 
rest of the world. Importantly, this was resisted by communist states at the time and 
made possible, at least in part, by the marginalised status of many of the world’s 
peoples still living under colonial rule.  
 
The narrow club of states in the UN at the time seriously compromised 
the normative universality of the movement’s founding document. 
Antonio Cassese, the former President of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, wrote that the West imposed its 
philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because it 
dominated the United Nations at its inception.12 
 
Therefore, rather than providing a moral basis for this new world politics, the UDHR 
serves as the first imposition of a distinctly Western and liberal conception of 
individual rights. The critique runs deeper than an accusation of political imposition. 
By justifying the content of human rights through an appeal to a distinctly human 
essence, Western powers infused the new order with their own universalising 
ideology. ‘The official documents of human rights, therefore, embody a specific 
cultural world-view: that of the modern Western world, but more insidiously, in the 
very assumption of “human” that this also entails.’13 The appeal to human nature and 
human dignity, defined in Western liberal terms, justified the imposition of human 
rights norms on everyone and also undermined the possibility of opposition or dissent. 
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It is the moral justification of human rights and the new international order, not 
simply the act of exercising Western power, which is objected to as an illegitimate 
imposition.  
 
     This critique retains its force even when one does not assign nefarious motives to 
the drafters of the UDHR. ‘Ultimately the assumption of the natural dignity of human 
beings became part of the UDHR despite the attempts by the drafters to keep the 
language neutral on this topic.’14 The central idea here is that there is an irresolvable 
contradiction in the idea of human rights – it requires an appeal to an essential feature 
of humanity to justify its universal legitimacy. ‘Though the UDHR is based on an 
essentialist view of the human being, the drafters were aware of the difficulties that 
come with such a basis. This historical moment reveals the depth of the problem that 
we are still trying to reconcile.’15 This understanding can lead to rejections of the 
human rights regime as such or to calls to limit the consensus to a purely practical one 
– essentially reiterating Jacques Maritain’s famous reflection on a UNESCO 
sponsored meeting to discuss human rights: 
 
It is related that at one of the meetings of a Unesco National 
Commission where Human Rights were being discussed, someone 
expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed 
ideologies had agreed on a list of these rights. “Yes”, they said, “we 
agree about the rights but on the condition that no one asks us why.” 
That “why” is where the argument begins.16 
 
Whether critics see room for practical agreement on human rights based on the UN 
framework, first developed in the UDHR, or think that the regime is wholly 
compromised by its biases, the presumed universality of the UDHR is seen as an 
imposition – a moment to be overcome not celebrated.  
 
     My goal in what follows is to consider the UDHR without relying on either 
narrative. In part this involves returning to wider historical narratives of human rights 
and primary texts from the drafting of the UDHR, but more importantly it involves 
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rethinking what human rights are, based on the argument offered thus far in this work. 
Crucially, seeing human rights from a situated and pluralist framing reduces the 
importance of consensus. By connecting the aspects of agreement and imposition 
involved in the drafting and adoption of the UDHR through an alternative theoretical 
understanding of rights – which appreciates the context in which these human rights 
ideals were expressed as moral principles and that the declaration of rights was also a 
political act without final moral authority – we are able to see the historical moment 
of the drafting and adoption of the UDHR differently. I want to suggest that we can 
see its significance with different eyes and hear the voices of the drafters with 
different ears.  
 
     The central claim of this chapter is that the UDHR is a key document in the 
opening of a debate about human rights that revolves around two key theoretical 
issues: (1) the meaning of human dignity and its implications for the substance of 
human rights, and (2) the effect of human rights claims on the legitimate structure of 
world politics. To understand why these two issues emerge and why the UDHR 
responds to them in the way that it does, we need to appreciate the context of the 
drafting – namely as a particular response to the post-WWII reconstruction, which 
was issued as a call to uphold the dignity of shared humanity in the face of nationalist 
and racist ideologies, and as a challenge to the supremacy of state sovereignty as the 
organising principle of world politics. This importantly did not involve a rejection of 
the state system, but rather in a call for its moralisation (often primarily through 
legalisation), as tepid support for a permanent human rights courts, the lack of direct 
UN reporting mechanisms, the limitation of non-state UN representation and a focus 
on securing state citizenship demonstrate. Placing the UDHR drafting in context 
undermines the traditional narratives of a consensus that provided the basis for further 
progress, as if the guaranteed promise of the future was necessarily contained in the 
past. An unwillingness to see human rights as part of an ongoing contestation over the 
meaning of humanity as a political identity and the legitimate structure of world 
politics lends support to critics who see it as a limited political project imposed by 
powerful states.  
 
     There is support for the view that the drafters saw themselves as providing a 
foundation to build a new and moral world politics, but there is also significant 
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evidence that they saw themselves opening up a new discussion on the question of 
human dignity and the shape it might give to an evolving world politics. I am not 
concerned with revealing the true intentions of the drafters but pointing to the way 
their debates exemplified the ambiguous and contested nature of human dignity and 
demonstrated a self-conscious reconstruction of world politics.17 I suggest that the 
drafting debates are an early and influential discussion of human rights, a point of 
reference and significance, but not a new founding for the final articulation of a moral 
politics. Looking at the drafting debates suggests that some of those involved had a 
sense of the contingent and ongoing nature of their task and a realisation that what 
they accomplished was a temporary settlement in an ongoing contest in an emerging 
human rights politics – these are the elements I focus on here.  
 
     I first look at the historical context that led to the UDHR. Then, I turn to the 
specific debates that took place during the drafting process concerning human dignity, 
arguing that this idea was seen to both open up a new politics and to require an appeal 
to an essential nature. Finally, I turn to the liberal political order that was supported 
by the UDHR, and highlight the fact that the settlement the drafter’s reached was 
quite consciously seen as a specific and limited response to emerging problems and 
not the final word on the shape of the international order. In conclusion, I argue that 
focusing on the contestation over these two aspects of the UDHR opens up an 
alternative narrative about this important historical moment and provides some 
measure of credibility for the reconstruction of human rights offered here. 
 
II. Contesting History’s Meaning and the Meaning of Human Rights  
 
How one understands the history of the UDHR depends in part on how one 
understands the historiography of human rights. The history of human rights is a fairly 
                                                 
17
 This statement of intent raises the question of the status of the claims made in this chapter – most 
simply, I do not intend to provide a more authoritative or accurate account of the history of the UDHR. 
What I do claim is that by approaching that history with a particular perspective, historical events take 
on a different significance than is generally acknowledged in the narratives surrounding the UDHR. 
This does not imply that I only find what I am looking for in the historical inquiry, but that the ideas we 
have about rights will influence what we see and what meaning we grant those historical facts. 
Importantly, this general approach to the history of human rights allows for surprise, as the historical 
facts, contestable and partial as they are, have the power to unsettle the concepts and categories with 
which we approach history – in this regard the work conducted here serves to challenge and refine the 
understanding of human rights developed thus far. 
  214 
new project and for this reason has been written by activists, journalists, social 
scientists and political philosophers as often as it has been written by historians.18 As 
a result the story of human rights is often written in broad stokes and results in a 
narrative with a grand backdrop of moral universalism or the progressive move from 
natural rights to universal human rights, which gives meaning to the more prosaic 
character of human rights as a distinct concept developed through a concrete set of 
events.19 More rigorous historical works, which examine how the idea and discourse 
of human rights emerged, as well as the distinctive move to a universal and 
international conception of these rights after the Second World War, have begun to 
challenge the grand narrative approach.20  
 
     Historiography is important for my analysis in this chapter because it goes to the 
heart of why the UDHR is such an important symbolic moment. Acknowledging the 
ambiguity of the historical background to the UDHR allows us to appreciate the plural 
influences at work in the development of human rights. Does the UDHR represent an 
important step in the ongoing development of the idea of human rights as moral 
universalism?21 This is a story of universal rights as the foundation of legitimate 
political authority, which is very much a story of western political development 
spreading to the rest of the world.22 Or is it a disruptive event, one that grows out of a 
movement advocating for international human rights in opposition to an international 
order dominated by the inviolability of state sovereignty?23 Here, the declaration is a 
chapter in the story of the revision of the European international order, where 
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sovereignty is tamed through international organisations and treaties that articulate a 
concept of universal human rights as fundamental to a new international order.24 
Finally, the UDHR is also taken as a milestone in the diverse developments in 
democratic politics. Tales of popular social movements, working to realise a variety 
of political goals through universal appeals, suggest that the UDHR emerges from, but 
is not reducible to, a plurality of disparate histories that can nonetheless be seen as an 
identifiable democratic tradition.25 These histories include rebellions that informed the 
English revolutions,26 the broad social changes enabling the French and American 
revolutions in the name of the “rights of man”,27 the Haitian revolution as a distinct 
but largely unacknowledged contribution to the development of universal rights,28 the 
labour movement,29 the women’s rights movement,30 and the independence 
movements that lead to decolonisation.31 These different ways of telling the human 
rights story each get at important elements of the ambiguous and contested concept of 
human rights, and which history seems most convincing is, in part, a consequence of 
how one understands what human rights are. The dominant account, leading to the 
view of the UDHR as a foundational moment of consensus, has been one of an 
expansive history of moral universalism that culminates in the utopian project of 
human rights in the 20th century.32 Rather than simply endorsing one view of human 
rights, I want to suggest that the diverse histories that it is possible to tell are a result 
of the ambiguity of the idea itself, while at the same time suggesting that attending to 
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a history of human rights as democratising claims on social power supports and 
enriches the theoretical reconstruction I have been pursuing.  
 
     Whatever historical framing is used, a distinctive concept of international human 
rights (as opposed to the idea of “rights of man” or inherent rights claimed in a 
nationalist context) only begins to feature in modern international law in the late 19th 
century, most notably in the Geneva Conventions addressing the lawful treatment of 
wounded and captured combatants, as well as non-combatants and civilians. An 
explicit reform agenda, aimed at undermining the traditional balance of power system 
emerges as a significant political force after the First World War, and while there was 
not a formal human rights treaty, the League of Nations and the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) did express concern for the rights of individuals and peoples as an 
important part of maintaining international peace.33 In the inter-war period and during 
the Second World War the idea of human rights, and specifically an international law 
of human rights, gained real momentum among intellectuals, activists and civil 
society organisations, particularly in the Anglophone sphere. Numerous associations, 
including labour unions, religious societies and political campaigners, embraced the 
idea of an international law of human rights and pushed reluctant states to uphold 
human rights. For example political groups such as the Commission to Study the 
Organization of Peace, American Association for the United Nations, as well as 
religious groups like the Federal Council of Churches and the American Jewish 
Committee actively worked at the San Francisco conference drafting the UN 
Charter,34 and labour organisations were active from early on, including the American 
Federation of Labor, which submitted a draft declaration to the committee that 
produced the UDHR.35 Individually, H. G. Wells, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Jacques Maritain, W.E.B. Du Bois and Kwame Nkrumah were influential public 
advocates of human rights of the time, despite ranging in their views from utopian 
socialism to Pan-Africanism.36 The idea of human rights gained a degree of 
acceptability among governments as well, not just among the major Allied powers 
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using them to justify their war with the Axis power.37 In particular Latin American 
countries were early supporters of human rights law, as well as former British settler 
colonies such as Australia and New Zealand,38 while the ongoing anti-colonial and 
nationalist struggles were supportive of efforts to affirm the right of self-
determination as a central human rights concern.39 
  
     Focusing on this immediate context, in which the UDHR emerges as the first 
official and global human rights document, explains the institutional form that the 
post-war human rights movement took and the lasting significance of the UDHR. As 
the UN became the primary international organisation for the creation of a reformed 
international politics, it likewise became the institution within which human rights 
laws would be drafted and agreed to – though many regional human rights treaties 
would emerge later, they very much took their cue from the UN. As important as it 
was, this relatively new movement to institutionalise international human rights 
through international organisations that could reform and tame the older system of 
sovereign states, it was not an independent or comprehensive development. The 
modern human rights regime, from the beginning, was contested and ambiguous 
reflecting the broad notion of equal universal rights, as well as rights to self-
determination that served as the basis of legitimacy for the representative nation-state, 
along with statist concerns to preserve order and protect sovereignty. Along with 
these traditional understandings of human rights, the discourse that emerged around 
universal emancipation supported and enabled a plurality of political movements that 
were potentially more disruptive, highlighting deep-seated and wide-spread 
patriarchy, racism and imperialism as limitations on what individual and collective 
rights that preserved so much the status quo could achieve. These broadening notions 
of universal right, both radical and reformist, were in conflict with the prevailing 
notion of sovereignty. The significance of the state sovereignty ideal was reflected in 
the limited power of human rights protections within the UN charter and the reticence 
of states to accept the authority of institutional mechanisms for human rights 
protection that operated above the state level.  
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     This incoherence of the emergent human rights regime is often taken to reflect the 
persistent force of statist structures and the influence of politics, but this is only 
because it is assumed that true human rights will be coherent, indivisible even, rather 
than ambiguous and at times working at cross purposes – it is this reading that leads 
Samuel Moyn to argue that human rights do not come into their own until the end of 
the 20th century.40 This is true so far as human rights are defined in terms of a 
universal utopian vision, as well as an institutional regime with relative coherence and 
mechanisms of implementation, but again pluralising the idea of human rights, and 
focusing on them as an ethico-political tool for responding to concrete social 
problems upsets this logic. 
 
     The dominant story of both the post-war human rights movement and the founding 
of the UN is one of responding to the tragedy of the Second World War. While I do 
not want to promote the idea that the post-war order was a great victory for the forces 
of justice and order – a political mythology that is challenged by the injustices 
sustained and created by this new order41 – I do want to suggest that the war was the 
vital political and social event that gave the human rights movement substantial force 
and made the UDHR a possibility. Certainly, there had been many destructive wars 
before and the First World War had similarly shaken the old Westphalian faith, but 
the breakdown of international political order in the Second World War was more 
extreme, and importantly only part of a massive social disruption. The failure was a 
social one, in the broadest use of the term, as the Western world found its technology 
turned against life itself with a staggering ferocity, its moral superiority proved an 
illusion and its institutions of political authority under siege at home and in the 
colonised world. The contributions of women and minority groups in the war effort 
created populations with broader experience and knowledge, and with newly enabled 
desire to see their sacrifice redeemed in domestic political changes. Politically the 
centres of power had shifted to the US and the USSR, the process of decolonisation 
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was underway (despite the insistence of men like Winston Churchill),42 the project of 
rallying the world in a fight of freedom against tyranny inspired those subject to 
different tyrannies to continue their fight – including African-Americans, Black South 
Africans, the working class throughout Europe, Latin American states and nations still 
struggling with the ongoing imperial ambitions of the US – and the old international 
order was consciously being remade for this world of new powers and new states. 
‘Everything, recalled Sutan Sjahrir of Indonesia in Out of Exile, “was shaken loose 
from its moorings. … All layers of society came to see the past in another light.”’43 
 
     The rights tradition was certainly not the only political and ethical tradition that 
could have responded to the question of political legitimacy created by the horrific 
disorder of the Second World War – and in fact the ambiguous relationship between 
socialism and post-colonial nationalism emerges because these ideologies were not 
compatible with the liberal rights tradition that defined dominant understandings of 
human rights in the post-war period. Universal rights were the currency of social and 
political reform in Western European countries – democratic revolutions were fought 
in the name of the civil and political rights of man; the working classes struggled for 
voting rights, labour rights and social welfare; minorities claimed rights of self-
determination and demanded equal rights under the law; women struggled for 
emancipation using the vernacular of rights.44 This is not to suggest that all struggles 
for social change were expressed in a language of universal right, but it is important to 
note not only the dominance of the rights tradition within internationally dominant 
states, but also that the idea of universal human rights spread and pluralised rapidly.  
Where white, Christian, middle-class, property owning men demanded political and 
civil rights in one social revolution, suddenly Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Women, 
minorities and the lower classes were making their own claims in the name of human 
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dignity or God given rights.45 A similar process began during and after the Second 
World War among disadvantaged groups in Western states, and among colonised 
peoples – especially when the rhetoric of human rights became a rallying cry for the 
Allied power in their mass mobilisation for the war effort.46 The implication of this is 
not a defence of a liberal human rights triumphalism. Human rights movements have 
the power they have in light of the disruptions of social order in which they can act as 
both cause and effect, but their success is in no way ordained or presumptively always 
for the better. The development of human rights has often been played out as a 
struggle of the oppressed or weak against the dominant and strong, which is often 
obscured, but rights are not the necessary language of such struggles and human rights 
are often used by dominant powers to reinforce their legitimacy. The dissident 
position is usually worked out from a perspective of exclusion or marginality and 
always fragile, as established powers are able to co-opt or rollback social change.47 
 
     The actual drafting of the UN Charter challenges any sense that a utopian vision of 
peace and justice was the dominant one for post-war international politics. What is 
surprising is that the call for universal rights was given as much space in the charter as 
it received. In San Francisco, however, the influence of smaller powers, prominent 
individuals, emerging NGOs and public opinion proved sufficient to give the idea of 
universal rights an ambiguous but prominent place in the new charter. Along with the 
efforts of NGOs, a conference of twenty-one American states held before the San 
Francisco convention expressly opposed the Dumbarton Oaks agreement.48 Three of 
the participants in the Inter-American Conference on War and Peace – Cuba, Chile 
and Panama – also provided early drafts for a human rights declaration they hoped to 
see taken up the UN.49 The rights movement, however, was marginalised in the 
structure of the new agency – relegated to the responsibility of Economic and Social 
Council it seemed highly unlikely that human rights would emerge as an institutional 
and political force sufficient to challenge the power of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council, who tended to defend the imperatives of state sovereignty. 
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     The drafting of the UDHR started shortly after the UN charter came into effect and 
took place over two years. The initial process was characterised by a great deal of 
disagreement over what sort of action the new UN Human Rights Committee, created 
within ECOSOC, should undertake. Recommendations were made for a declaration of 
common principles, for a legally binding international bill of rights and even for a 
complementary international human rights court.50 To address the question of what 
kind of document or institution to produce for the UN system, UNESCO conducted a 
survey of prominent thinkers from around the world for their thoughts regarding 
human rights.51 Along with the UNESCO project the Drafting Committee of the 
Commission on Human Rights was inundated with suggestions and drafts for an 
international bill of rights.52 Latin American governments submitted important drafts, 
with the draft from the government of Panama proving influential, and also the 
American Law Institute produced a draft declaration and a number of important 
studies related to the issue.53 
 
     The declaration itself is properly seen as primarily the work of two men. John 
Humphrey, an international lawyer from Canada, who served as secretary for the 
Commission. His draft drew on the hundreds of pages of material submitted to the 
Commission on Human Rights, a survey of existing national constitutions and 
included an extensive bibliography of sources.54 René Cassin, the French 
representative and an international law expert of reputation, then used this draft to 
produce the document that was used in further deliberations. The final document is 
structured so that key principles that apply to the whole document, namely its 
universal and equal application to all people regardless of their political status, appear 
first. The different rights are then articulated in groups, with political, civic, 
economic, social and cultural rights all appearing in turn. The final provisions then 
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underline the intentions of the document by stating a general right to a secure and 
peaceful international order.55  
 
     Initial deliberation took place in the Drafting Committee and its working groups, 
before being considered by the larger Commission on Human Rights and the 
Economic and Social Council. Each article was extensively debated and most 
significantly revised before the UDHR reached the General Assembly for a vote in 
1948. Further changes resulted from the deliberations in the General Assembly as 
well. While the document that emerged was altered in many ways it retained its basic 
structure and was widely accepted as a needed response by the UN to the political 
horrors of the recent war. Nazi aggression, the Holocaust, the imperial ambitions of 
colonial powers old and new, the war crimes tribunals in Nuremburg and Tokyo, the 
slow deconstruction of colonial structures all figured into the political imperative 
surrounding the declaration.56 Human rights advocates all too often sell the General 
Assembly vote as an example of unanimous consensus, and while it is the case that no 
state voted against the UDHR, there were a number of important abstentions. The 
emerging socialist bloc in Eastern Europe abstained – despite their role in 
negotiations, never wholly supportive but not completely hostile to the project – 
largely out of an opposition to the emphasis of civil and political rights in the UDHR 
that challenged the state’s authority. Other abstentions were included Saudi Arabia, 
for whom the right to religious freedom was unacceptable, and South Africa, who 
took issue with the challenge that the strong and clear statements against 
discrimination presented to the apartheid regime.  
 
     With this broad historical setting in place, I want to turn to the details of the 
debates that went into the drafting of the UDHR. In what follows I examine the 
importance of the idea of an essential human dignity to the UDHR, suggesting that it 
should not be understood as either a moment of consensus or an illegitimate 
imposition. I then turn to the political reforms suggested, rejected and embraced in the 
UDHR drafting in order to consider the implications of human rights as an idea that is 
transformative for world politics. Again, I want to avoid easy conceptual distinctions, 
in this case between cosmopolitan and national orders, and emphasize the situated 
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nature of the drafters’ response to the post-war era and the possibilities human rights 
open up for reconstructing political order today. 
 
III. Human Dignity: Impartial Imperative or Situationist Ideal 
 
ARTICLE 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity 
and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
 
The importance of the idea of human dignity is key to interpretations of the UDHR’s 
significance. Parekh sums up the issue, saying ‘Ultimately the assumption of the 
natural dignity of human being became part of the UDHR despite the attempts by the 
drafters to keep the language neutral on this topic.’57 Supporter and critic alike agree 
that “human dignity” in the UDHR points to essential or natural human characteristics 
that justify rights, where they part company is on whether a neutral and consensual 
definition was achieved or is possible at all. There are two problems with this 
understanding. First, the focus on a neutral account of dignity, or its absence, is 
required by a particular way of understanding rights – as has been argued in earlier 
chapters, a moralistic understanding of rights construes them as moral principles that 
determinately limit the boundaries of legitimate politics. If we reject this view and 
look at the articulation of human rights as contingent ethical ideals intended for 
specific contexts, then the contestation and ambiguity of human dignity is as 
important as the supposed consensus on an essential meaning. This highlights the 
second problem with conventional understandings of human dignity in the UDHR; 
they only focus on particular aspects of the drafting process: those bits favouring 
either a narrative of achieved or imposed consensus, as one’s inclination demands. In 
this section, I focus on why the drafters thought human dignity was so important to 
the UDHR and the future of human rights, as well as the contestation of that meaning 
– this leads me to argue that rather than achieving a consensus on the essential 
features of human nature, the UDHR is a key early moment in an ongoing discussion 
of human dignity in the context of world politics. 
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     Anyone reading a history of the UDHR or the transcripts of the drafting process 
will be struck by how much time was spent suggesting, debating and revising 
individual articles. Yet, an important philosophical conversation surrounded this more 
practical work and constantly re-emerged as a point of discussion. As P.C. Chang, the 
primary Chinese representative, stated in a meeting of the Commission on Human 
Rights intended to define their task, ‘I am afraid when we are asserting rights, rights, 
and rights, we are apt to forget the standard of man. It is not merely a matter of getting 
things, getting things, but also: what is the objective of being a man?'58 Contrary to 
the idea that dignity was a necessarily vague concept, the discussion of human dignity 
was seen by even the less philosophical drafters, such as Coronel Hodgson 
represented Australia, to be a vital part of the declaration, as it served as the 
justification in the preamble it needed to amount to more ‘than a series of pious 
objectives.’59 Despite trying the patience of some, in particular Hansa Mehta who 
represented India, there was a clear sense that these philosophical issues mattered. 
Charles Malik, of Lebanon, responded to Mehta’s impatience by underlining that 
ideology informed all thought and insisting that the Committee on Human Rights deal 
with such matters in the open.  
 
Then, the honourable representative from India said that the 
Charter already contains a mention of human dignity and worth 
and that we should not enter into any ideological maze in our 
discussion here. Well, unfortunately, whatever you say, Madam, 
one must have ideological presuppositions and, no matter how 
much you fight shy of them, they are there and you either hide 
them or you are brave enough to bring them out into the open and 
see them and criticize them. Furthermore, it is precisely my 
intention to give meaning to that vague phrase, human dignity and 
worth, which is used in the Charter to give it content and, 
therefore, to save it from hollowness and emptiness.60 
 
The discussion of dignity was important in revealing the different views of why 
human dignity justified the human rights being declared, but it did more than that. By 
focusing the drafters on the task of, as Chang put it, ‘making the standard of man 
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respected,’61 the focus on human dignity clarified the problem they were addressing. 
The declaration of these new human rights was intended to affirm universal moral 
principles for international politics based not on the authority of states but the value of 
the people of the world. Early on Chang grasped the novelty of what they were doing, 
saying, ‘we are dealing with something which has not been dealt with before, namely 
the international aspect of equality.’62 The awareness of their work as a response to a 
particular situation was widely shared, especially when discussing the foundational 
notions of human dignity. 
 
     While it possible to overstate the importance of Nazi atrocities to the UDHR 
drafting,63 the wider context of the Second World War was the immediate backdrop. 
In particular, there was a sense that the defence of human dignity provided by a new 
human rights institution was called for by the mistreatment of, and extreme demands 
placed on, individuals.64 Assistant Secretary General, Henri Laugier, opened the 1st 
meeting of the Commission on Human Rights with a clear evocation of this purpose: 
 
With your boundless devotion to the cause of human rights and to 
the cause of the United Nations, let us here gather strength for our 
fight from the recent memory of the long darkness through which 
we have come, where tens of millions of human beings died so that 
human rights might stay alive, from the memory of all those men 
and women who have found in their dignity alone the strength to 
sacrifice their lives in order, obstinately, to proclaim, amidst the 
depths of surrounding darkness, the presence and the permanence 
of the stars.65  
 
The work of defending human dignity was seen as a deeply moral task demanded by 
concrete political tragedy. In particular, there was a sense that a common humanity 
had to be affirmed and that individuals protected from the power of the state. Cassin 
expressed both of these commitments often: 
 
We have seen and lived through a period when human society has 
been practically destroyed by the application of a concept of race, 
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or concept of the nation, or concept of the volk, I will call it; and it 
is a most important fact that we should have lived to see this 
possibility of men crushing and denying the rights of man, both as 
communities and as individuals. I think we must insist upon this 
fact: that we must finally reach the fusion of the idea of man as a 
community and man as an individual.66  
 
The State, in other words the collectivity, has asked the maximum 
from millions of people, the greatest thing they could offer - their 
lives.67 
 
This focus on the dangers of the totalitarian state, while clearly resonant with the 
liberal tradition, was drawn from the specific context the drafters were responding to, 
in which states had turned against their citizens in a shocking way.68 Further, the 
sacrifice demanded of citizens by states during the war also played a key role in 
understanding both rights to membership and welfare provisions as central to human 
dignity.69 This is important because the conception of human dignity under discussion 
was not an attempt to derive abstract philosophical principles, but practical moral 
reasoning at work, in which the drafters sought to articulate a moral ideal to guide 
future action. Human dignity was debated against a backdrop of real offenses – all 
encompassing interstate war, mass slaughter, enormous civilian casualties, nationalist 
and racist ideology, statelessness, economic depression – and the debate reflected that 
situation even as it revealed an persistent pluralism of views.  
 
     Malik, Chang and Cassin were the primary representative that developed the ideas 
that framed the drafting process.70 This, however, did not mean they were of one mind 
on the meaning of human dignity. In an early Human Rights Committee meeting, 
Malik71 focused on the idea of conscience as the ability to change one’s mind: 
                                                 
66
 Verbatim Record, 31 January 1947, Commission on Human Rights. 
67
 Verbatim Record, 23 June 1947, Drafting Committee. 
68
 This is a fundamental tension that emerges in later human rights development once the concerns of 
post-colonial states to ensure self-determination gained prominence in both UN conventions on human 
rights. 
69
 This connection is made most strongly by René Cassin (France) and Hernán Santa Cruz (Chile). 
Verbatim Record, 23 June 1947, Drafting Committee. 
70
 Glendon, “Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 1157-1159. Not only were they 
the most philosophically inclined members of the drafting committee, the three men also were part of 
the working group that did the detailed work of preparing the actual draft. For a detailed account of the 
drafting process see Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 4-35. 
71
 Charles Malik was the youngest member of the Commission on Human Rights and was a novice in 
diplomatic matters, having only recently been drafted as the representative for Lebanon – leaving his 
previous position as a philosophy professor. While Malik was a Christian, he also strongly identified as 
  227 
If we have any contribution to make, it is in the field of 
fundamental freedom, namely, freedom of thought, freedom of 
conscience and freedom of being. And there is one point on which 
we wish to insist more than anything else, namely that it is not 
enough to be, it is not enough to be free to be what you are. You 
must also be free to become what your conscience requires you to 
become in light of your best knowledge. It is therefore freedom of 
becoming, of change that we stress as much as freedom of being. 72 
 
This lead him to focus on the protection of persons from the pressure and power of the 
modern state, to accord a special place to the organs of civil society in which we make 
our common life, and the preservation of a space for free thought, opposition and even 
rebellion against established authority.73 Further, he was among the strongest 
advocates of human rights because he thought they ensured that the people 
determined the state, which not only reflected his concern to protect individuals from 
the state, but also to protect small states from imperial powers. ‘We intend to say that 
the people are active and take the initiative in the determination of the State. It is not 
as though you come to the people, offer them something, and they consent to it. It is 
our intention that originally the people, themselves, take the initiative in determining 
what the state should be.’74 So, while it is accurate to point to Malik’s emphasis on 
‘natural rights,’75 we see that his understanding of their justification was hardly 
orthodox and attempted to preserve what he saw as valuable in human being and 
becoming.76 There is a tension in Malik’s view, or perhaps blindness, in asserting that 
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the most important freedom to protect is a person’s freedom to change and become, 
while also asserting that we can build a social order upon man’s essential nature that 
does not limit that very freedom. Yet, despite this rhetoric of human nature, Malik 
continuously put the protection of the freedom of the person into the context of his 
times.  
 
Who is this person? This person, Mr President, is the living, dying 
man who suffers and rebels, is scared, is often undecided, makes 
mistakes, the man who thinks, hesitates, decides, and gossips, and 
who needs to be lifted when he falls. It is the being even who 
blushes, laughs, and changes his mind when he knows better. This 
being, Mr President, in his own personal dignity and self-respect is 
in danger of being drowned and obscured by political and 
ideological systems of all sorts.77 
 
Whatever the consistency of his metaphysical beliefs about human nature, Malik’s 
defence of human rights was based on an opposition to forms of social order, both 
domestic and international, that failed to respect persons as feeling, thinking and 
creative beings increasingly subject to the power of the nation-state, at the cost of 
intermediate ties, and devalued by contemporary conditions and ideologies – whether 
individualist or collectivist. This view was firmly rooted in his experience of that 
time. 
 
     Along with Malik, P.C. Chang78 was the most philosophically inclined participant. 
In addition to clearly articulating the task the drafters had before them in terms of 
human dignity, Chang also made important contributions to the idea as it developed in 
the UDHR. His primary thought was that conscience, as an essential aspect of dignity, 
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involved what he called ‘two-man mindedness.’79 The idea of two-man mindedness 
implies sympathy as fellow feeling, but also something deeper and more demanding, 
what Chang described as ‘extending our consciousness to others.’80 This involved 
both recognition of mutual duties between all human beings and a respect for the 
values of others. ‘The definition of man is to be human-minded – namely, that 
whatever he does, he thinks of the other person as if the other person were in his 
place.’81 This entailed not only the acknowledgment of a common humanity, but an 
insistence that this enabled forms of understanding that could cross cultural barriers 
and should inspire consideration for others. Chang, for example, was instrumental in 
insisting that reference to a monotheistic deity be kept out of the document, as this 
would undermine the potential universality of the document.82  
 
     The idea of two-man mindedness develops dignity in a different way than Malik’s 
notion of conscience, as Chang points to an orientation that individuals should, and 
can, take toward their relationships with others. This involves, as he said, ‘the feeling 
of the sense of human dignity in the individual, that is, as an individual feels when he 
thinks of equality. He feels that he is as good as anybody else.’83 Yet, along with that 
the individual recognises the perspective of others and adjusts his behaviour in light 
of social duties and obligations. Therefore, along with asserting the freedoms and 
rights of the individual, the consideration of human rights requires determining the 
social ties and obligations that exist internationally. The practical consequences of this 
in the UDHR included recognition that individuals have obligations to the community 
and that states retain a degree of privilege as the political embodiment of distinct ways 
of life, which was reflected in several articles and shared by a number of those 
involved in the drafting process. Both C.H. Wu, the alternate Chinese representative, 
and Ronald Lebeau, from Belgium, supported Chang’s focus on both individual 
freedoms and duties.84 ‘In the eighteenth century the human being was the individual 
whereas in our opinion, the human being nowadays is the person who participates in 
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the normal life and existence of society.’85 Also, Romulo, from the Philippines, shared 
a concern to ‘take into account all the different cultural patterns there are in the world, 
especially in respect to popular customs and legal systems.’86 
 
     The French representative René Cassin87 was the third major intellectual figure 
among the drafting committee. While he often expressed his agreement with both 
Malik and Chang, his own words reveal that whatever intellectual alignment he may 
have had with these men was coloured by his own particular views. More than 
perhaps any other participant Cassin had a sense that the UDHR must respond to the 
horrors of the Second World War and ought to ensure dignity by affirming the 
oneness of humanity and guarantee the legal personality of every individual:  
 
But the fundamental that there is a unity in human society, society 
composed of human beings which can be compared to one another, 
which has the same natural aptitudes whatever this would be, this 
is the most important thing which must be placed in our 
resolution.88  
 
This is a point which we have not yet examined and I think it is 
appropriate. Since we are studying the fundamental rights of man, 
to state that not only must everybody be free physically, but to 
state also that every human being normally possess rights and 
obligations, and, therefore, has "legal personality."89  
 
While he affirmed Chang’s notion of two-man mindedness by asserting that ‘that idea 
of reciprocal duties is at the foundation of the concept of fraternity,’ one wonders if it 
contained the same sense of struggling to extend one’s consciousness to understand 
the perspective of another. Cassin’s further remarks suggest he was less aware or 
concerned with how a universal account of human dignity might impinge upon others. 
The violent particularlisms that characterised the Second World War were at the 
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forefront of his mind and while he argued that ‘it is quite obvious that we cannot, in 
our International Organization, affirm or assert concepts or ideas which would be 
special to any one nation or to any one category of man,’90 he expressed little doubt 
that each individual must hold their human rights as a recognised legal person before 
a representative international political authority.  
 
     It is perhaps Cassin’s familiar grounding in a liberal universalism that has lead 
many to see the entire UDHR as a wholly “Western” project. This does a disservice to 
Cassin’s thought, as he was remarkably cosmopolitan in his view, asserting that 
human rights break open the state, exposing it to scrutiny and interference. Further, he 
modulated the very French idea of “Fraternity” into a global register, looking beyond 
any republic to a human community that must be protected through the establishment 
of legal rights. Other liberal members also backed up this individualistic view. 
Charles Dukes, the British representative, stated that ‘the British conception of human 
rights rests fundamentally on a belief in the dignity and importance of the individual 
man. It is a conception which the United Kingdom will always defend.’91 Dr Jose A. 
Mora, from Uruguay, echoed this sentiment, arguing that the individual should be 
placed at the centre of international law in order to undermine the absolute authority 
of national sovereignty.92 Likewise, Eleanor Roosevelt spoke in individualistic terms, 
though it is worth noting that she, like the other “liberal” representatives, were 
concerned with economic and social rights as well as civil and political ones, taking it 
to be central to the dignity of individual that a person had health, welfare, food and 
income.93 
 
     It becomes clear in examining the debates over the drafting of the UDHR that there 
was no simple consensus on what dignity meant and that the contesting ideas 
informed the resulting list of rights – as well as further plans for institutionalisation – 
in different ways. Yet, this contestation did not result in the victory of a single 
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ideological view or the creation of a practical but empty consensus. Instead, we see a 
vigorous debate in which key lines of thought emerge that will play crucial roles in 
the development of human rights. There was an agreement that the Second World 
War, taken as a diverse whole, revealed a grave threat to human beings in the forms of 
deprivation, war, murder, expulsion and abuse – and, importantly, the state was 
inadequate to the task of preventing these abuses, and was in many cases a direct 
perpetrator of them. This lead to a common commitment to a shared humanity, yet 
even this common picture of human dignity was painted in many hues. Further, there 
was a shared sense that new political institutions were needed to protect people from 
the power of the state, again for different reasons and leading to different suggested 
reforms, examined in more detail in the next section.  
 
     Attending to the ambiguity of these early debates gives us more than a richer 
history of the ideas that motivated the early stages of the human rights project, they 
also provide an impetus for reconsidering how ethical and political theory relates to 
such events. It is all too common to read the lack of consensus as a failing, or part of a 
process that, ideally, will lead to consensus – we see this tendency because of how we 
understand the relationship between moral principles and political action. The effort 
to capture a sense of the debates over human dignity highlights a situated approach to 
ethical theory and allows us to understand the contestation we see in ethical terms. 
However, it is important to keep the political aspects in mind, as a closer engagement 
with the debate over the UDHR provides us with a productive example of how human 
rights are understood and deployed in world politics, and how it can lead to 
entrenched ideas and powers being articulated in universal terms without critical 
reflection. Therefore, keeping an eye on the always-political content of ethical 
reasoning encourages a critical response. 
 
     A number of contemporary questions emerge from revisiting the debate over 
human dignity. What does human dignity mean now? Can the plural and contestable 
accounts of humanity lead to single and coherent set of institutions? These are key 
questions. For now, I only want look to the way these questions alter the debates over 
human rights: moving away from the assertion or rejection of an essential humanity to 
a contested understanding of the moral significance of shared humanity, which is 
expressed in various forms. And institutionally, how should we judge the 
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contemporary international human rights regime? Or even further, should we be 
looking to other spaces of human rights activity? These lines of thought and openings 
for inquiry are given further examination in the final chapter. 
 
IV. Human Rights’ Dreams Deferred: The Limits of Reconstruction in World Order 
 
ARTICLE 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration 
can be fully realized. 
 
The second aspect of the drafting I want to discuss is the self-conscious reconstruction 
of the structure of international politics that the participants took on. This was an 
unavoidable feature of their work as articulating an international set of human rights 
implied that new demands would be placed on all states. Therefore, the foundational 
distinction within legal and political thought between domestic and international 
spheres was thrown into question. Even though these elements of the debate were 
necessary to the idea of human rights, they did not lead to any one necessary set of 
reforms. Recognising the contingency in the shape that the reconstruction of 
international politics took is an important insight that speaks against seeing the legacy 
of the UDHR as either a progressive dream of a legalised global order too long 
deferred or evidence of the inevitable persistence of a state-centric order. 
 
     Conventionally, the story told about the place of human rights in the immediate 
post-war era is one of political weakness. Not only was the inclusion of human rights 
in the charter of secondary concern to the major powers, but also the emerging Cold 
War rivalry marginalised the importance of human rights within the larger UN 
organisation,94 until the promise of human rights was finally realised after the end of 
the Cold War. These historical accounts are accurate so far as they go, but they are 
importantly retrospective and I am primarily interested in how the drafters understood 
their role in reconstructing international politics, separated from their eventual 
effectiveness. Also, this conventional account assesses the place and importance of 
human rights from the perspective of a particular set of state representatives, both 
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within nation-states and acting as representatives within international organisations.95 
Returning to the original debates over the UDHR give us an insight into the contest 
over the role that the UN would have, and the specific challenge that was issued to 
state authority. Importantly, it places the progressive view of human rights under 
suspicion by emphasising the situated context of reconstruction and the contingency 
of particular successes and failures. The appeal to the UDHR as a founding document 
to a still emerging international human rights regime is one-dimensional and ignores 
plural lines of possible development. Revisiting these debates, however, also 
undermines an account that sees human rights as marginal to international politics or 
only the tool of powerful states – the conceptual power of human rights is in a sense 
beyond such easy control, even as the lines of development are ambiguous and plural. 
 
     Perhaps the most surprising thing about the debates over human rights, especially 
given conventional accounts of human rights as marginal or subservient to more 
statist concerns, is that everyone involved acknowledged that declaring and 
institutionalising human rights was a necessary part of the post war reconstruction. 
Also, there was a clear recognition that such a reconstruction would undermine state 
sovereignty and that the international community had a newly articulated duty of 
concern for individuals. These facts were seemingly taken as given starting points. 
Yet, there was a great deal of opposition over what the practical implications of these 
changes were, and how far the traditional international order was, and should be, 
undermined by a declaration of human rights. Important points of contention were on 
the necessity of an international court of human rights, the legal implications of a 
binding convention, the direct reporting of human rights abuses to the UN and 
whether UN human rights institutions would be staffed by state representatives or 
individuals unrestrained by their role in state governments. 
 
     Hodgson and Mehta were strong advocates for a human rights court. They saw that 
such a court was essential to establishing an effective international bill of rights 
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backed by political institutions that superseded the state.96 Cassin, likewise, was a 
strong advocate of legal institutions that would institutionalise the legal personality of 
the individual. During the first meeting of the Drafting convention it was decided that 
the work of the Commission on Human Rights should focus on three tasks: drafting a 
declaration of principles, drafting a binding convention, and finally drawing up 
provisions for the implementation of human rights – this final task was the least 
successful.97 
 
     The opposition to such a court or strong independent institutions for enforcement 
was varied. It is easy enough to read the opposition of the UK, USA and USSR as 
political opposition intended to preserve their power. Yet, in each case there was a 
principled case against such a court. The USSR was most opposed. They not only 
opposed the creation of international legal institutions that would place the individual 
above the state in international law, but cogently pointed to the danger that such a 
move could potentially institutionalise a standard of civilisation that recreated the 
logic of imperial and colonial authority.98 They were hardly alone in their concern that 
a strong international regime would be dominated by Western powers, potentially 
threatening international stability and undermining the right to self-determination. 
Chang and Romulo were both hesitant to embrace a comprehensive international legal 
regime, and Malik was keen to emphasize the protection granted to small states by 
emphasising the right to self-determination for peoples in the Declaration.99 The UK 
and US were less motivated by a fear of colonial imposition and rather more 
concerned with weakening the authority of the state, though they clearly supported the 
idea that human rights provided standard for the legitimacy of sovereign authority.  
 
     Early during the first meeting of the drafting committee a distinction was made 
between a declaration and a convention, which generated two further controversies. 
The original split was done to overcome controversy regarding the legitimacy and 
process of the committee in writing a binding legal document, with the USSR being 
sceptical and questioning the standing of the Drafting Committee to do more than 
                                                 
96
 Verbatim Record, 1 February 1947, Commission on Human Rights. 
97
 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of The Drafting Committee to the Commission on Human 
Rights (Geneva: ECOSOC, 1947). E/C.4/21. 
98
 Vladimir M. Koretsky, Verbatim Record, 12 June 1947, Drafting Committee. 
99
 Verbatim Record, 12 and 13 June, Drafting Committee. 
  236 
recommend articles for discussion and the degree to which the representatives were 
obliged to express the official position of their government.100 Other major powers 
were also cautious in establishing a binding legal document that infringed on state 
sovereignty. The US position, for example, was complicated by Roosevelt’s personal 
support for a strong human rights institutions and official US hesitance to produce or 
agree to a document that defined state obligations beyond those in the UN charter.101 
Even smaller states were concerned with the potential effects of a human rights treaty 
that would alter existing international law; in discussing the work to be taken on by 
the Drafting Committee, Dr Ghasseme Ghani, the Iranian representative to the 
Commission on Human Rights, worried that a strong human rights document could 
undermine the stability of the established system.102 These concerns led to the 
decision to prepare both a declaration of principles and a convention, implying 
different procedures reflecting the different status the documents would have. From 
this a second disagreement emerged.  
 
     Those countries favouring a strong legal document responded to this divide 
between declaration and convention by giving priority to the drafting of a convention. 
Hodgson and Mehta were strong supporters of a convention, as was the UK, 
represented by both Dukes and Geoffrey Wilson, who were keen to specify any 
declared rights precisely in order to establish any changes to the legal rights and 
duties of states.103 In the end, however, the primary focus was given to a non-binding 
declaration. The reasons for this were complicated. Partly it was a matter of political 
expedience, writing a non-binding document proved less difficult, and partly a result 
of the difficulty of drafting even a declaration that could garner wide support, as the 
later stages of the drafting process proved contentious. Importantly, it was only 
because the declaration did not require the Commission on Human Rights to resolve 
the issue of the legal standing of a convention that made it possible for a widely 
accepted international document to emerge. The surprising value of the UDHR as a 
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statement of principle capable of inspiring further political action was most clearly 
perceived by Eleanor Roosevelt.104 For many, this early failure to have an enforceable 
legal document was a major weakness of the early human rights efforts of the UN, yet 
it also helped to initiated a broader human rights politics in which the ideas and 
language of rights was taken up in new contexts.  
 
     Other major controversies were over the shape the new UN human rights 
institutions would take. In particular, there was disagreement over whether the 
Commission on Human Rights should set up mechanisms for individuals to directly 
report human rights abuses, and over the official standing of representatives in various 
human rights bodies, whether they would be state representatives or individuals free 
to express their own opinions and pursue their own ends. Yet, what on one level is a 
bureaucratic debate is also fundamental to the emerging human rights institutions and 
their degree of independence from state authority.  
 
     Roosevelt was a strong supporter of individual reporting mechanisms, motivated 
by the copious correspondence she received both as a private individual and as 
member of the Commission on Human Rights. Speaking of communications she had 
received, she said, ‘I am conscious of the fact that human rights mean something to 
the people of the world, which is hope for a better opportunity for people in general to 
enjoy justice and freedom and opportunity.’105 For her, and other supportive 
representatives such as Cassin and Malik, the UN could do vital work by providing a 
forum for individuals to appeal to when they were abused or neglected by their 
government. Debates within the Commission, however, were rendered peripheral by 
judgments higher up within the UN structure that communication of alleged rights 
abuses would be made anonymous before the Commission received them and that the 
Commission could only consult these communications to inform their work, not press 
for public redress within the UN.106 This stunted effort at reform was partly inspired 
by the experience of the Second World War, where the states had turned against their 
citizens in horrific ways, but also by a developing sense that responsibility to fellow 
human beings suffering in far flung locations required global institutions. This 
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emergent cosmopolitan structure, however, did not survive the early debates and the 
new human rights institution deferred to state authority, a compromise fully 
institutionalised in later conventions in which monitoring was done through country 
reports prepared by state authorities then passed on to the UN.  
 
     The debate over representation risks seeming even more arcane, but it was a key 
issue. In the early sessions of both the Commission and the Drafting Committee there 
were many questions regarding the status of representatives, did they represent 
themselves or their government. Further, the question of who could be involved in the 
drafting of human rights documents was raised, particularly, whether outside experts 
or UN officials not representing governments could draft binding documents, it was 
decided that they could be consulted but authority rested solely with state 
representatives. The USSR was particularly emphatic, though the US shared this view 
(which complicated Roosevelt’s position). Further debates were over who would 
participate in the human rights institutions that were being set up. Malik and Cassin, 
in particular, were supportive of having individuals capable of expressing their own 
views in these institutions, as well as the inclusion of experts and relevant 
organisations.107 Again, these matters of procedure would have major effects on the 
kind of institution the UN became and how much power the suggested human rights 
standards had independently of nation-states. The interests of state sovereignty won 
this struggle as well and further entrenched a UN approach to human rights that was 
dominated by the rights of states, but the contest was hardly decisively ended – the 
UN in later years has adopted reforms to increase the inclusion of non-state 
representative and to improve their responsiveness to human rights abuses reported to 
the its various human rights bodies.108 
 
     While the success of more fundamental reconstructions of international political 
order was limited, small and important changes were made. Further, the contests seen 
in these early debates have continued to be important for the development of human 
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rights. Two key changes are worth focusing on. Whatever the failings of the early 
human rights institutions and documents to overcome the priority given to state 
sovereignty, there was a revolutionary change that gave international legal status to 
individuals. Cassin was the most clearly aware of the significance of this change, and 
the most vociferous advocate of institutionalising it as thoroughly as possible. Also, 
the legal person that emerged was defined as importantly equal; the focus on non-
discrimination in the UDHR is hard to underestimate at the time. Not only was it a 
response to the racist ideologies of the defeated Axis powers but it challenged a 
variety of practices that embarrassed the victorious powers as well. The UDHR’s 
insistence on non-discrimination gave support to the decolonisation movement, 
bolstered the women’s rights movements, challenged racist policies in South Africa 
and the Unites States, and empowered those opposed to nationalistic politics. While 
the legacy of this institutionalised legal individual is not purely positive, these 
changes were historic and altered international politics in profound ways. 
 
     Also, the UDHR enshrined the equal sovereignty of states, while also making the 
respect of that sovereignty dependent upon respect for human rights. At the time these 
were seen as important victories for colonies fighting for self-determination and small 
states, long made insecure by the actions of powerful states. Further, the focus on 
legitimate sovereign authority spoke against the unmitigated power of state officials 
and was optimistically seen as a challenge to despotism, totalitarianism and 
systematic forms of oppression and deprivation. The idea of conditional sovereignty 
has experienced a renaissance with the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
discourse, but those drafting the UDHR recognised it as a central part of the UN 
system from the beginning. It is important, however, to appreciate the sorts of politics 
it was thought would invalidate a state’s sovereignty at that time. Those involved 
were far more concerned with the systematic forms of abuse enabled by the notion of 
absolute state sovereignty and the deprivation and insecurity brought about by modern 
economics and war, these concerns were especially shared by Malik, Santa Cruz and 
Cassin during the drafting process.109 This resulted in a focus on political reform in 
favour of democratic representation, the elimination of oppressive forms of 
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international control (colonial and imperial), the importance of the provision of social 
and welfare rights, and establishing the guarantee of citizenship. 
 
     In the end, my concern is less with the role of the UDHR in establishing the UN 
human rights regime that actually emerged and more with the sort of questions about 
international order that it enabled. Two features of this debate are particularly 
important. First, this sort of self-conscious reconstruction of international politics is a 
necessary consequence of human rights as an idea. Cassin was right that giving the 
individual central importance in international politics, by claiming rights in the name 
of a common humanity, fundamentally transforms those politics110 – but the final 
shape that reconstruction takes is not certain. This is the second feature of the debate I 
want to emphasise: neither the victory of state interest in the early period nor the 
revitalisation of UN human rights institutions after the Cold War are necessary 
developments. This is a particularly important point for human rights supporters that 
see the UDHR as a foundational document upon which a grand edifice has 
progressively been built up – our current human rights politics is not the unfolding of 
some process begun in 1948. Its development is clearly influenced by the ideas and 
institutions that did emerge but the opening for reconstruction created by human 
rights does not close. Just as the debate around dignity is ongoing and developing in 
diverse ways, so to is the human rights politics that was begun in earnest with the 
drafting of the UDHR. This insight is developed further in the next chapter, where I 
argue that looking to social movements as an alternative human rights politics, rather 
than that of international law and international institutions. Examinations of the 
UDHR and the UN human rights institutions that emerged later usually lead to either 
an affirmation or rejection. What I want to suggest is that critical responses can reject 
human rights outright as irredeemably compromised, or they can focus on the radical 
and ongoing critical potential of human rights claims on the structures of world 
politics  
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     Looking to the historical origins of human rights – both as broad tradition of 
political thought and as a specific international development in the post-war era – 
suggests that the understanding of rights as ethical claims that justify the 
reconstruction of social relationships is in some measure plausible and also it allows 
us to rethink conventional understandings of human rights. The key lines of inquiry 
developed here, looking to the plurality of values that are supported by an appeal to 
human dignity and the different lines of political development it enables, suggest that 
human rights are an ambiguous project.  
 
     For those that are critical of the Western origins of human rights – the negative 
effects of which are exemplified in coercive practices of intervention justified as 
securing human rights, hierarchical relationships in international politics justified in 
terms of development and good governance rather than civilisational superiority, and 
the privileging of a individualistic liberal subjectivity over all others – rereading the 
history of the UDHR should give pause to any inclination to do away with human 
rights. Acknowledging that human rights open up a discourse over the significance of 
humanity as a political identity and confront us with the challenge of creating a 
legitimate international order also acts as an invitation to join in that contest and not 
to cede the emancipatory potential of human rights to dominant powers. If we return 
to Upendra Baxi’s warning that ‘No contemplation of open and diverse human rights 
futures may remain innocent of their many histories,’ then finding that human rights 
are an always-contestable project undermines the myth ‘that suggest that human rights 
traditions are “gifts of the west to the rest.”’111 
 
     Human rights true believers, on the other hand, should be cautious of their own 
capacity for myth making, especially if human rights politics are to retain their 
capacity to challenge existing power. The promise of a remade international politics 
that places the protection of individuals at the centre of legitimate authority is hardly a 
dream realised and the Janus-faced embrace of human rights by dominant states risks 
the dangers of institutionalisation, highlighted by Stammers, in which the 
transformative demands of rights are reduced and made acceptable to existing power. 
Along with a wariness of established powers keen to make strategic use of human 
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rights, we must also be alive to the danger of a lack of self-reflexivity in supporting 
human rights. Returning to the controversies surrounding the UDHR, and 
understanding those contests as the start of a new human rights politics rather than a 
founding moment, suggests that we need to attend to the fact that each articulation of 
human rights standards or change in political structures excludes and limits at the 
same time, such that a liberal human rights vision, for example, may run counter to 
the vision of human rights inspired by socialist aspirations or the struggles of 
indigenous peoples. Whether we see the pre-eminence of human rights as a negative 
or positive development in international politics, reading the drafting and adoption of 
the UDHR as something less than the very beginnings  
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Chapter 7  
The practice of human rights: reconstructing the political spaces of 
rights 
 
‘I got another plan, one that requires me to stand 
On the stage or in the street, don’t need no microphone or beat 
And when you hear this song, if you ain’t dead then sing along 
Bang and strum to these here drums until you get where you belong 
I’ve got a list of demands written on the palm of my hands 
I ball my fist and you’re going to know where I stand’ 
-Saul Williams, List of Demands (Reparations) 
 
I. The Argument Thus Far 
 
In the previous chapter I examined the history of the drafting of the UDHR in order to 
highlight the contestation and plurality at the core of that most conventional of human 
rights documents. Part of the importance of this is recovering aspects of the problem 
the drafters confronted and the terms of their response, which have been obscured and 
reframed by later developments. Neil Stammers argues that the history of human 
rights is vital to understanding what human rights are and what they do, as there is a 
general tendency to read the present onto the past and to accept the history that fits 
our most powerful contemporary narratives.1 We see this in the interpretations of the 
UDHR that frame it as a founding moment of consensus or as one of political 
imposition. My examination of the UDHR hopefully serves the task of attending to 
the details of the history of human rights in some small way. 
 
     There is a larger significance, however, which relates to another goal of the 
previous chapter, which was to demonstrate an alternative way of understanding 
human rights as a political ethics that eschews certainty of principle and is responsive 
to social changes, while at the same time orienting our concern beyond existing 
political subjectivities and geographies. Underlying this reconstruction of human 
rights is an alternative approach to political ethics, which begins from the persistence 
and reality of pluralism, as well as the ongoing contestation that this entails. In this 
final chapter, I want to broaden that analysis of human rights in order to better 
appreciate the implications and potential appeal of the political ethics I have 
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developed throughout the larger work. To begin this reflection I respond to two 
questions. First, how does attending to contestation and plurality reconfigure our 
understanding of contemporary human rights as an institutionalised practice and an 
established ethical ideal? And, second, how do we evaluate contemporary political 
ethics of human rights? This requires a consideration of both the best way to 
understand the social phenomenon of human rights and also what human rights 
contribute to a global political ethics. To begin I focus on the space that human rights 
occupy between morality and politics, which points to the need to map that space 
before attending to an evaluation of human rights. I briefly explore how the most 
convincing defences of human rights answer these questions, in order to provide a 
contrast to my position, before moving onto my own account and qualified 
affirmation of human rights as a political ethics. 
 
     Dominant accounts of human rights, examined in detail in Chapter 1 & 2, suggest 
that human rights act as a fundamental moral law, establishing what must and must 
not be done in political life. These rights provide the basis for a liberal order, whether 
minimalist or maximalist in nature. The sources of this moral law are diverse and the 
search for justification fractured. Rational consensus, actual political consensus, an 
appeal to basic human needs or the conditions for human flourishing have all been 
suggested as justifications, reflecting the diversity within conventional accounts of 
human rights – drawing from utilitarianism, social contract theory, deontology and 
virtue ethics. Within that diversity, however, the logic of interaction between morality 
and politics is maintained. Further, as the presumed autonomy of morality is used to 
constrain political activity within the limits of “legitimacy”, there is little questioning 
of the basic terms of political life. The separation of the moral and political grants a 
corresponding autonomy to politics, particularly to the institutions that structure social 
life: states are accepted as the best (or necessary) form of social organisation, 
constitutional democracy defines the limits of legitimate political arrangements, a 
liberal economy (more or less socialised) of global exchanges is accepted (or 
endorsed), and cultural life is defined in individualist terms (whether focused on 
cosmopolitan or nationalist sentiments). The political ethics exemplified by 
conventional accounts of human rights does not uphold the whole social order, but it 
does provide an important control upon political life, whether by defending the 
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objective superiority of liberal politics (both domestic and internationally),2 by 
supporting an expansion of the protection of rights through cosmopolitan liberalism,3 
or, at a minimum, ensuring that the liberal state and international order is not morally 
objectionable – even if other reasonable alternatives may exist.4   
 
     Even critical theorists that reject the conventional moral justifications of rights 
(giving no quarter to natural rights, social contract theory or bare consequentialism) 
are at pains to maintain the jurisdiction of the moral over the political. Benhabib, for 
example, does much to overcome the problem of exclusion in moral universalism by 
insisting that moral equality be maintained through inclusion in the communicative 
processes that determine moral principles, and to expand the political processes that 
produce the law.5 Both Benhabib and Linklater imagine a world in which the state is 
not discarded but in which the power of its borders to create exclusions and justify 
violence is reduced. Their common cosmopolitan vision is of increasing the number 
and effectiveness of institutions that support democratic inclusions, and human rights 
play a key role in this vision. Human rights protect individuals from harm while also 
ensuring participation in decision-making processes, echoing the role the principles of 
discourse ethics play in protecting moral equality, and in so doing they separate the 
moral from the political and ensure that any contestation of moral principles is limited 
to ensure legitimacy. For this reason, human rights, if they are to be defended, provide 
the necessary foundation for an expanded political community of cosmopolitan 
scope.6 
 
     Yet the cost of this solution is the separation of rights-holders, as universal 
citizens, from any actual place or community in which politics can be conducted.7 The 
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moral universalism in this cosmopolitan orientation, separated from any particular 
political reality, opens the door to questionable uses of power to defend human rights 
with coercive intervention as moral sentiment is invoked to justify violence and 
coercion, but too often with insufficient appreciation of the way in which political 
interests exploit such moral appeals. Because legitimate forms of political subjectivity 
and community are reduced to generalised universals they are emptied of all but 
formal content. While the formalism of moral principles may support the beautiful 
revolutionary dreams of well-intentioned philosophers, they are more problematic in 
practice,8 as cosmopolitan moralism is prone to being made politically meaningful by 
the designs of powerful actors able to assume a mantle of un-contestable moralism for 
politicised ends.  
 
     We see this same dynamic in the limited political imagination opened up by this 
approach. First, when individuals enter into an ideal discourse the presumed moral 
perspective is essentially a modern rational and secular individual, who is able to 
dictate the terms of consensus – to demand the adaptation of difference to “mutual” 
terms. But because the moral perspective is empty at the same time that all actual 
moral questions involve real people, the demand for consensus as the sole source of 
legitimation becomes a demand for conformity with a particular vision of the good of 
social life embodied in the equal autonomous individual, which Robbie Shilliam 
convincingly examines in terms of the moral demand that everyone become modern, 
European, and individual.9 Further, the political order that results from this 
cosmopolitan dream looks surprisingly an expanded internationalism that would seem 
to require only a partial revision to our current politics. One would be forgiven for a 
cynical tone when asking, “does cosmopolitan democracy amount to anything more 
than expanded voting rights within the European Union?”10 Are we so sure of the 
legitimacy of liberal democratic nation-states that the best solution to global problems 
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is expanding it regionally and globally? It would seem that the presumptions of 
dominant political actors are simply carried over to the question of what a moral 
world politics requires.11 This is a fatal problem for critical theorists on their own 
terms, as the project is to offer some ground beyond the particular for the evaluation 
of social life. Their defence of human rights requires this if they are to amount to any 
more than the historical ethical values that one finds in the development of western 
liberal powers.  
 
     This suggests that the problem is with the question asked – as defenders of human 
rights play into the hands of their critics in articulating the requirements of a theory of 
human rights in terms of an undeniable universal justification that results in regulative 
principles of political legitimacy. It presumes that truth is inherently moral, or that 
morality is inherently true in a special sense. This is a fundamental point of difference 
with the pluralist and pragmatic approach offered here – the truth of our moral values 
is not only multiple, but contingent. This plurality and contingency is not the result of 
some essential collective identity or moral tradition which ensnares us in various 
relativist traps, nor an individualistic scepticism that ends in solipsism – rather it is the 
result of understanding moral values as inherently human and social creations that 
express ways of living, rules for action and attitudes towards others that are always 
developing. It insists on inverting the question of how we justify a universal moral 
principle from a particular source. Instead, the question is how does a universal moral 
principle assist us in responding to particular situations. The universal is only a 
socialised generalisation with no more secret power or deeper truth than its 
conventional place in social action as a guide to future action and its ability to 
withstand constant questioning in the process of applying moral intelligence. Moral 
principles, including universal claims, are tools for social action – or in some cases 
weapons wielded in battles for social change – they must prove their worth and should 
be subjected to ongoing reconstruction. 
 
     This is a vital distinction – the defences of human rights I have criticised in this 
work seek to articulate a universal that can constrain diversity. The disagreement 
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(nearly all the action in fact) is about how to make the universal more inclusive, more 
rational, more consensual – more complete. This discussion misses the real problem, 
which is that ethical life is plural. The situations we face, when we have to act and in 
acting affirm some valued end, do not admit of single solutions – each decision closes 
off another possibility and every assertion of a universal is the generalised expression 
of a partial desire – if not an enforceable political power. The act of valuation cannot 
be granted a final certainty or an exclusive warrant.  
 
     The problems of diversity and pluralism are importantly different and there is 
perhaps no more common mistake in contemporary reflection on human rights than to 
confuse these issues. Diversity of opinion is a problem of understanding; it presents us 
with the difficulty of understanding unfamiliar values, customs and reasons. The 
failure of such understanding is exemplified in missionary’s desire to save the savage 
through conversion to, and revelation of, moral truth. The problem of pluralism 
presents itself where we have understanding because it is the problem of differing 
valuations, a problem of judgment, exemplified in the situation in which I value 
justice while you value mercy. Even as each understands why the other values what 
they do, our commitments are simply different. The danger of the quest for certainty 
exists for both diversity and pluralism, but they are distinct. An insistence that one’s 
understanding is certain and true, and that those who think or believe differently are 
dangerous or evil or irrational, threatens the humanity of those one does not 
understand. We see this happen when difference is rendered as threatening or wholly 
alien otherness, which in turn licenses many forms of exclusion and violence. The 
insistence that ones valuations are singular and certain, however, is a failure of 
judgment, which threatens to eliminate politics by either insisting that ones valuation 
is synonymous with the true, right and good – therefore accepting no contestation – or 
declaring all valuations to be irrational, which reduces politics to conflicts based on 
the exertion of greater force. Pluralism, understood as accepting that we can value 
different things without either of us being wrong or deluded or evil, is a necessary 
requirement for a properly political ethics, where ethical questions involve more than 
the coordination of self-interest or the determination and application of moral 
principles. Political ethics, in this pluralist mode, requires judgment, compromise and 
commitment.  
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     The subject and community of human rights, conventionally rendered as universal, 
rational and progressive, must be acknowledged as plural, diverse and contingent if 
one accepts the alternative ethics developed here. This involves not just an intellectual 
ban on explicit progressivism that guarantees a better future state; such utopianism 
has been out of fashion for some time. It also involves more than the suspicion that 
rational consensus may only be an ideal; numerous thinkers accept that diversity, 
tragically, makes such a final consensus impossible. Finally, it involves more than 
rejecting the outdated idea of a universal individual, long seen by many to be at most 
a conceit providing an idealised moral perspective able to assist in the regulation of 
unruly human diversity. The ideals that underpin human rights were long ago placed 
under suspicion, and the theoretical contortions of its defenders show the suspect 
squirming under the pressure of ongoing interrogation. As Connolly reminds us, the 
distinctive feature of late-modern thought is our inability to tolerate either the problem 
or solution at hand.12 The desire for certainty is not easily overcome, but if the work 
presented here amounts to anything, I most hope it goes some way to showing what it 
means to work towards a more ethical world politics without recourse to final 
principles to guide us.  
 
     Embracing an alternative political ethics as part of a reconstructed account of 
human rights requires rethinking the political spaces in which we know human rights. 
It leads us to express harsh critiques of seemingly unobjectionable political projects. 
One would be forgiven for asking, “what value are these ideas if they undermine the 
universal protections offered by human rights against torture and imprisonment, to 
political participation and welfare provision, and which limit the actions of states in 
the conduct of their wars?” But this is simply the wrong question, not least because no 
intellectual argument has the power to completely undo these developments, to 
disabuse us completely of these ideals or fatally compromise these institutions. 
Undermining the certainty of human rights and insisting that we acknowledge the 
political element of our commitments does not eliminate our capacity for empathy or 
pull down the edifices of the human rights regime, and certainly not in a single go – 
taking a critical orientation towards human rights requires respecting the depth of our 
habitual and customary attachment to those ideas and institutions. More importantly, 
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it is also the wrong question because it presumes that achieved ends, such as the 
tragically partial ban on torture or the still contested right to clean water, are achieved 
within a universal ethics progressively realising the end of greater freedom. The 
reasons we may have for supporting these ends are neither singular nor fully 
compatible, and their achievement is anything but certain and inevitable, despite the 
stories we may tell ourselves after the fact. This is important because it reveals the 
struggles and contestations that have gone into creating human rights, and it also 
highlights the central importance of creativity, as well as constraint, in the function of 
political ethics, as a worthy ethics should lead us to create values and institutions, not 
simply act as linesmen in already ongoing game. This is why the task of the rest of 
this chapter is to illustrate how the wider political world of human rights appears 
differently from the perspective I defend, and to argue for what I think should be 
maintained and what opposed in the use of human rights as a political ethic for world 
politics in our contemporary times. 
 
II. The Practices of Human Rights and the Democratising Ideal 
 
In the previous chapters I have been building up an important claim: that we cannot 
fully understand human rights as a social phenomenon if we assume that the effect 
they have in world politics is either positive or negative. The tendency to see human 
rights in this way is deeply intertwined with dominant approaches to moral theory that 
inform the study of human rights. For proponents, moral principles reflect necessary 
commitments to the right way of ordering human life. While for critics, the way in 
which the moral principles that justify human rights are articulated is necessarily 
compromised, rendered partial, political and oppressive to otherness. At the heart of 
my claim that we must attend to the consequences and practices of human rights is an 
insistence that framing political ethics in this way is a hopeless pursuit. Ethical 
choices, guided by principles and leading to action in pursuit of the good, are never 
certain; they can never be drained of all their particular content or of their political 
implications. There is no point in trying to determine a final moral principle, and a 
critique of all ethical action as particular and political renders itself critically 
moribund. Instead of this tired to-and-fro, I have been arguing for a political ethics 
that attends to the particular situations that ethical thought is intended to address, to 
the concrete goods pursued in action and the importance of moral intelligence. 
  251 
Thinking of human rights in this way forces us to consider how human rights are put 
to work in the lives of people across the globe. Only by attending to actual 
consequences and practices could we possibly know if human rights represent a 
global consensus or no more than a neo-liberal project of domination, neither of 
which turns out to be a very convincing diagnosis.  
 
     I have raised an essentially empirical question, and one I can only respond to in 
broad strokes, but this is a necessity for addressing the further question of whether 
human rights should be defended. Yet, an unavoidable circularity will quickly appear 
to the attentive reader. A critic could rightly claim that my empirical account of the 
consequences and practices of human rights is framed by the commitment to a radical 
and agonistic understanding of democracy that I have defended, thus making my 
appeal to empirical consequences suspect and any argument in favour of human rights 
unsatisfactorily circular. This is an important criticism and a fair one, up to a point. I 
certainly do take the virtues of agonistic respect and critical responsiveness, which I 
see as central to the radically democratic ethos I have been arguing for, as background 
to my investigation of human rights. I am, in a direct sense, looking for evidence that 
human rights have and can continue to support such a political ethics. But human 
rights are not a piece of objective reality that one examines dispassionately. They are 
a set of values, practices and institutions that can be taken together as a social 
phenomenon, but one that is altered by our reflections and evaluations. Further, our 
own character as members of various political communities and participants in world 
politics is implicated in such evaluations.13 To say, “human rights do X”, is 
necessarily a massive simplification. A more accurate account would be, “X is the 
result of some combination of social forces, identified as human rights, at work in 
particular circumstance.” All of that is fine for the social analyst interested in isolating 
such phenomena. For the project at hand, however, I am engaged in an evaluation of 
human rights in its fuller sense, and my critique of the underlying political ethics that 
justify human rights for most contemporary thinkers leads to the question, “can 
human rights be justified by and also support a different political ethics?” This is the 
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question I consider in this section, which in turn leads to an evaluation of human 
rights’ potential contribution to such an ethics – those that remain unconvinced by my 
critique of the morality of certainty or the democratising I endorse must revisit those 
chapters or simply humour me though the final stage of analysis.  
 
     The above, however, should not be taken as a contradiction of the commitments to 
pluralism and corrigibility made in previous chapters. My argument for a radical 
democratic ethos is not intended to be final or absolute, I not only acknowledge that 
other political ethos can and do command the allegiance of others, but also insist that 
my own ethos is susceptible to revision, and possibly rejection, in light of the 
consequences and experiences it enables. There are at least three levels at which the 
reader might evaluate the work at hand: first, as a pragmatist-pluralist approach to 
political theory; second, as a radical democratic political ethos; and third, as a critical 
reconstruction and qualified defence of human rights – while these tasks are 
connected, rejecting or accepting any one argument does not necessarily entail the 
same for the others. Which is to say, one could accept my approach but reject my 
political ethos or evaluation of human rights, or one could accept either of those 
commitments but reject my theoretical starting point.  
 
     When we look to the scholarly literature on human rights, particularly in the fields 
of political theory and international relations, to find out something about their effects 
a familiar and comforting picture appears. Numerous theorists tell us that human 
rights offer vital protections, ensuring the well being or protecting the dignity of the 
abused and oppressed in the world. Yet, in most human rights studies these people do 
not appear. Instead, we learn how well states comply with the various human rights 
treaties they have signed,14 or about the progress of international institutions and 
courts in ensuring rights protection by forming committees, writing reports or, less 
often, rendering judicial decisions.15 And all of this is useful, so far as it goes, but the 
problem is that it does not go very far. Even when scholarly work focuses on the 
struggle for rights in particular contexts, an account of the battles whereby dictators 
are deposed or regimes of impunity are ended, little attention is paid to what those 
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involved thought about their own struggle for human rights.16 What one does not hear 
is how people struggling for rights understand their own rights claims, do they use the 
language of rights for principled or strategic reasons, whether their struggles are 
actually easily rendered compatible with the institutionalised international norms of 
human rights law, or whether they present more challenging claims.17  
 
     While there are undoubtedly practical reasons why such detailed social analysis is 
absent, the difficulties of translation and prolonged observations are inadequate 
explanations. More fundamentally, there is a hierarchy of analysis that coalesces with 
conventional moral justifications of human rights – powerful and privileged actors 
impose universal standards upon weaker and marginalised ones. This hierarchy is 
built into international human rights law. Privileged international institutions and 
powerful states declare and enumerate human rights, which are expected to bind those 
states that sign up to them. States that are parties to human rights treaties are 
empowered as legitimate authorities by securing the human rights of their subjects. 
The individual as rights-holder may be at the centre of the idea of rights but she is 
hardly at the centre of international human rights politics. Individuals may be victims 
or perpetrators of abuse, they may be agents of law or disorder, but there is little space 
for them as political actors engaged in the work of forming human rights ideals and 
using those rights to alter their social conditions. 
 
     This is a familiar image of human rights politics because it conforms to the image 
of human rights seen from both critical and supportive perspectives. Even where 
Benhabib, for example, gives space for democratic iterations through which human 
rights standards are contextualised to the local situation, this contextualisation is 
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limited and guided by a more binding universal standard, to which democratic 
iterations may add their particular accents – but the language or grammar of rights is 
set before democratic politics begins.18 Similarly, work on transnational activists 
networks suggest a feedback-loop of support between global and local actors that 
motivates human rights reforms, but the interactions between levels are limited and 
partial. Local groups carry grievances to the international level and bring back human 
rights standards from the international to be imposed upon state authorities.19 Yet, this 
image of human rights is not the complete picture and there is an increasing amount 
of work that reveals the degree to which human rights are taken up and reconstructed 
by people facing specific political threats and problems. This work upsets the 
hierarchy of human rights politics and questions the idea that moral principles and law 
are transferred from the international to the local level.  
 
     A number of critical historians, anthropologists and sociologists have contributed 
to developing a wider account of human rights politics, with much of that work based 
in feminist and post-colonial perspectives. These scholars share a focus on analysing 
the use of human rights in particular social struggles and on attending to the way 
those involved in those struggles use rights. While this work has been ongoing in 
various disciplines, surprisingly little of it has influenced normative theorising on 
human rights. This is true, at least in part, because both supporters and critics of 
human rights actually lack the conceptual space to full acknowledge the value of such 
work. Brooke Ackerly, one of the few scholars to engage with both normative 
political theory and detailed analysis of the practices of human rights, presciently 
notes that attending to the details of how human rights are used and what those 
involved in social struggles mean when they deploy the idea of human rights requires 
rethinking one’s approach to normative theory.20 While I share sympathy with 
Ackerly’s project in trying to rethink ethical theory so that space is made for the 
experience of the people engaged in human rights politics, the terms in which I do so 
are different.21 Similarly, but coming from the field of anthropology, Mark Goodale 
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notes the split that persists between anthropology’s detailed study of the social world 
and a version of political theory beginning with abstract first principles. 
 
This dichotomy is of course a false one. There is no reason why 
anthropologists or others interested in making sense of 
contemporary social practice in a way that resonates beyond the 
mere case study, the mere collection of disconnected human 
exotica, should be forced to either observe and faithfully record or 
drown in a sea of theoretical foundationalism.22 
 
Unintentionally echoing Dewey in noting the falseness and limitation of such a 
dichotomy, Goodale develops an anthropological approach to human rights based on 
insights generated by the ethnographical study of human rights practice, which in turn 
seemed to require its own political theory. My own argument can be seen as coming 
from the other direction, developing an account of normative theory of rights that 
requires specific and sustained empirical analyses of rights practice.  
 
     Without suggesting that political theorists need to change disciplines, or that we 
need historians, sociologists and anthropologists to do political philosophy on the 
side, I do want to argue that these interdisciplinary connections can be developed by 
attending to human rights as a political practice and that doing so opens up promising 
new modes of ethical inquiry. Human rights politics take place in a wider variety of 
social spaces than is conventionally acknowledged. The use of human rights by 
activists and participants in social movements are as important as the pronouncement 
of national leaders and international lawyers, and the informal political discussions 
that lead to popular protests are as significant as a political act as a new indictment at 
the ICC. Along with diversifying the spaces and multiplying the practices that 
constitute human rights, engaging in an analysis of how human rights are used also 
allows us to see beyond the hierarchical transmission of human rights from privileged 
actors to the oppressed, from “philosophers” to the “masses,” and renders the 
transmission of human rights ideas far more ambiguous than conventional feedback 
loop from “global” to “local” would suggest, as “local” human rights movements 
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influence diverse and dislocated “locals”, and human rights ideas developed in the 
“South” or among the “oppressed” influence international norms. Not only have 
international and local political spaces been pluralised, but also the inherent hierarchy 
of the global-local account is upset and challenged by remapping the political spaces 
of human rights.  
 
     By now it is a common place among critics of human rights that the spread of 
human rights norms and institutions imposes a particular political subjectivity (sold as 
a universal account of the individual rights holder) and presumes that a liberal 
organisation of the social world is unambiguously beneficial.23 This makes two 
presumptions that are contestable. First, it assumes that this imposition is actually 
happening and is successful. Second, it assumes that this liberal ideology, imposed as 
a cohesive whole, is not valuable to those upon whom it is imposed. This uncritical 
critique finds as little need to engage with the practices of human rights as the 
uncritical defence does.  
 
     Attending to the details undermines both presumptions. First, it is not clear that the 
imposition of human rights is intentional and fully successful in the manner that the 
critique suggests. Human rights language and appeals to international standards do not 
only originate from international sources, as those suffering social oppression and 
exclusion often make human rights for themselves. This does not imply that there is 
no connection between international standards and particular political struggles or that 
the power imbalances in world politics do not colour human rights practices. The 
Brazilian Landless Peasants Movement (MST), for example, uses human in both a 
principled and a strategic way: first, it monitors and reports on human rights abuses 
committed by corporations that oppose their direct actions and makes appeal to 
national and international human rights bodies; and second, the group articulates its 
own conception of a human right to land in terms of the socially beneficial use to 
which peasants put the land, rather than based on a right to private property. Not only 
do human rights serve as a way to seek protection and redress, but they are also 
deployed in innovative ways that challenge conventional accounts of rights.24  
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     The idea of imposition, however, suggests an evangelical zeal that is certainly 
present in international human rights politics, but is hardly definitive. For example, 
Lauren Leve traces the complex interaction between human rights norms and 
Buddhist spiritual beliefs, noting that Buddhists in Nepal take up the language of 
rights and advocate for secular institutions in order to protect their religious belief 
within society. This occurs despite the ontological conflict between these very 
different notions of the self, where the liberal rights-holders contrasts with the selfless 
centre of perception in Buddhism.25 Yet where Leve seems to suggest that the secular 
liberalism of human rights places a burden upon Buddhists, forced to exist with a sort 
of dualist sense of self, this presumes that the ideology of human rights is a coherent 
whole and that Buddhists deployments of human rights are not also critical 
reconstructions of the liberal model of rights. Leve is certainly right to point to a 
tension in Buddhist deployment of human rights in Nepal, but exposing a tension is 
not the same as identifying an always-present imposition. This points to the 
distinctive value of a pluralist and pragmatic line of critical engagement, as seeing 
human rights as a contested ideal and plural practice both complicates our analysis 
and requires our judgments on the value of human rights to take account of the 
consequences of human rights in practice. 
 
     It is hardly clear that human rights, even if limited to “liberal” notions of rights, 
present as a comprehensive ideology that is resistant to change and lacking in internal 
ambiguity. Neil Stammers, for example, in his historical and sociological study of 
human rights highlights the internal ambiguities of the western rights tradition, noting 
the conflict between accounts of rights that begin with the idea of the possessive-self 
and those that begin from the social dependent-self – a contrast he traces back as far 
as the English revolution.26 Similarly, Lynn Hunt’s history of rights emphasises the 
importance of literature in developing sensitivity to the pain and suffering of others, 
suggesting that the human rights self is a sympathetic-self, not merely a possessive-
self.27 In both cases, the authors are careful to note that human rights ideas are not 
static, and that such contrasting ways of thinking about rights are prone to being 
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overwhelmed by powerful ideologies as well as the cynical manipulation of powerful 
political actors. What it preserves, however, is the politics of human rights, which is 
often denied by supporters and critics alike, who tend to turn human rights into an all 
or nothing proposition.  
 
     The work of Sally Engle Merry, who looks at the use of human rights to combat 
violence against women, looks at the various spaces in which human rights politics 
take place.28 Moving from the conference rooms where human rights treaties are 
drafted and violations reported, she traces the points of transmission between agents 
of international institutions and global civil society, who then transmit human rights 
ideas and practices to individuals and groups engaged in social struggles. Unlike 
constructivist work on human rights, however, Merry’s focus is on the way human 
rights norms are transmitted between these social spaces. She describes this process as 
‘vernacularization’ and in this process people make the ideas and practices of human 
rights work for themselves, and, perhaps more importantly, reconstruct the meaning 
of human rights.29 This not only mars the clean lines of the human rights feedback-
loop, it also raises the question of what happens if human rights norms and 
institutions are being formulated by the receivers of human rights norms, but it also 
reveals further lines of diffusion. Global civil society activists do not dutifully carry 
norms from the international to the local, they transmit human rights practice 
horizontally and the ideas they transmit are often innovated by individuals and groups 
normally perceived as receivers of human rights. Merry acknowledges the power of 
dominant global actors, able to dominate the international political space, but 
maintains some hope that international human rights can provide important space for 
a critical and ethical form of politics, functioning in a in a ‘genuinely emancipatory 
way’30 – but this is a rather fragile hope. This results partly from her focus on the 
legal aspects of international human rights, which she notes are often distant from the 
experience of women who lack understanding of international human rights norms 
and make their claims for social change in multiple vernaculars.31 While I do not want 
to suggest that all social movements make human rights claims, expanding our 
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understanding of human rights beyond claims that appeal to international legal norms 
allows us to appreciate the way human rights, as ethical claims that reconstruct 
political identities and orders, have a wider significance in social movements. 
 
     Goodale focuses on oppositional social movements in Bolivia, which oppose the 
transmission of neo-liberal human rights through various instruments of international 
law in addition to more direct political opposition.32 Recognising that the inability of 
marginalised people to reconstruct established institutions and official discourses on 
their own, he analyses the way social movements deploy their own understanding of 
human rights outside of established international practice. He characterises these 
forms of human rights politics as indigenous cosmopolitanism,33 which itself 
challenges the notion that the international realm is exclusively dominated by liberal 
cosmopolitanism and international human rights standards articulated by powerful 
actors.  
 
Rather, what indigenous cosmopolitanism in Bolivia demonstrates is 
that a cosmos, projected as a new and more expansive framework of 
essential inclusion, can be both translocal and transnational and 
nonglobal and nonuniversal at the same time. So, even though 
indigenous Bolivians project a new cosmos as a way of breaking free 
from, or resisting, all of the expected historical and cultural categories 
within Bolivia, they do not, in the process, envision a world in which 
they are essentially the same in rights and obligations as everyone else 
indigenous or not.34  
 
The analysis and revelation of plural human rights politics at the global level is 
another important opening provided by attending to the details of rights practice. A 
further example comes from Stephen Hopgood’s analysis of human rights as a 
spiritual belief supporting a secularised universal morality, which he contrasts with re-
emerging religious universalisms. This account of human rights as a secular religious 
faith destabilises the idea that there is a singular rationalist account of liberal human 
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rights.35 Finally, Rahul Rao traces out a cosmopolitan perspective based on anti-
colonial resistance and protest, which is not an account of human rights, but provides 
yet another global political context in which human rights emerge as a plural and 
contested project.36 By complicating the picture we have of human rights practice we 
end up with a more ambiguous field, but we also establish a much better starting point 
for evaluating the consequences and prospects of human rights. 
 
     While there is clearly much greater potential for reconstructing human rights than 
some critics admit, it is worth making clear that there are limits imposed by 
approaching a global political ethic through human rights. These limits are both 
historical and structural. First, human rights discourse is deeply embedded in a 
western tradition of thinking that has served as a justification for an oppressive 
international politics. The moral superiority inherent in universal discourses of 
Christian conversion and progressive emancipation served as an apologia for a violent 
and exclusionary politics that dehumanised and degraded an uncounted number of 
human beings.37 While human rights have an ambiguous relationship with past 
colonial and imperial policies, we must acknowledge their historic complicity in such 
politics and their potential to underwrite neo-imperialist politics – especially for 
conceptions of human rights based in absolutist universal values. Second, the 
institutionalisation of human rights presents an always present danger that the rights 
relationship will become one in which rights are granted by the powerful to the weak, 
that the contestation of rights claims disappears as rights are incorporated into the 
structures of established political power. 
 
     These two weaknesses encompass the most serious objections to rights and the 
limits they place upon our political imagination. While I have defended a notion of 
rights as basic claims made upon the organisation of social life, this is not the only 
way such claims can be articulated. Historically, rights have tended to assign 
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individual civil and political protection to liberal legal subjects, who make claims 
upon constitutional government, a social relationship modelled on capitalist forms of 
economic contract. While it is certainly possible for rights to be established for 
different political subjects and to be held within a political community not reducible 
to a corporate charter, there are limits. Subjects, whether individual or collective, 
make rights claims upon an identifiable political community, claims that must be 
generalised. This does not suggest there cannot be special rights, but that rights must 
be generalisations and not an infinite list of exceptions. This structure entails that any 
rights based political order and ethics will give special significance to separation and 
abstraction – rights holders are made into individuals, whether as single human beings 
or groups, who can object to and contest social norms and institutions. Further, the 
rights-holder’s status within the political order is abstract, meaning that it will always 
fit imperfectly with the actual experience of political subjects. There are legitimate 
reasons to object to this way of organising political life, but before we reject a rights 
framework we would do well to acknowledge the positive consequences of such an 
arrangement. 
 
     First, the generation of social space between political subjects preserves the 
independence and liberty necessary for dissent, opposition and contestation. 
Recognising this does not require an exclusive commitment to formal legal freedom 
and is compatible with insisting that political subjects isolated and disempowered 
have little reason to value the freedom granted to rights-holders. Second, the abstract 
relations created by a rights framework provide protections as well as limitations; an 
appeal to abstract and formalised laws can do much to preserve individuals and 
groups persecuted within society. This does, however, illustrate the importance of a 
contingent order of rights that is open to change, as the conditions of rights holders 
may change in a way that demands new recognitions, in which case an order of 
absolute rights becomes a cage. Further, it highlights the importance of an underlying 
ethos to rights claims, always contestable and perhaps partial, but offering a clear 
account of the ideal good that our rightful relationships should support. 
 
     Beyond the limits of thinking in terms of rights, it is necessary to consider the 
limitations of humanity as a political category. Whether assigning rights and duties to 
the individual human being, or speaking of the responsibilities and powers of a human 
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community, there is an ambiguous and at times threatening notion at work. 
Historically, powerful social actors have used the idea of humanity to generalise and 
impose their experience on others, in turn justifying exclusion and violence. Yet, it 
has also been used as a demand for recognition, for a status within the social world 
that cannot be denied. What we need to be conscious of is that appeals to humanity 
are neither natural nor uncontroversial. Realising the potential of humanity as a 
political category requires that we pay attention to the role it plays in enabling 
recognition for those lacking other status or encumbered with a degraded and 
marginalised social identity, but also understanding humanity as plural and diverse. 
To return to the distinction between plurality and diversity, this way of thinking about 
humanity implies that we need to understand diversity, to behave as if we can 
understand each other through our differences; the pluralism of humanity, 
alternatively, requires that we acknowledge and respect that people will hold different 
values, which are not irrational or evil, and that our political relations reflect an 
agonistic respect. 
 
     The lingering worries that we may have about embracing human rights as a 
political ethics – and I would not want to downplay the serious reasons we have for 
such hesitance – can be allayed to some degree by attending to the way human rights, 
and other forms of universal right, have been established. There have been a number 
of recent studies that connect human rights to political movements contesting the 
basic terms of the social order; recovering this radical history of rights is vital to 
properly evaluating their further potential. The key distinction that emerges from 
these studies is what Stammers terms ‘power to’ versus ‘power over’38 – Upendra 
Baxi makes a similar distinction between a ‘politics of human rights’ and a ‘politics 
for human rights’39 – which points to the importance of the moment of transition 
when a right changes from a new and disruptive political demand to an accepted part 
of the social order. Sociological work on rights vitally highlights the danger of 
success for any rights claim. Both Stammers40 and Siba Grovogui41 note that the 
Haitian revolution did not lead to a wider recognition of the humanity or rights of the 
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enslaved, despite their political victory, which reminds us that there is always the 
potential for rights to become regressive and for appeals to humanity to go 
unacknowledged,42 in this case the Haitian slave’s rights were not embraced as 
legitimate rights of man till decades later. Similarly, Lynn Hunt notes the way rights 
claims were made by women, former slaves, religious minorities and other 
marginalised groups in the lead up and aftermath of major rights revolutions – but 
these claims for inclusion were unsuccessful in most cases.43 Rather than providing an 
unshakeable confidence in the progressive realisation of a comprehensive human 
rights ideal, attention to the historical and sociological detail of how rights have 
emerged reveals the contingency of rights movements. More promising, however, is 
that this analysis of how rights were established suggests that the human rights 
tradition is wider and more diverse than the neo-liberal re-articulation of liberal rights 
witnessed since the end of the Cold War. 
 
     In response to the concern for the limits of humanity as a political category, we 
also find evidence of an ongoing politics of humanity. This can be seen in historical 
examples where recognition of shared humanity provoked recognition of the 
oppressed – women, slaves, workers, religious minorities and other oppressed human 
beings have always had allies among the socially privileged that responded to a sense 
that the existing social order was inhumane and intolerable. More importantly the 
abstract category of humanity has provided a way of making claims to recognition. 
Sojourner Truth, an early feminist and anti-slavery activist used the language of 
inclusive rights to great effect: ‘I am above eighty years old; it is about time for me to 
be going. I have been forty years a slave and forty years free, and would be here forty 
years more to have equal rights for all.’44 Keenly aware that she had been denied 
human status as a slave and as an African American and as women, she recognised 
that speaking in terms of a shared humanity was vital to making the political claim for 
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recognition and consideration. Therefore, despite the limitation of a discourse of 
humanity, it is important to acknowledge the gap left by abandoning such a discourse, 
rather than critical reconstructing it.  
 
     My aim in this section has been to argue for another tradition of human rights, one 
that reflects a democratic and pluralist politics, in which the marginalised, excluded 
and disempowered are able to lay claim to social power and reconstruct the political 
orders that have oppressed them. I do not want to claim that this is the authentic 
human rights tradition, not only is the case for a far more conservative and 
exploitative human rights tradition far too easy to make, to make a claim to some final 
authentic account would undermine my entire argument. What I have tried to make 
clear is that human rights are a diverse political practice, defined by the pursuit of a 
variety of ethical values and embodied in contesting political movements. Even 
opposing sides of a political conflict, for example between the neo-liberal state and a 
worker’s movement, can be engaged in a human rights politics. The final defence of 
the potential of rights to contribute to a democratising ethic is taken up now. 
 
III. A Question of Valuation, or, What Human Rights are Good For 
 
There is an obvious objection that could be raised to my argument thus far. By 
suggesting that human rights are an ambiguous moral project that reflects the diverse 
ways that human rights are used politically, it could be suggested that I am pulling the 
rug from underneath the idea of legitimate authority, or undermining the power of 
morality to act as the law that constrain politics. If we accept that there is no 
ultimately authoritative or final set of human rights, and instead suggest what human 
rights are, is in fact, a mode of contestation, this not only undermines the plausibility 
of consensus on objective universal principles, but it subverts the desirability of such 
principles. My response to this is, on one hand, simply to accept the charge and much 
of the previous argument has been about developing a political ethics that does not 
depend upon universal principles in that way. Yet, on the other hand, a further 
response requires that we reconsider the force of such an objection.  
 
     There is an important difference between a theory actually undermining the 
supposed force of existing moral principles and offering a theory that acknowledges 
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the lack of universally binding principles as a condition of ethical and political 
experience. Normative theories often fail to address this difference, instead appealing 
to a general sense of moral confusion brought on by a lack of authoritative principles 
and offering a return to certainty by articulating (or more accurately, re-articulating) 
new authoritative principles.45 This is to be expected; if one of the presumptions of 
ethical theory is that is has the ability to provide certainty, failing to do so would then 
be a symptom of the supposedly anomalous and threatening modern condition of 
moral confusion (of diversity and doubt) that undermines the power of morality or the 
authority of the law. The theory of human rights I defend begins from the reality of 
contestation, disagreement and plural sources of moral authority, and there is no 
reason to think that this or any other political ethics could transcend those conditions. 
Rather, the purpose of such a theory is to enable us to respond to the world of our 
experiences, to critically evaluate it and to act more purposefully, more intelligently 
and more ethically. Whether one recognises the condition of uncertainty and plurality 
as positive or negative, whether it is seen as deep ontological reality or a more 
transient consequence of modernity will affect the ethics that emerges as a response.  
 
     The agonistic and democratic ethic I have argued for views the plurality we 
encounter in the world in a positive way and it suggests that the contingency of ethical 
life is a basic feature of our experience. Therefore, an agonistic and democratic ethos 
respects deep pluralism by seeking modes of contestation that enable coexistence and 
encourage inclusion in setting the terms of social order, rather than allowing 
contestation to degenerate into violence and exclusion. Evaluating this perspective 
requires that we consider how it enables our response to pressing problematic 
experiences in world politics, as opposed to its ability to justify authoritative 
principles. My own argument may not meet that criteria, and in fact the most 
damaging critique would be that it does not enable better and fuller ethical thinking in 
world politics, but I must insist on being held to the proper standard, not to one 
necessitated by particular presumptions about the reality and efficacy of objective and 
transcendent moral principles. 
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     Human rights are not the cornerstone for some grander political and moral project, 
though they may be co-opted to serve in such endeavours. Abandoning this notion 
allows us to recognise human rights as a particular practice that provides a way of 
organising political life, potentially at all social levels – from locals to globals, as it 
were. I have identified the key element of human rights practice as a responding to the 
need to justify coercive authority, to establish political legitimacy. Along with 
responding to the question of political legitimacy, human rights also enable any 
“human” to contest that legitimacy. Those, I think, are the basics, but obviously the 
way in which that schematic account is filled in is open-ended. I have tried to give 
good reasons why the historical tradition of moral and political universalism that lays 
claim to the mantle of human rights should be greeted with scepticism, but the line of 
thinking that extends from natural rights to liberal cosmopolitan remains influential. 
In particular, what ties this tradition together, allowing it to bear a substantial 
intellectual load, is the way it fills in fundamental elements of human rights practice. 
First, legitimacy is determined by justified moral principles with sufficient certainty to 
draw relatively final and determinate limits around political practice. Second, the 
universalism entailed by the idea of humanity is singular, and while equal capacity is 
assumed, equal possession of full humanity is not. Challenging this tradition is 
difficult not only because it enjoys a cultural prestige in dominant societies, but also 
because it appeals to deep-seated understanding of how ethics and politics fit together 
in social life. For this reason, the position defended here has had to work in several 
registers, linking alternative traditions of ethical theory to alternative strains of 
democratic politics and human rights practices. 
 
     The reconstruction offered here has a tradition of its own, and throughout I have 
linked my defence of human rights to a radical democratic orientation and counter-
hegemonic practices in world politics. Not only do I think this reconstruction is more 
convincing as an approach to ethics, but also defending a radical democratic rights 
tradition makes an important contribution both to how we conceptualise human rights 
in world politics, as well as how we judge and act as participants in world politics. 
While the full exploration of these ideas can only be taken up in future work, I want to 
mention three advantages of thinking of human rights in these terms. First, 
reconstructing human rights as a democratising political ethos reconfigures how we 
understand sovereignty. Rather than human rights defining the responsibilities for 
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legitimate sovereignty (taming the beast) or human rights providing so much 
ideological but insubstantial cover for the exercise of political power unconstrained 
by the demands of legal and moral legitimacy (disguising the beast),46 a 
democratising human rights ethos looks to the contingency of sovereignty as the 
capacity to remake the social world or to hold it in place. Connolly explicitly develops 
a democratising sovereignty, though the idea is implicit in many of the other thinkers 
I draw on, in his analysis of sovereignty as defined by positional and expressive 
elements.47 He suggests that whatever the concentrated power of the positional 
sovereign, enabled by structures of authority, ranging from holding the means for 
physical violence to the authority of the law, expressive sovereignty ultimately rests 
with the political community, in either their acquiescence or their willingness to 
demand (and in some cases carry out) political actions, including changes in the 
institutions of institutional sovereignty.48 This account of sovereignty counters both 
cosmopolitan and statist accounts and opens up the meaning of human rights in 
important ways. 
 
     John Dewey rejects the mythology of sovereignty in a manner similar to Connolly, 
and suggests that the democratic nation-state is a contingent arrangement that is ill 
suited to the problems of contemporary politics, which for him include the difficulty 
of creating democratic community under contemporary conditions49 and the 
increasing power of social forces that escape democratic control.50 In Connolly’s 
terms, the expressive sovereignty of the democratic public has been subverted and 
blocked, while positional sovereignty serves the interests of an elite few at great cost 
to the majority. While a full examination of these issues is impossible here, what it 
highlights is that the effect of human rights claims on state sovereignty is more radical 
than supporters or critics of traditional human rights would allow. Human rights have 
the potential to do more than restrain sovereignty and despite the best efforts of those 
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 Louiza Odysseos, “Human Rights, Liberal Ontogensis and Freedom: Producing a Subject for 
Neoliberalism?” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 38, Number 3 (2010), 747-772. 
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 William E. Connolly, Pluralism, 130-160. 
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 Ibid., 146. 
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 It is noteworthy that so many of the conditions that Dewey identified are still important, and in fact 
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the isolation of individuals in bureaucratic systems, new modes of communication and travel that 
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 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems. 
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with positional authority they are not so easily turned into merely ideological cover 
for sovereign power.51 As was highlighted in Chapter 5, a democratising human rights 
ethics enables new claims to be made upon institutions of sovereignty and to 
reconfigure the democratic community beyond institutionalised boundaries – as the 
human rights claims of undocumented migrants, for example, challenges not only the 
rules for who is included and excluded from political community but also seeks to 
reconstruct the rights and duties owed to those without citizenship-status. Rather than 
seeing such movements as part of a global transformation, however, this 
democratising perspective frames such movements in terms of specific human rights 
publics, contesting particular political arrangements, which are linked together in 
what could be thought of as a human rights assemblage, in which resonances and 
diverse linkages create a recognisable but plural and changing human rights 
sensibility.52  
 
     Second, a democratising account of human rights also helps us to understand and 
justify the extension of political community beyond conventional accounts of national 
community without appealing to the abstract notion of a universal human community. 
A democratising human rights ethic frames the struggle for inclusion by excluded 
groups as the quintessential political contest enabled by appeals to human rights. This 
runs counter to Hannah Arendt’s influential argument that the key failing of human 
rights was that they failed to identify the political community necessary for 
meaningful rights.53 The powerful claim is that human rights failed to matter in the 
moment they were most needed, as victims of the Second World War were rendered 
stateless and subject to brutality and murder, with no responsible party able to protect 
their rights. Where Arendt saw the idea of belonging to a “human” political 
community as essentially meaningless (a critique largely endorsed above in regard to 
cosmopolitan accounts of human rights), a democratising rights tradition sees the 
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 Andrew Schaap, “Political Abandonment and the Abandonment of Politics in Agamben’s Critique of 
Human Rights,” Unpublished Paper (Exeter: The Exeter Research and Institutional Content archive, 
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assertion of humanity as part of the fight for status. As Andrew Schaap suggests, the 
‘subject that claims its human rights emerges in the interval between the identities of 
citizen and human, which are afforded by a socio-legal order.’54 This political account 
of the claim to humanity is possible because the identities of citizenship and humanity 
are not taken to be certain or singular, but instead open to renegotiation. A further 
implication of the view defended here (particularly in Chapters 4 and 5) is that 
actively seeking to democratise political community, through human rights, is a vital 
task for coping with our contemporary condition and expanding democratic control of 
the social forces and practices that impact our lives.  
 
     Finally, thinking of human rights as a democratising ethos has the potential to 
improve on a key area where human rights as a political practice has been less 
successful, in struggles to overcome economic marginalisation and severe inequality. 
Returning to Dewey’s account of rights as defining the privileges and obligation of 
communal relationships, it becomes possible to get around the liberal tendency to 
think of rights as individual claims to some protection or good. Dewey’s democratic 
ethic suggests that the key issue of marginalisation is not met by defending a right to 
have our basic needs met or to be free from intentional economic harms inflicted by 
others – as important as both of those are – but enabling individuals and communities 
to participate in the control and determination of their economic fortunes.55 Rather 
than engaging in seemingly ill-defined debates about whether an individual can claim 
a human right to work, education or health, the question becomes what sort of 
economic relationships and material provisions should obtain between individuals and 
within the community. While this reorientation does not make the struggle to redefine 
economic relationships simple or easy it does clarify the task – no longer is the 
question of economic justice about fairness in the application of the rules, but about 
the whether the relationships that result from economic structures are acceptably 
democratic. A key political question this opens up is the issue of private property; 
normally assumed to be a fundamental right (if not the defining liberal human right) 
as the rights bearer is essentially a property holder, but this is a particular way of 
organising economic relationships that can be reconstructed – for example, in the way 
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MST have claimed that a right to land is based in the productive use that is made of it 
on behalf of the community. 
 
      These brief comments serve to indicate how a pluralist and pragmatist account 
improves our thinking about human rights in world politics, even as the analysis is 
limited in depth. These limitations are in part the practical limitations of space, but 
they also reflect the situated approach necessitated by the position defended here, as 
human rights function in relation to specific problems as opposed to as abstract 
generalities. To consider the effect of human rights on any of these areas of concern – 
sovereign authority, political community or economic provision – would require its 
own study engaged with the particular struggles and contexts in which human rights 
claims were being made in regard to these areas of concern. 
 
     Along with providing a better understanding of how human rights do and can 
function in world politics, this reconstruction of human rights suggests that there is 
value in embracing a democratising ethos that extends agonistic respect in 
approaching political contests and advises that we bring a critical responsiveness to 
our politics, which helps us to interrogate our own privileges and the impositions we 
place upon others. At the heart of this ethos is an orientation that cannot be finally 
justified but which can be stated to make clear its appeal. A democratising human 
rights ethos actively seeks to enable people to make claims on the social conditions 
that affect them. What it does not do, however, is to articulate those claims as 
universals spoken on the behalf of others, rather it seeks to follow Baxi’s advice to 
speak with others in the struggle for political change. Finally, the value of being able 
to make claims outside of privileged status, whether it’s nationalist, religious or some 
other form of privilege, is that it enable an equal democratic politics, which ennobles 
individuals, by working to ensure everyone shares in the vital democratic activity of 
exerting one’s power to remake the world.  
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Conclusion 
The Measure of Reconstruction 
 
‘As far as philosophy is concerned, the first direct and immediate effect of this shift 
from knowing which makes a difference to the knower but none in the world, to 
knowing which is a directed change within the world, is the complete abandonment  
of what we may term the intellectualist fallacy. By this is meant something which 
may also be termed the ubiquity of knowledge as a measure of reality.’ 
-John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty 
 
I. A Measure of the Distance Traveled 
 
A conclusion is not a summary, but a marker, of the completion of a task, of what has 
been accomplished. I will not mark this ending by recounting results and findings, or 
by listing consequences and final evaluations; so far as this is necessary, it is done in 
the previous chapter. What I offer here is a marker by which the measure of this work 
can be taken, measuring it as both a response to the initial question of what human 
can become, and as a point from which to move forward. Taking the measure of this 
work means considering how far the end of preserving the transformative power of 
human rights while undermining their totalising tendency has been advanced. 
 
     At a basic level this has been a work that considers how we think – about human 
rights, about world politics, about ethics – rather than one that tries to determine what 
should be thought about such matters. In this sense, it is a theoretical rather than 
practical work; therefore it may frustrate those readers who desire prescriptions, who 
expect theoretical reflection to produce imperatives. This lack marks a difference in 
approach, distinguishing the kind of reconstructive work undertaken here from more 
clearly normative political theory. There are prescriptive elements in my call to see 
human rights as an agonistic politics concerned with the privileges attached to 
humanity as a political identity and the ongoing contestation over the best form of 
political community. More prescriptive still, I have affirmed a democratising human 
rights politics that enables agonistic respect for those we disagree with but whom we 
can still support and find common cause with, while also calling on us to be sensitive 
to the claims of those who are excluded, marginalised and abused. Further, this 
democratising account of human rights, if one is convinced by it, pushes us to attend 
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to and support the use of human rights to make world politics more inclusive and fully 
democratic – this is importantly a call for direct and participatory forms of 
democracy, which exceed the limitations of the nation state but do not aspire to a 
global expansion of systems of representative governance.  
 
     While the principled reason for avoiding authoritative prescriptions helps to 
distinguish the approach I have taken throughout this work, the lack of clear 
evaluations and firmer judgments requires a further response. Even within the terms 
of the approach to ethics I have defended, this work lacks judgments, specific 
evaluations of what human rights do and do not mean, and clear visions of what world 
politics should and should not be – tasks which I have suggested should be possible, 
and in fact enabled by the perspective offered here, so the absence of more concrete 
judgments needs to be acknowledged and explained. The simple explanation is that 
the work carried out here is prior to these more concrete tasks; it is a difference in the 
end of inquiry. Here I have set out to reconstruct human rights as an ethical ideal and 
while this has important applications for the institutions and practices that instantiate 
those ideals, the primary work here is conceptual – it is the work necessary for 
applying a reconstructed account of human rights in more specific critical inquiries. 
One could object that this approach is overtly (and overly) idealist, which would be 
true if this work were thought to be complete unto itself – it is not. And this is for me 
the most important marker to acknowledge when taking the measure of my work: will 
it enable further insight into world politics, and will it support the work of identifying, 
analysing and responding ethically to problematic situations. These are speculative 
questions and therefore the full measure of the work done here can only be made 
when there are further consequences to look to, no matter how comprehensive or 
convincing the theoretical account may (or may not) be. To clarify the contribution 
made in this work, I want to turn to three ways in which my position alters how we 
think about human rights, which in turn suggests further lines of inquiry that can more 
fully measure the value of the account of human rights presented here. 
 
     First, the ethical position I have defended alters the location of our judgments from 
the abstract to the specific. This means that when we consider more immediate and 
concrete questions, we will be able to offer more specific and surer judgments. For 
example, if we are asking should we support the Egyptian protestors in Tahir square 
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attempting to unseat their president,1 or whether intervening to stop the violence in the 
Ivory Coast is wise,2 then clearer judgments and more detailed prescriptions of what 
should be done will be possible. Conventional moral theory suggests that working out 
abstract principles and imperatives will tell us how to think in specific moments when 
judgment is required, while the ethics I defend suggests that our generalisations and 
abstractions come from our past experience of particular moments and the received 
insights of tradition and therefore the abstract is not absolute but contingent, at best a 
shorthand but in any case located far from the moment in which judgment is actually 
required and made.  
 
     Second, along with transposing the location of our most authoritative judgments, 
the political ethics that comes out of this reconstruction undermines and changes the 
status of those judgments. What would it mean to say democratic protests should 
unseat Mubarak, or that an intervention in the Ivory Coast is necessary? Such 
judgments are affirmations of particular ends in view, which must be tested against 
experience; therefore, ethical judgment is always uncertain, it contains an element of 
risk, as there is a danger that our judgments are wrong, either because the end pursued 
proves wanting or we failed to understand the situation adequately. Acknowledging 
the partiality and uncertainty of our ends requires that we constantly attend to the 
fallibility and corrigibility of our judgments. 
 
     Finally, the ethical position defended here opens up the meaning and practice of 
human rights to further critique. While it remains possible endorse elements of 
existing human rights practices and the conventional ideals those rights support, my 
reconstruction raises questions about the political relationships that define 
contemporary human rights practice, which are as often as not unequal and 
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hierarchical, and the sorts of exclusions that define the meaning of rights, for example 
raising doubts about the focus on individual violations and individual rights violators, 
portrayed as evil and exceptional. These points can be clarified by thinking about the 
current situation in Libya.3 The recent resolutions by the UN Security Council, which 
authorised an ICC investigation and an intervention to stop government violence, 
reveal positive aspects of contemporary human rights practice, as there has been an 
effort to halt the violence against rebels and civilians, and to hold the government of 
Libya accountable for the violence perpetrated against its own citizens.4 Yet, even in 
this seemingly positive case attending to the politics of human rights raises important 
problems with the response to events in Libya. First, it reveals the hypocrisy and 
hierarchy that is inherent in the contemporary human rights regime, as the 
international response to rights violations is dependent upon the fickle will of 
powerful states and international actors in determining when and if there will be 
interventions to stop abuses, and whose crimes matter and whose are ignored. Second, 
it points to the limitation of contemporary rights thinking as the focus is exclusively 
on specific figures responsible for rights abuses, Colonel Gaddafi most prominently, 
rather than the wider social context in which violence was made possible. The 
corporations and states that have provided arms to the Libyan government cannot be 
conceived of as rights violators, and this is truer still of those who supported the 
Gaddafi regime despite the widely acknowledged abuses. This is of course an 
extremely limited consideration of a complex case, and what I want to highlight is the 
ways in which attending to the politics of human rights enables a more critical view. 
 
     More fundamentally, the reconstruction of human rights as a democratising ethos 
addressing the ethico-political significance of our shared humanity and the terms of 
legitimate social order opens up bigger questions. For example, the extended 
economic crisis, which has been ongoing since 2008, and its negative consequences 
have not been addressed as a human rights concern. Within the contemporary terms of 
human rights this is not surprising, the suffering that has been caused is not widely 
acknowledged as a human rights abuse given the ambiguity of the right to be 
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defended and the rights violator it must be defended against. Further, there seems to 
be little that can be done to alleviate the widely-acknowledged suffering – especially 
within the orthodox neo-liberal frame of contemporary economic thinking – as the 
negative consequences (both from the crisis and the response to it) are taken to be the 
result of economic forces rather than the activity of culpable moral agents.   
 
     Without engaging in the details of the causes and consequences of the crisis, I do 
want to suggest that it is possible to frame the issue in human rights terms. If the 
economic crisis, and the response to it, is about any one thing, it is the unbalanced 
state of the global economy, in which the interests of the economic elite have been 
explicitly privileged and enabled5 – which has now had disastrous consequences, 
which have affected those least responsible most profoundly. This egregious injustice 
is largely acknowledged, but where are the calls for a more comprehensive and radical 
response? The inability of contemporary human rights to offer a perspective on this 
event is a damning indictment, as it displays an indifference to the global poor who 
lack secure access to food, basic services and prospects for fuller and more dignified 
lives as well as the dissatisfied and suffering working class. How can human rights be 
mobilised to address such a widespread and pressing concern? There are have been 
sporadic invocations of human rights in response to the ever-clearer economic 
injustices perpetuated by the global economy, for example demands for a right to 
housing,6 and demands for economic relationships that serves the masses rather than 
the elite.7 But a more comprehensive response is possible by understanding human 
rights claims in the way I have suggested: first, we can contest the image of humanity 
that constructs human rights on the model of individual property rights, and second, 
we can articulate new social relations as a condition of political legitimacy, such that 
a system that benefits the economic elite at the expense of the majority simply cannot 
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 Supporters of a neo-liberal global economy acknowledge this feature of the economy, the institutions 
of the international economy are intended to enable powerful actors to conduct their business freely – 
the moral case for this position, and its almost always made in moral terms, is that everyone benefits 
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 US based NGO Take Back the Land has responded to the housing crisis in the US by advocating both 
for a human right to housing and extending community control over land, for more see their website: 
http://www.takebacktheland.org.  
7
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be legitimate. Again this is only suggestive, but what I want to emphasise is the 
openings made possible by the reconstruction offered in this work.  
 
     In the end, the value of the work completed is complex and remains uncertain. It 
provides an analysis and critique of human rights as an ideal that is at the centre of 
contemporary world politics, further it provides an alternative ethical and political 
understanding of human rights that works to highlight the transformative and 
inclusive aspects of human rights while exposing the assimilative elements of the 
human rights ideal to ongoing critique, and finally it suggests a new approach to 
thinking about human rights, which I hope enable more critical and creative inquiries 
into human rights and world politics. 
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